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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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☐ Reviewer ________ Date 8/16/82

January 4, 1957

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
UNCLASSIFIED

Letter No. 62

Dear Alex:

I have checked with Bill Godel in General Erskine's office on the status of Col. Ekvall. Bill assures me that there will be no difficulty in extending his present assignment. Apparently the red tape that has vexed us previously will not have to be contended with again. However, Bill warned me that Ekvall is nearing the mandatory retirement age of 60. He wanted to give us due notice so that we would have ample time to make other arrangements. We have checked the Army register and find that Ekvall was born in February, 1898. Hence his compulsory retirement date should be February 28, 1958. That is far enough in the future so that we will not have to worry about the matter for the present. As you know, we now have a modest Foreign Service interpreter training program under the guidance of Howard Sollenberger of the Foreign Service Institute. The first trainee, John Dexter (already a Chinese language Officer) should complete the interpreter training by early next year.

We have received intimations from Dave and Helenka that he is very eager to return to his work in CA and that you might be willing to consider releasing him after the next meeting. Undoubtedly FE would get a much larger over-all return from Dave if he were working full-time for us here in the Department, rather than for brief and infrequent periods at Geneva. This would

Lot 72 D 415

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Prague

UNCLASSIFIED

would seem to be doubly true since the talks have entered a stereotyped phase where there is little for him or any other assistant to contribute. It has occurred to me that we might explore the possibility of bringing Dave back, and detailing Ed Martin to commute between London and Geneva for the meetings, if you are receptive to the idea. Probably it would have to be understood that there would be no more than two meetings a month in this event. We have not discussed the matter with EUR or Embassy, London, and will not do so until we get your reaction. We have ascertained that such an arrangement apparently would be feasible from the FE budgetary standpoint, although Ed's travel expenses, plus the differential pay which Dave would receive when he is back in the Department, would come to a little more than we are now spending. I have to make this letter unclassified, since otherwise there would be a long pouch delay. However, I believe the essentials are spelled out.

We intend to see that you get all the support you feel you need, and if the proposed arrangement would not suit you we want you to say so. It would be clearly understood, of course, that if you do give up Dave, we would reassign him or someone of comparable qualifications for full-time service should the talks take a new turn involving the discussion of other major substantive matters.

Regards and good wishes to you and Pat for all of '57.

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

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Rec'd Jan. 14

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
January 7, 1957.

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Walter:

I have just received your unclassified letter of January 4 and hasten to reply in the same way mailing this by APO channels from Nurenberg when I go through there tomorrow.

It is reassuring to know that if I am still at this in 1958 a substitute is in the mill. You can be sure I most fervently hopeful that the contingency will not arise.

I had told Dave that if by the end of the next meeting it looks as if things are going to continue on the same course I would be willing to tell the Department I was willing to release him to return to the Department, subject, of course, to the arrival of a replacement. I had not thought of Ed Martin from London but am delighted at the prospect and believe that from my standpoint it would be entirely practicable if we continue at our present pace of not more than a meeting each two weeks. This would leave the problem of a secretary which I will discuss with Geneva when I arrive there. With Dave Popper at no. 2 there now I may be able to work out something more satisfactory than previously. I will let you know.

I hope you have lots of news waiting for me at Geneva, so that I know at least as much as the other fellow about what has happened, if anything.

All the best,

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director,
Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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Lot 72 D 415

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Lot 72 D 415

January 14, 1957

SECRET
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Letter No. 63

Dear Alex:

I hope you got my letter No. 62 of January 4, sent to you at Prague. I presume you did since we received no word that you would carry through the travel and leave plan which you were considering when you wrote your letter No. 51 of December 13 (received here December 21).

I am leaving on the 17th to participate in a panel discussion of Communist policy at the Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Air Base, Alabama. I hope we can get our guidance telegram for the January 19 meeting on the wires not later than Wednesday, the 16th. I hope we can have a preliminary meeting today. There will be nothing really new to put in it unless we decide to have you bring up the missing servicemen again. I'm going to recommend that the subject be brought up at this week's meeting. I assume you will have enough time to prepare your presentation, and it needs to be done to satisfy Defense, and to back up many letters to the relatives in which we state that we are continuing to pursue the question actively. It is evident that we are not going to make any headway in the MAC. I agree with the suggestion in your last letter that some blanket inquiry be included which would cover other incidents where military

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

SECRET

personnel have disappeared in the general area of China and adjoining waters.

We do not feel that we have any good explanation for Wang's insistence on not having this week's meeting on January 17. Chou En-lai's current trip to Poland may have something to do with it, although it seems doubtful that Chou's present itinerary had been planned in detail as early as December 13. As you know, extensive changes in Chou's travel plans have been made, or at least announced, since then.

We have sent you what little we have on Nehru's conversations touching on China matters while he was recently in this country. We have no reason to think that anything took place in those talks which would influence our tactics with Wang. I gather that Nehru is not sanguine about the prospects for any immediate favorable action on the prisoners by Peiping.

We are in a rather difficult position in our efforts to hold the line on travel of Americans to Communist China. The unexpected entry of the 3 American newsmen into Communist China has complicated our problem. The present disposition here is to refrain from any sort of legal or administrative sanctions against these three. The "Look" Magazine people have already ordered Stevens and Harrington out and the "Afro-American" publisher has promised to advise Worthy to leave promptly, although Worthy is not actually an employee of the "Afro-American" and may not feel obligated to respect their wishes. Wiggin of the "Washington Post" is making a comprehensive study of the whole subject for the American Society of Newspaper Editors. While he is not entirely unsympathetic to our position his report may make it more difficult to hold the line 100 percent. There is a strong effort to break down our position to the extent of letting in a selected few newsmen. But we do not see how we can discriminate against

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against people in other occupations who have plausible reasons for going in. We intend to continue to use all the moral suasion we can while avoiding tangles with the courts and with public opinion. It seems important to get out a better statement of our reasons for opposing travel to Red China than we have yet done. Such a statement is being worked on now.

Our difficulties have been compounded by the digging up of a 1952 press release (copy enclosed). This release announces that all passports will be stamped not valid for travel to various Communist countries including Communist China but explains that "this procedure in no way forbids American travel to those areas." None of us were here when this press release was issued. Do you recall any background on why it was stated that we would not object to travel in Communist China? That is hard to understand since it was issued at a time when the Korean War was still going on and more than 40 Americans were unjustly imprisoned in Communist China.

Our endeavor to keep the pressure on the Communists to release the American prisoners by refusing passports to mainland China until they are released has been further damaged by the action of the defense lawyer in the Powell sedition case, Abraham Lincoln Wirin. He has given the court a long list of witnesses in Communist China whose testimony he claims is essential to his clients' defense. The judge has issued an order providing that the testimony of these witnesses be taken in the form of depositions before an American consular officer in Hong Kong. However, Wirin avers that in order to get the witnesses to come to Hong Kong he must go personally to Communist China and North Korea to interview the witnesses and others with information relating to the case (including Chou En-lai and Kim Il-sung.) Having been denied a passport valid for travel to Communist China and North

Korea, Wirin appealed to the court and the judge issued an order (copy enclosed) to the effect that he was to go to these two areas as an officer of the court, at government expense, depositing his passport in Hong Kong, and the court would protect him from any criminal or administrative action against him by reason of this travel. L, which has primary responsibility in this situation, has decided not to contest the judge's action and Wirin has announced, according to the press, that he will depart for Hong Kong and Communist China on January 28. Thus, we have another precedent and another breach in the dike.

Regards and good wishes to all of you,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 341 of May 1, 1952.
2. Copy of court order.
3. Two Nehru Briefing Papers:
    (a) Chinese Prisoners in U.S. Penitentiaries.
    (b) Background Paper on Father C.J. McCarthy.
4. Copy of Television Interview - Edward R. Morrow and Chou En-lai

P. S.

It would be useful if you could let us know right away if any breaching of the line at all on travel of Americans in Communist China would compromise your position in your talks with Wang. You will recall that you have mentioned several times to Wang that we could not change our policy while Americans are unjustly held. If you have any important observation on the effect in Geneva of any modification of the policy, it might be well for you to telegraph as well as write.

We are naturally interested in the interview which Worthy is to have with American prisoners in Shanghai today or tomorrow. But we have decided it would be inappropriate for us to transmit any questions for Worthy to put to the prisoners, as we have an opportunity to do. We do not wish to seem to be capitalizing in any way on Worthy's visit when it has been termed contrary to official policy. Furthermore we do not believe any additional information would result from action on our part. The questions which might logically be asked are obvious and will occur to Worthy without any prompting from us.

It now seems as if we may put out a strong statement immediately on our handling of Chinese prisoners and students, in order to correct the harmful misrepresentations which Chou En-lai is making in the course of his current tour.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for January 19 meeting.

1. Express deep disappointment and concern of American people that new year has begun with terms of Agreed Announcement still unfulfilled by Chinese Communists. Many months have passed since last American released. It now appears Chinese Communists taking no repeat no measures permit Americans expeditiously return US as promised in Agreed Announcement but instead compelling each prisoner serve out term of sentence prior release. Such action is flagrant violation of Agreed Announcement and contrary Wang's assurances that prompt action could be expected. It also in sharp contrast to US action regarding Chinese prisoners in US. Only Chinese prisoner choosing go mainland China released after serving only two and one-half years of seven to twenty year sentence. US has extended benefits of Agreed Announcement to all Chinese in US including common criminals in prison such as narcotics offenders and murderers. US even invited Indian Embassy interview all such prisoners. Chinese Communist refusal permit interviews cannot obscure fact US has done more than required by Agreed Announcement regarding Chinese in US, while

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Rev

611.93/1-1557

Drafted by: FE/CA:RNClough:emm 1/15/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Walter S. Robertson

Clearances:
CA - Mr. McConaughy
FE - Mr. Sebald
L - Mr. Phleger (cleared in draft)

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Chinese Communists have failed ~~to~~ carry out their commitment regarding Americans.

2. Renew demand for ~~an~~ accounting by Chinese Communists for missing military personnel. Frame demand in terms broad enough ~~to~~ encompass both personnel missing from Korean War and other US military personnel missing from aircraft lost ~~in~~ vicinity of China. Select from dossiers forwarded ~~to~~ you best-documented cases ~~of~~ missing individuals reliably reported at one time in Chinese Communist hands and present in detail to Wang. (Material sent you McConaughy's letter December 7 all now declassified.) If Wang should refuse ~~to~~ consider subject, refer ~~to~~ statements of Communist side at Panmunjom at 67th Meeting of MAC on November 26, 1956 that personnel QUOTE detained by authorities outside Korea UNQUOTE or QUOTE disposed of UNQUOTE by Chinese Communist regime not repeat not subject ~~to~~ discussion at Panmunjom. Point out this is obvious issue between us, one of great concern to American people, and therefore suitable subject for Geneva talks.

3. Maintain previous position other subjects.

4. Propose next meeting February 7. (FYI Lengthening interval between meetings will serve to emphasize to Communists our dissatisfaction ~~with~~ their attitude in ~~the~~ talks and make less frequent demands on your time.)

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WSR DULLES

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
1/21/57, 9:30 AM SW

Control: 9882
Rec'd: JANUARY 17, 1957
9:44 AM

FROM: GENEVA - CORRECTED PAGE 1

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 705, JANUARY 17, NOON

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of Officer
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FROM JOHNSON

RE TRAVEL COMMUNIST CHINA AS INDICATED MYTEL 67 AUG 16 FROM PRAGUE FELT FACT ISSUE LARGELY TURNED INTO ONE BETWEEN US PRESS AND USG HAD LARGELY DESTROYED NEGOTIATING VALUE POSITION HERE AND BEST COURSE WAS FIND SOME WAY ACQUIESCE AND CAPITALIZE ON SITUATION RATHER THAN HAVE CORRESPONDENTS TRAVEL IN DEFIANCE USG POLICY. AS SOME CORRESPONDENTS HAVE NOW IN FACT TRAVELLED AND FURTHER SUCH TRAVEL MUST BE ANTICIPATED IF CORRESPONDENTS NOW THERE NOT PROSECUTED OR COURTS REFUSE CONVICT, AND AS WIRIN'S TRAVEL WILL PROBABLY GIVE RISE TO QUESTION TRAVEL BY OTHERS SUCH AS FAMILIES PRISONERS WHO MAY WELL CONSIDER SELVES MORE DESERVING, FEEL NEGOTIATING VALUE POSITION THUS FAR TAKEN HERE HAS NOW BEEN DESTROYED.

THIS, AS CHICOMS FEEL SELVES WELL ON WAY ACCOMPLISHING IMMEDIATE PURPOSE THIS FIELD WITH BONUS OF HAVING CREATED ISSUE BETWEEN US PRESS AND USG, IN SPITE OUR POSITION HERE, CONTINUATION THAT POSITION WILL NOT CONSTITUTE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THEM EXPEDITE RELEASE REMAINING AMERICANS.

DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS SUFFICIENT POSSIBILITY MODIFICATION US POSITION WOULD EXPEDITE RELEASES TO JUSTIFY SUCH MODIFICATION SOLELY ON THIS GROUND BUT DO NOT FEEL SUCH MODIFICATION WOULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS AND IN FACT MIGHT HAVE SLIGHTLY FAVORABLE EFFECTS. HOWEVER, SUCH MODIFICATION COULD NOT NOW BE EXPLOITED HERE AND IF SUCH DECISION WERE TAKEN IT COULD PROBABLY BEST BE DONE BY PUBLIC STATEMENT PEGGED TO APPROPRIATE APPEAL FROM SOCIETY NEWSPAPER EDITORS OR OTHER SUCH ACTION.

WHITEN FULLY

p. 2 missing 8/29/58

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-2- 705, JANUARY 17, NOON FROM GENEVA

WHITEN FULLY RECOGNIZES EXTREME DIFFICULTY SUCH MODIFICATION AT THIS TIME FEEL THIS ACTION PREFERABLE TO FURTHER EROSION OUR POSITION BY DEVELOPING EVENTS.

RE INQUIRY MCCONAUGHY JAN 14 LETTER CANNOT RECALL CLEARANCE WITH FE OF PRESS RELEASE 341 MAY 1 1952 AND USE WORD "CHINA" WITHOUT FURTHER CLARIFICATION WOULD APPEAR INDICATE LANGUAGE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FE. HOWEVER, IT POSSIBLE LANGUAGE WAS CLEARED ON BASIS WE WERE AT TIME ALSO DISCOURAGING TRAVEL TAIWAN IN VIEW POSSIBILIT SPREAD KOREAN HOSTILITIES THAT AREA. TAKEN IN CONTEXT AND FROM MY RECOLLECTION PRACTICAL APPLICATION IT SEEMS CLEAR INTENT FIRST SENTENCE SECOND PARA WAS SIMPLY STATE ENDORSEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE INFLEXIBLE BAN ON SUCH TRAVEL WHICH HOWEVER COULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AFTER AUTHORIZATION ACCORDANCE PROCEDURE SECOND SENTENCE SECOND PARA.

GOWEN

SEG

*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1957 JAN 17 PM 3 18
BUREAU OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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FEB 4 1957

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Department of State
Jan 22 1956

UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

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☑ Reviewer ________ Date 8/6/82

January 17, 1956

SECRET

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

Letter No. 52

Dear Walter:

I have just received your letter of January 14 and in accordance with your suggestion have this morning sent off a telegram giving my views on the present situation with respect to travel to Communist China. I well realize that it may not be exactly what you are expecting but I cannot in all honesty say anything else. David and I both feel very much the same on this. I of course base myself primarily on our evident inability to hold the line and to obtain public support or support from the courts.

In my telegram I also answered your query in regard to the press release of May 1, 1952. In this connection we were not at the time preventing travel to Communist China on the grounds of their unjust imprisonment of American citizens but on the more general grounds of the Korean hostilities which made such travel unthinkable. We, of course, had American citizens unjustly imprisoned at the time in other Communist countries and while I recall that that was a factor in restricting Americans traveling to those areas, I do not believe that we have in any case other than China made it the sole factor. As a matter of fact while the Oatis case was a factor in including Czechoslovakia in the ban we never entirely prevented all travel to Czechoslovakia, particularly of newspaper correspondents, and removed the restriction with regard to Czechoslovakia even though we had and still have at least one American unjustly in prison there.

I am surprised that you did not get word of my leaving Prague on January 8. I sent an OM well before Christmas confirming the plans I had mentioned in my previous letter to you. I also sent a telegram on the day I left. I fortunately

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

Lot 72 D 415

received your letter of January 4 just before leaving and sent a reply by open air-mail from Nuernberg on January 8 which you should have received well before your letter of January 14. In that I had said that I was agreeable to Dave and Helenka going back after the next meeting if it looked as if things were simply going to continue to drag along, subject, of course, to obtaining an adequate replacement for Dave. I said that I was delighted at the prospect of having Ed Martin and thought that ~~the~~ his communting here would be entirely practical.

I do not understand your reference to having sent me material on the Nehru conversations as I have received nothing except background papers prepared in FE. Perhaps you have sent something to Prague which I missed.

I have to close this hurriedly in order to make the pouch.

Regards to all

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. ....

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791

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 710, JANUARY 19, 3 PM

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FROM JOHNSON

DESULTORY TWO HOUR FORTY MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH NOTHING NEW EXCEPT MY PRESENTATION MISSING MILITARY PERSONNEL ITEM TO WHICH HE RESPONDED ALONG SAME LINES AS IN 1955

IN PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT WANG REVIEWED COURSE OF TALKS ALONG STANDARD LINES LEADING UP TO REITERATION NEXT MOVE UP TO US. HE STUCK TO THIS POSITION THROUGHOUT GIVE AND TAKE. NO IMPLICATION INTENT THEIR PART BREAK OFF.

WHEN I PROPOSED FEBRUARY 7 FOR NEXT MEETING, HE SUGGESTED FEBRUARY 14 WHICH I ACCEPTED.

IN COURSE IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSION, WANG HANDED ME NAME ADDRESS CHINESE ALLEGEDLY FORCED BY US TO TAIWAN AGAINST WILL: LEE, LI-CHUEN, (CHARACTERS NOT RECEIVED) 45 LUDLOW STREET, APARTMENT 2, NEW YORK 2, N. Y.

GOWEN

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1957 JAN 21 AM 8 22

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2:15 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 712, January 19, 6 p.m.

1-6

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FROM JOHNSON.

Minutes 64th meeting being pouched leaving Geneva January 20.

GOWEN

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1. Wang opened 64th with prepared statement: As talks between us enter third year would not be without purpose if we reviewed at this first session of new year ground talks so far covered. These talks owe origin to Asian African Conference Bandung April 1955, where premier of Wang's country first made proposal negotiations should be started between China America. Ensuing developments led to elevation on August 1, 1955 of Consular level contact to present talks on Ambassadorial level. Agreed agenda of talks included return civilians and other matters at issue between two sides. Attitude held by each side towards two items throughout entire course negotiations showed who been consistently working devotedly for negotiation and resolution problems and who been lacking in sincere desire for resolution issues and obstructing progress in talks. Sincere desire his side for settlement problems these talks displayed at first meeting, when his side took special measures of leniency even before entering into discussion of substance, to grant early releases of 11 airmen who been convicted of intrusion into territorial air of China to carry out espionage activity.

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794

2. Wang continued China had tens thousands its nationals in US including several thousand students. Since proclamation of PRC, when US Government began actively carrying out policy of hostility towards China, these Chinese nationals had lost freedom of returning to homeland. In violation international law and principles of humanity, US Government even issued orders prohibiting Chinese nationals returning motherland, while obstructing and unlawfully persecuting those who desired return. In discussing first item of agenda it was essential that such abnormal state affairs should be corrected. American nationals in China had always been able return their country freely and China had never tried obstruct them doing so. This was entirely in contrast attitude my side towards Chinese nationals. After Agreement September 10 was reached, Wang's side faithfully carried out, and in addition continuing offer assistance departure of those Americans desiring return, they had also taken further lenient measures in advancing ~~the~~ release of greater part American criminals.

3. Wang continued, US, however, not only failed give China names of all Chinese in US but also resorted to various means continue obstruct return Chinese in defiance agreement. In this respect there still 52 of 55 and 25 out of 103 who thus far not returned. Besides, US also failed take corresponding measures on own initiative settle cases imprisoned Chinese so as enable them return. My side not only refused submit

complete list imprisoned Chinese but even adopted illegal screening operation. Under such circumstances, my side still sought disregard Chinese law by demanding immediate release ten remaining American criminals!

4. Wang said on second item, attitude my side even more unsatisfactory. Their side made, under second item, proposals to hold FMC and lift embargo. My side had raised proposal for making declaration on so-called renunciation force. Here it should be pointed out it was only after period unreasonable delay my side entered into second item. Intent this proposal of my side been clear from very start, that is, it designed interfere with internal affairs Wang's country, and obstruct his country from liberating its rightful territory Taiwan. With view reaching agreement acceptable both sides, Wang's side had put forward on October 27, 1955 reasonable draft declaration regarding proposal my side. Subsequently, in order meet point view my side, his side successively put forward amended drafts on December 1, 1955 and May 11, 1956, but my side not given up in slightest its attempt interfere internal his country, and obstruct liberation its own territory, and consequently obstructed ever since agreement on this problem.

5. Wang continued it not fortuitous my side should have adopted in these protracted talks such attitude and performance which had nothing in common with desire settle outstanding problems and improve relations. Ever since Chinese people

overthrew reactionary rule Chiang Kai-shek which had been renounced and discarded by entire Chinese nation, US been hostile to Peoples' Repblic and been attempting overthrow it by every means at its command. To achieve this end, US Government not hesitated resort to open warfare and covert subversion. US Government still at this moment occupying China's territory Taiwan by armed force.

6. Wang continued, on international plane, US Government repeatedly been obstructing xxxxxx restoration lawful rights PRC in UN. This policy of unscrupulous opposition to PRC could not win US prestige. On contrary, could only lead to moral bankruptcy and failure. No matter whether certain people like it or not, Peoples Republic stood in world and was ever making progress.

7. Wang said since opening these talks, his side already taken many steps. He would hope at this first session of new year, US would make new efforts and I would be in position put forward constructive opinions that would give us good start in new year.

8. I replied I too had hoped we could have gotten off to better start during this new year. If statements Wang had made here and statements of his government on desire for improving relations had real content his government would long ago have implemented first agreement between us. When he and I first came here in August 1955 I tried in every way I could

impress upon him importance this question of Americans detained his country. I would not have done that if I had not hoped for quick substantial progress in these talks. His authorities appeared have recognized that fact by accepting this question of return civilians as first item agenda. They appeared indicate, in public statements at time, desire resolve this problem and appeared indicate it was capable of ready solution. I had told him at time we entered into Agreement September 10, 1955 of very favorable effects it would have on our discussions and future course our relations if it were faithfully implemented. I had told him of very favorable reception it received from public my country and their very great satisfaction that this problem apparently resolved. I had been encouraged by release ten these individuals at time we entered into this Agreement. This showed what his authorities could do if they wanted to resolve this issue. I had taken it as token of their intent speedily resolve this issue. I had taken it as token their intent carry out agreement we entered into that day. Wang's government had it within its power at that time, by carrying out this agreement, bring about I would say very marked improvement in atmosphere surrounding these talks and our relations. His government had it within its power demonstrate it prepared honor fully letter and spirit agreements into which he and I ~~had~~ entered.

9. I continued, here we were at beginning 1957; this agreement we entered into 1955 still not fulfilled. This is source most keen disappointment to me, to my government, to

my people. As I had often said here it could in all honesty be said we had gone backwards since we made this agreement. It been many months since even single American been released. Whereas prior to our agreement it appeared some Americans released prior to completion their sentences, it now appears his government adopted policy requiring them serve out full terms their sentences before being released. This not only direct violation commitment Wang's government entered into on September 10, 1955, but even step backward from position existing prior that time. This deeply discouraging; cannot be reconciled with genuine desire on part his government resolve outstanding problems between us.

10. I continued, Wang's failure resolve this problem cannot be obscured by repetition these vague unsubstantiated charges concerning Chinese in US. Action—or rather Inaction of his authorities in this matter stood in very stark contrast to action which has been taken with regard Chinese in my country. He continued make here very vague unsubstantiated charges concerning US obstruction Chinese desiring return his country. Even though his country still maintained exit permit procedure, he ~~xxm~~ attempted characterize action US took prohibit departure some few Chinese students as violation international law and rules humanity. That surely extraordinary charge particularly in view procedure for exit aliens maintained his country. In any event as I had informed him August 2, 1955, all orders

concerning those few persons had been removed. They withdrawn not because were violation of international law and rules humanity but in order fully resolve to his satisfaction question with regard these students. Any Chinese in US who desired return Wang's country did not need apply to anyone to do so. He simply did so. Under our Agreement if rightly or wrongly he felt in any way being obstructed he could communicate with Indian Embassy. We entered into this Agreement September 10, 1955; it now January 19, 1957. During that period, Indian Embassy had not brought to our attention single case in which Chinese desiring leave my country had been obstructed from doing so. We had even extended this right of return to commom criminals.

11. I continued, Wang appeared charge my government with giving false information to Indian Embassy and not giving it list all Chinese alien nationals in our prisons. I resented this charge, which utterly false. Fact that his authorities refused agree to Indian Embassy interviewing these prisoners to determine their desires could not obscure fact we had done more than our agreement of September 10, 1955, whereas they failed carry it out. Even though they refused permit Indians carry out offer made them, we nevertheless went ahead and took steps return his country any imprisoned Chinese who desired return. As I had told him, the prisoner desiring return, as determined by impartial survey American Red Cross, was permitted

do so promptly even though had served only two and half years seven to twenty year sentence. He permitted do so even though he committed common crime and even though under normal parole and commutation procedures under our law he not entitled release.

12. I continued, with regard second item agenda, my suggestion for first step between us to resolve peacefully our disputes was very simple and fundamental one that we simply say we going resolve them by peaceful means only. No amount misrepresentation proposals I had made here obscures fact his government still refused accept that first and fundamental f proposition. No amount proposals on subsidiary items from his side could obscure fact his government still unwilling state unconditionally that our disputes could be settled only by peaceful means. Rather than my side refusing negotiation, question is one of his side refusing first fundamental step toward peaceful resolution disputes. Not question at this time discussing merits those disputes which he seemed continue try mix in with these discussions, but rather saying they will be settled only by peaceful means. No amount words or charges could obscure fact his government still unwilling accept this simple proposition. If his government desired we make progress here; if his government willing give substance to, rather than just give appearance of, desire improve relations, way open to it is very clear and simple: resolve first issue between us by carrying out first agreement entered into between us and then agree that differences between us will be resolved only

by peaceful means, including our differences in Taiwan area. Nothing unilateral in these two simple propositions. Acceptance of both propositions could be of tremendous benefit to his government and to peace of world. I still failed understand why his government delays acceptance these propositions.

13. Wang replied he xxxxxxxx had made statement this morning briefly reviewing ground covered our talks. He intended make it as reminder essential we strive go ahead with talks rather than remaining xxx deadlocked without making progress. However, lengthy statement I had made not given him impression US Government now ready contribute progress these talks by putting forward constructive opinion. If any had been discouraged by these talks, as I said, it him who been discouraged and xx disappointed. If purpose these talks improve relations and solve existing problems, then purpose not achieved by repeating series empty statements but only by taking concrete action. It ~~w~~should be pointed out ever since talks started his side taken concrete steps toward settlement our problems in both first and second items agenda. This action his side had fully shown sincerity on thir part in these talks. However he regretted point out sucess our talks could not be achieved by efforts only one side. During these talks US had not taken concrete constructive steps toward resolution our problems but merely content making unjustified unfounded charges against his country in many respects. Such approach these talks in no way contributed to success our talks. I had also remarked our talks

going backward. He ready accept this observation, but this does not come from intent his side.

14. Wang continued my remarks with regard non-existence obstruction to return Chinese in US did not obscure fact US authorities do obstruct their return. In this connection he would here call attention to specific case in which deliberate obstruction on part US has been established. They had received information that a Chinese resident in New York, Mr. LEE Li-chuen (no Chinese characters) had received orders from American Immigration authorities during October last year telling him leave for Taiwan. He wanted point out this represented yet another serious violation of Agreement September 10. This case indicated how US Government consistentlyx in defiance Agreement continually coercing Chinese nationals proceed destination to which they did not desire go. Wang's side demanded my government immediately stop these and other acts obstruction of return Chinese nationals and requested me promptly make investigation and give accounting of this case. For my information he giving me name and address (he did so). From actual cases such as one just mentioned, fact clearly seen who faithfully carrying out agreement and who not. If anyone dissatisfied with state in which Agreement implemented it actually and exactly his side which dissatisfied.

15. I replied did not know exact circumstances case Mr. Lee Wang mentioned. However could categorically tell him even in case ordinary Chinese citizens who entered US illegally -- that is not accordance our immigration laws, such as case seamen who jumps ship or something that nature -- he not forced go Taiwan or any other destination against his will. While he required leave US, he permitted go any place which would receive him. I knew many cases seamen for example subject deportation for illegal entry who had been deported to Wang's country in accordance their choice. Wang's authorities must be perfectly aware these cases. I also know if Mr. Lee wanted go Wang's country and felt he being obstructed do so, he entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy.

16. I continued he had spoken of improvement our relations and resolution our existing problems by concrete action rather than empty statements. That exactly point I was trying make here for all these many months. What I trying say was insofar as Americans detained Wang's country, empty statements would not resolve problem, but only concrete action permitting them return. There another concrete x question in which my government was and is still extremely interested. Question which I raised earlier our discussion second item agenda and also still not resolved.

17. I continued from prepared statement:

a. On October 27, 1955, and again ~~at following meeting,~~ that year on November 3, raised with you question missing American military personnel. Pointed out this was practical matter unavoidably affecting relations between our two countries, one ~~with~~ which clearly came within ~~it should in accordance~~ terms reference our talks. ~~deal here~~

b. Your position that time ~~appeared~~ was this question should be dealt with through MAC in Korea. You will recall I replied it was immaterial whether accounting furnished here or in MAC. What was - and still is - important is this practical matter at issue between us be settled.

c. Over year has now gone by, matter still not been settled, either here or in MAC. It not my intention this morning enter controversy over question proper ~~forum~~ place for accounting requested by my government. What ~~would like~~ simply wanted do is underscore this question is real, vital, practical matter at issue between our two countries; ~~it is there~~ this question arises not because I, or my Government, have chosen ~~[illegible]~~ raise it but because your side not even after this long lapse years carried out its clearly expressed obligation this matter vital interest to American people

d. My government responsible to American people not just in abstract, but to them as individuals. It is responsible to Mrs. Vergie Walker. Mrs Walker's son, Army Private Archie Walker, reported missing in action in Korea August, 1950. On March 28, 1951, New China News Agency broadcast report by one its correspondents listing names addresses persons in US to whom American prisoners war in certain camp in Korea wished send greetings. One of persons named was Mrs. Vergi Walker. Since then she had no word whatever of her son. He not repatriated. His body not returned. No report his death received. Most careful questioning repatriated prisoners not resulted in any firm information concerning his fate. Mrs. Walker does not know whether he alive or dead. She naturally incredulous when your official news agency and radio at one time serves as channel for sending her greetings from her son and then subsequently your side says it knows nothing about her son. She cannot but have hope her son may still be alive. However, if he is dead she would naturally like know even that. She clearly entitled some definite information this regard and clearly entitled feel your side must have such information. She and my government find it impossible understand why it not made available.

e. My Government responsible to family and friends Army Captain Harry D. Moreland. Captain Moreland was captured in Korea October 27, 1952, following crash his plane. He reportedly lost left leg in that crash. According other Americans imprisoned with him ~~Captain Moreland~~, his right leg also amputated in November 1952. Some time during November, Captain Moreland taken from his room, not seen subsequently.

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f. My Government responsible to relatives and friends Ensign Thomas Biesterveld. There no doubt about fact Ensign Biesterveld's capture April 29, 1951, following crash his plane. There uncertainty about what happened Ensign Biesterveld subsequently. When last seen by fellow prisoners, June 1951, he suffering from severe burns received in crash his plane. He also contracted pneumonia dysentery. On June 25, 1951, Ensign Biesterveld removed from prison camp, according later statement Chinese interpreter to one Biesterveld's fellow-prisoners, he died in prison hospital June 26, 1951. There never been any official confirmation this, however, nor ~~[illegible]~~ has his body been returned.

g. Could mention many other similar cases, cases where man's family knows beyond any doubt he held prisoner by forces your side, but has no other information any kind. For these people, this issue overshadows all others between our two countries. Towards many hundreds persons thus directly and deeply concerned by you Government's refusal thus supply information it must have, my Government has responsibility it cannot shirk. This matter at issue between us cannot be resolved by simply ignoring it, or by arguments over proper forum, but only by action your authorities providing information which I have requested, and which I again formally request this morning.

h. Even apart from such solemn international commitments as Korean Armistice Agreement, it common international practice for country rescue survivors, recover remains, and inform country of origin in any case where aircraft or vessel of another country is lost in or near its territory.

i. Accordingly, in addition this accounting for US military personnel still missing from Korean hostilities, request any additional information which your authorities now have or may in future acquire concerning Americans surviving or killed in such accidents or incidents. This is another matter on which only concrete action by your authorities either here or in MAC in Korea, can resolve outstanding issues between us.

18. Wang replied, matter I had just brought up an old matter I had already raised in early part our talks. I would recall at that time his side had firmly rejected attempt bring up such matter in our discussion, because it not within terms reference our talks. This still held to present moment. His side not prepared enter into discussion any such matter.

19. I replied whether Wang rejected it or not, it still matter at issue between us. As I had said it immaterial to me where this matter resolved. When we raised matter in MAC, Wang's side there states that individuals held outside Korea do not come under authority MAC, and it therefore irrelevant discuss in MAC. His representative in MAC states MAC no connection with prisoners of war disposed of by Wang's government.

Wang could not have it both ways. Either matter for discussion and resolution here or matter for discussion resolution in MAC. I had waited over year for this be resolved in MAC. It had not been resolved there. It was matter at issue between us.

20. Wang replied he had kept saying matter which taken place at given place must be resolved that place. The alleged matters concerned persons in Korea and should therefore be referred to organization in Korea itself. During Korean war US Government in gross violation of international agreements forcibly detained immense numbers prisoners war. Specifically, some 14,000 captured Chinese personnel sent to Chiang clique by force. Chinese Government received no accounting for this gross violation international agreements. Families these 14,000 ~~p~~ captured Chinese prisoners will always remember kinsmen forcibly sent to Chiang clique by US Government. Such is matter which Chinese Government so far received no~~x~~ accouhting -- but they had not proposed raise this matter at this conference. Now that US deliberately brought up matters this nature, does US now intend account for 14,000? Who should be held responsible for so-and-so missing on Korean ~~fx~~ field? Responsibility lies on government which had sent those persons there. Who sent these young men to place thousands miles away from home to engage in war of aggression? It those who sent people there who should be re~~xx~~sponsible. Such matters would not have arisen if governments concerned had not sent men go war in that place.

22. I replied in first place, as I had pointed out, no parallel between persons for whom we had asked accounting - who still missing - and persons from his side who voluntarily chose go Taiwan. I had not raised question here of those Americans who decided go his country. I raising with him here persons who clearly captured by his side; persons whom his own official channels of communication admitted holding at one time and with regard to whom his side now says there is no information. His representatives in MAC state they have no information regarding these men and at same time state have no connection with prisoners of war who may have been disposed of by Wang's government. Official information agencies of his government at one time admitted knowledge many ~~xhxxx~~ these men. Seems incredible his government did not now have information regarding what happened to them. As said previously with regard this question, making no charges, merely asking for information which all evidences showed must be in posession his government. As had also x said immaterial to me where furnished. If he felt proper place furnish it was MAC it entirely satisfactory to me. However, not been furnished through MAC and therefore still remained an issue. Also desired point out UN members MAC had told members his side fully prepared give detailed accounting all persons of whom his side has requested an accounting whenever his side prepared give accounting persons still missing. However, simply saying had no information regarding men of whom at one time they clearly

did have information could not be regarded as satisfactory accounting.

23. Wang replied he had stated his attitude toward this matter. Did not consider it necessary repeat it all over again. However would be glad if I had any opinion to put forward on second item, specifically concerning their proposals on lifting embargo and personal contacts and cultural xxxxxx exchange (Wang's interpreter also mentioned FMC).

24. I replied I previously clearly expressed our attitude on this and would not take time repeat this morning. I had hoped this morning he would have been able take more positive attitude regard saying unconditionally our disputes would be settled only by peaceful means, and thus clear way for our discussion subsidiary matters. Other questions between us could only fall into their proper place when his government willing say it willing settle these matters only by peaceful means. Continued overhanging threat his government resort force, if it could not otherwise obtain objectives, remains fundamental issue between us.

25. Wang replied if I wanted talk about threats, it US which threatens China. If one were to speak about resolution problems x unconditionally by peaceful means, it US which should do so. In course talks his side already made many efforts. If talks going make any progress efforts of only one side of two could not achieve this end.

26. I asked who had proposed we unconditonally refuse to resort threat or use force resolve issues between us? Who is it thus far refused do this?

27. Wang pointed out American occupation Taiwan was one such condition and American insistence right self defence in Taiwan area another such condition.

28. I stated unconditionally means we unconditonally say we will not go war about these problems but will seek their peaceful solution.

29. Wang said ~~had something more concerning unconditionally.~~ THERE WAS MORE TO "UNCONDITIONAL" THAN THAT. If US ready accept their draft ~~this~~ US would thereby prove sincerity.

30. I answered that his proposals did not constitute unconditional renunciation force. I had been in past and remained willing consider any proposals which did accomplish this. Not willing consider proposals which gave appearance doing so but in fact avoided doing so. Not willing accept proposals which mean one thing one side and another thing to other side. Particularly not willing do so after our experience with agreement on civilians.

31. Wang insisted had dealt with all these problems in past and did not like my "new" opinion in this regard this morning.

32. I suggested next meeting Thursday, February 7. Wang preferred February 14. I Agreed.

GOWEN

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WPM (95)

(Copy Walter)

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AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

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B-1-301

January 19, 1956

SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Letter No. 53

Jan 24

Dear Walter:

Back from the 64th. As I implied in my summary it was a dreary affair. Today he seemed to be saying that he was willing to sit there just as many months as I was but I should not believe he was going to make any further moves and I said the same back to him. So there we are. It is not a cheerful prospect. As a footnote, if I did not seem too brilliant at the end it was because my mouth was hurting from a tooth I had to have pulled late yesterday evening which, together with other facts of nature, made me desperate to get out of there.

Incidentally, I told the New York Times man here yesterday that, without any direct quotation, he could indicate I was very unhappy that some correspondents had traveled to Communist China in spite of the U.S. Government's position as it obviously had greatly weakened my position vis a vis Wang here. I hope this will be of help to the Department.

I also had USIS expand out their story from here on today's meeting to review the facts on the release of Americans and the fact no Chinese have been obstructed in leaving the U.S. I suggest you take a look at it. I thought it would be useful for the field to be reminded of some facts to counteract the line Chou has been putting out on his journeys.

The talks now seem in a complete cul de sac and look as if they could well continue indefinitely in that state. It now seems to me that while they would probably quickly fall into any move on our part which would place the onus for a

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

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Lot 72 D 415

break on us, they are not going to take the onus for breaking and only some major outside development or a move by one side or the other in the talks can resolve the impasse. It seems clear we cannot at the present stage expect the release of any Americans other than possibly slightly expedited releases of those whose terms will shortly expire.

I am, of course, entirely willing to go on as we are if it is still felt it is serving a useful purpose but I hope that that decision will be fully examined at a high level. I am not arguing that the exercise is not useful, I think it may well be, but I just want to be sure that the Secretary also still thinks so.

Sincerely,

UAJ

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

OUTGOING TELEGRAM 780

Department of State

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Though effectiveness US ban on travel Communist China as pressure on Chinese Communists release imprisoned Americans may possibly have been somewhat weakened by fact three correspondents defied ban, we do not believe US Government can or should alter opposition to travel Americans in area where no repeat no protection can be provided, where regime continues hold Americans as political hostages, and where it desires promote cultural exchanges to break down US policy of non-recognition and non-seating in UN. For US to acquiesce in such travel would encourage Communists to redouble efforts to promote QUOTE cultural contacts UNQUOTE while taking no repeat no action to release imprisoned Americans.

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Following considerations have bearing on Department's position:

1. Employers of LOOK correspondents ordered them out of Communist China after policy explained to them. Department believes moral suasion will still effectively keep most correspondents and other Americans from going.

2. Investigation under way to determine if three correspondents who defied ban misused passports preliminary to determining what further

Drafted by: CA:RNClough/FE:WJSebald:emm 1/22/57 WJS

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Walter S. Robertson

Clearances: 3/1 L - Mr. Phlegen (in draft)

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JAN 23 1957 P.M.

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action will be taken.

3. Wirin travel to Communist China and North Korea is unique case of individual travelling as officer of Federal court pursuant to court order specifically authorizing such travel for purpose of offering opportunity to prepare defense of persons accused by our Government of crime of sedition. If Wirin's travel prevented, this might seriously prejudice Government's efforts prosecute case. Wirin's passport was not validated for Communist China or North Korea.

Under present circumstances Department will therefore continue adhere to policy of discouraging to greatest possible extent travel to Communist China by any Americans including correspondents and will refuse to acquiesce in requests for approval such travel either with or without passport.

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Ans'd. in letter of 7 Feb WPMcC

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
FEB 6 - 1957
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(copy RNC)

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
January 28, 1957.

Dear Walter:

I received a copy of Taipei's despatch No. 240 of December 10 commenting on NIE 43-56 and copy No. 57 of the Department's instruction A-159 of January 15 on the same subject. Although I was not able to check what envelope they came in I presume CA sent them to me for my information and I appreciate it very much. I found both most interesting. My only purpose in mentioning it is to be sure the copy of the Department's instruction was in fact intended for me and that a copy was also sent to Taipei.

Thanks very much for the word on the travel of the correspondents. I will of course be most interested in knowing before my next meeting whether anything developed between Chou and Nehru on the subject of the remaining prisoners.

Sincerely,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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Lot 72 D 415

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UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
~~GENEVA, SWITZERLAND~~

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Feb 6 - [illegible]
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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL January 30, 1957

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dear Ralph:

I talked with Ed Martin by phone yesterday and he told me London is somewhat less than enthusiastic about having him fly here for the meetings. From the absence of direct word from CA, I expect you all are encountering a similar lack of enthusiasm on the part of FE/EX for incurring the additional travel expenses that would be involved in sending out a replacement from CA, particularly in the light of the uncertain future of the talks.

I don't know whether you have already considered and discarded the idea, but if the interval between talks is to stay at its current length, would it not be a possibility to have me or some other CA officer fly out for each meeting? On a thumbnail basis, I make it out to be less than $200 a month more expensive than just keeping me here, if a reasonably cheap rate on tickets could be obtained from the airlines. Such an arrangement would have the additional advantages of not wasting an officer's time between meetings, and maintaining closer liaison with FE. I haven't talked this out fully with the Ambassador yet, but I did mention it to him briefly.

Needless to say, Helenka and I both hope something can be worked out. Not only for various personal reasons - --- ...

--- but also for the official and principal reason, that there just isn't any work for me to do here between meetings.

However it works out, we appreciate the efforts we know you're making.

Sincerely,

David L. Osborn

David L. Osborn

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January 30, 1957

Letter No. 64

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

SECRET

Dear Alex:

1. Your letter No. 53 of January 19 came January 24 and has been read by Messrs. Robertson, Phleger and Sebald. All of us sympathize with you in the frustrating and exasperating position in which you find yourself, with the talks apparently leading nowhere and dragging on indefinitely with the same tired points being reworked ad infinitium and ad nauseam at every meeting. Undoubtedly it is difficult for the man who is on the scene and who is carrying the chief burden to see the further utility of the exercise. However the talks are precisely fulfilling the primary purpose envisaged by the Secretary in 1955. Mr. Robertson told him yesterday about your letter including the question you had raised about the desirability of prolonging the talks. The Secretary smilingly recalled that when he was giving you your instructions he had mentioned to you that you should be prepared to carry on the talks ~~had better be prepared to conduct them~~ for two years. The Secretary said that you were handling the talks exactly in accordance with his wishes, and that the talks were serving the purpose he had in mind. He appreciated the difficulties you confront but his views as to the importance of the talks and the desirability of continuing them had not changed. He said that when the Middle East pressures subsided somewhat, he would be glad to review the matter and give careful attention to any arguments

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Prague.

SECRET

Lot 72 D 415

against continuation of the talks which we might consider overriding. But as of now he felt the talks should continue and that you should know that he approves the way in which you have conducted the talks.

Undoubtedly the talks continue to cause us some embarrassment, and lead to some misunderstanding of our posture vis-a-vis Communist China, especially in the Far East. Also the continuance of the talks makes it difficult for us to manifest the full extent of our dissatisfaction at Chinese Communist violation of the Agreed Announcement. On the other hand, we still have the Chinese Communists tied up in talks which may make it more difficult for them to start any hostilities in the Taiwan area. If they should initiate any such action while conversations are going on, the risk they would run of general world condemnation and possible multilateral sanctions against them would be appreciably increased. While the Chinese Communists obviously estimate at this stage that their interests are best served by continuing the talks, they are probably not happy over the negotiating situation in which they find themselves and would be delighted if we broke off the talks. An onus would attach to the side which took the initiative to break off the talks, and this the Chinese Communists want to avoid. We have them in a situation where they are on the defensive on both of the principal points at issue, and unable to improve their negotiating position. As one officer put it, if we broke off the talks now we would in a sense be letting the Chinese Communist off the hook and would be giving up just at a time when we for once are beating them at their own game by out-sitting and out-talking them. As Mr. Phleger put it, "Alex is doing fine, and should carry on along the lines that he has already developed so well". You don't need to worry about repetition, or lack of new topics. It may be a dreary, boring business but it is serving a purpose which is more apparent here than it can be in the front line. The talks undoubtedly are reducing the pressures from European quarters for other U. S. contacts with the Chinese Communists and they make it much easier to refute the arguments advanced for a Foreign Minister level meeting.

2. We were quite interested in the record of the last meeting. Wang's argumentation was of some significance, even though there was nothing new in it. It was all right to send the full report by pouch. It arrived in four days.

3. We were somewhat taken aback at the New York Times despatch of January 19 from Geneva quoting you as feeling that your negotiating position had been seriously weakened by the visits of the three newsmen to Communist China. While your negotiating position certainly was not helped by the visits, we do not see that it was helped by the public attribution of this feeling to you either.

4. We are sending you herewith a full report of O'Neill's interview with Huang Hua on December 28, 1956. In this conversation, Huang Hua explicitly denies that the Agreed Announcement applies to American prisoners. We anticipate that this will give you plenty of material for the February 14 meeting.

5. We released our statement on Chinese Communist failure to release

imprisoned Americans on January 29. A copy is enclosed for your files. We are also sending a copy to Osborn. We thought Chou En-lai's statement in Nepal about a possible "exchange of prisoners" gave us a good occasion to issue the statement. However it has not received as much play in the press as we hoped for.

6. There has been a new development in the Powell case. Having been authorized by the judge to travel to Communist China as an officer of the court, leaving his passport in Hong Kong, the defense attorney, Wirin, now claims to have received a cable from his contact in Peiping stating that he will not be admitted without a validated passport and that the United States Government should communicate with the Chinese Communist authorities concerning his travel. (Copies of the defense motions are enclosed.) Wirin is reported to have mentioned orally to the judge that the Geneva talks would be a suitable channel for communicating with the Communists concerning his travel. The Department of Justice attorney who is handling the Washington end of the case informed us that the judge categorically turned down Wirin's request for a court order that his passport be validated for travel to Communist China and North Korea. The judge said he had no authority to issue such an order. The judge is reportedly unsympathetic to Wirin's latest gambit. He has asked that appropriate government authorities provide him with an affidavit setting forth the United States Government's position with regard to the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes, travel by Americans to those areas and the

facts concerning the Geneva talks. We are preparing material on these subjects for Justice, which will then prepare the affidavit. A hearing is set for February 2, when the judge will consider this information.

It seems clear that the Chinese Communists are using the Powell case as another lever to compel a change in our policy regarding travel to Mainland China. They probably feel that they are in a strong position in this case, since if the U. S. Government blocks Wirin's travel to Communist China, there is a good chance that the case against the Powells will be dismissed. Thus, whichever way we move, the Communist movement would stand to gain. Peiping's tactics in this case strongly suggest that they are not interested in utilizing the Powell case to revive the germ warfare charges against the U. S. If they were, they would certainly be more inclined to facilitate Wirin's travel. Their propaganda, too, has supported this conclusion, since they have played up the Powell case as another attempt by the U. S. to persecute journalists who try to tell the truth about Communist China. Germ warfare has been barely mentioned. We are giving Justice the information we have on the various efforts by Peiping to break down our passport policy, so that they can pass this background informally to the judge.

7. It now seems as if the passports of Stevens and Harrington of Look Magazine will be made valid only for return to the U. S. Action on Worthy will be withheld until we get a full report on his travel and the use he made of his passport.

8. It has been good to talk to Pat, and to get some further news

of you and your children through her. I wish you could join her here.

Regards and good wishes,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 43
2. O'Neill interview with Huang Hua- Dec. 28, 1956
3. Defense motions on Powell Case
4.

784

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OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WPM

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
February 6, 1957.

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Walter:

I have just received the Radio Bulletin containing your January 30 statement.

It is an excellent job and the most convincing statement we have put out. It should do much to dispel the doubts of those who have felt that there must be some fire behind the Chicom smoke screen.

I see in the New York Times we even got some grudging support out of New Delhi.

With respect to the next to the last paragraph of the statement, it is excellent from my and a public relation standpoint. However, are we not going to have to be careful not to get ourselves into the box of in effect making an open ended commitment to deport to Communist China any Chinese alien who desires to go there regardless of the crime he may hereafter commit. I have tried to skirt around this in the talks by sticking to the 34. We can of course meet this problem if and when it arises. I do not believe the statement as drafted does commit us but it may carry that implication. In this connection do you have any information on arrests of Chinese aliens subsequent to the survey that turned up the 34?

I have heard from Dave that London refuses to release Ed. I know this must be very disappointing to you as it is to me. It seemed to be the ideal solution. I will be open to any other suggestion you may have.

Incidentally, I have written to Ed Freers about coming back on a couple of weeks consultation this spring - perhaps around April or May - if there continues to be a

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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month's gap between meetings. I told him to get in touch with you if he thought well of it. It will have then been close to two years since I was home and there is much I would like to talk over both on FE and EUR matters.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

OUTGOING TELEGRAM 785 Department of State

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FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for February 14 meeting.

1. Take issue with virtual repudiation Agreed Announcement by Huang Hua in interview with O'Neill December 28, when former stated that until American prisoner released from jail QUOTE question of encountering obstruction UNQUOTE did not arise. As Wang well knows, Americans imprisoned or under house arrest were the very ones that were subject of American representations and there would have been no purpose Chinese Communists declaring they would QUOTE further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return UNQUOTE if it were not to apply to Americans in jail. Furthermore, recall that even though Chinese criminals in US jails were not covered, when Communists suggested they were covered if ~~US~~ Americans in Communist jails were, US while denying this interpretation, nevertheless so there could be no question proceeded to see that Chinese criminals in US jails were given opportunity to go to Communist China. If Wang counters with usual charges regarding QUOTE obstruction UNQUOTE Chinese departing US, refer categorical statement by spokesman of Foreign Ministry, New Delhi, February 1, that

49

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Drafted by: FE:CA:RNClough:emm 2/11/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Walter S. Robertson

Clearances:
CA - Mr. McConaughy
FE - Mr. Sebald (in draft)
L - Mr. Phleger (in draft)

S/S-CR
FEB 11 1957 P.M.

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Government of India QUOTE unable find any obstruction being placed on their exit. UNQUOTE.

2. Again press for accounting missing military personnel, presenting additional individual cases.

3. Maintain position other subjects.

4. If Wang endeavors exploit current controversy in US over travel newsmen Communist China, refer as necessary to Communist treatment Americans as reason for US policy, but avoid extended discussion.

5. If Wang refers press reports US plans station Matador unit Taiwan, avoid comment.

6. FYI Lee Li-chuen, who Wang alleged being forced go Taiwan, is seaman who entered US November 1, 1955 on GRC-registered ship Union Power. At one time deportation Taiwan planned. Immigration states Lee now under order deportation plans depart voluntarily own expense San Francisco February 23 for mainland China. Since Lee may fail depart as scheduled, believe preferable not repeat not inform Wang now. However, if he raises case, you may state categorically Lee never obstructed from leaving US for any destination. END FYI.

7. Propose next meeting March 14.

Dulles

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February 11, 1957

SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Letter No. 65

Dear Alex:

1. Developments in the issue of travel of newspaper men to Communist China have not been very favorable for us. The press is giving strong support to Stevens and Worthy. Apparently they have been able to whip up a certain amount of public support for their position. Worthy appeared on Eric Sevareid's nation wide newcast Sunday afternoon February 10 and probably evoked quite a bit of sympathy for his position. Worthy left Moscow before the Embassy received our instructions, and he refused to submit his passport to the Legation in Budapest for restrictive endorsement. He also refused to say yes or no on the passport hearing which was offered him, placing his case in the hands of the Civil Liberties Union. When Worthy passed through Immigration at Boston his passport (by decision) was not taken up or restrictively endorsed. As I see it this will make it difficult for us to follow through in Stevens case. Look Magazine plans to fight the case of Stevens and Harrington. Presumably there will be a passport hearing in Washington when Stevens returns to this country. Stevens was given the choice of a hearing in Moscow or Washington before restrictive action was taken, and Look Magazine instructed him to choose a hearing in Washington, which will presumably take place a few weeks hence.

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
Geneva

SECRET

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Lot 72 D 415

The decision to seek to restrict the passports was taken with some reluctance in view of the legal uncertainty but our hand was more or less forced by the press release of December 28 in which it was stated flatly that the passports would be made valid for return to the U. S. only. We did soften the proposed action by making it clear to our Embassy in Moscow that we did not require Stevens to come home. The instruction was to endorse the passport "upon departure from the Soviet Union, valid for return to the U. S. only". This would enable Stevens to continue his assignment in the U. S.S.R. without interruption. However Look has elected to bring him home in late March in order to fight the case.

We are faced with a flat defiance of the Department by Worthy, and strong resistence short of defiance in the case of Look Magazine and Stevens.

The Secretary took a very strong position in his press conference of February 5. We have been looking through the Geneva records for the best documentation that we can find based on Wang's remarks. Of course we have the Wang statement about the handling of the prisoners being influenced by the state of relations between the two countries and the tie in between visits by American citizens and the "state of relations". We have found nothing along this line dated later than September 28,1955. I presume neither you nor Dave recalls anything later or more specific than this. I understand you got a copy of the Secretary's press conference separately, but to make sure that you have it, a copy is enclosed herewith. We still hope to hold the line by voluntary action of the press, plus limited administrative action where necessary. No acourt action is being considered byt we may run into difficulties again here with administrative passport action. The line up against us is pretty solid, especially since Senator Humphrey has entered the picture with a proposed Senate investigation, and since the American Society of Newspaper Editors has sent a resolution to the President.

2. We anticipate that your instructions for the February 14 meeting will follow the usual line. We expect you to hammer hard at Wang on the subject of the interview of December 28 between O'Neill and Huang Hua in which Huang Hua virtually repudiates the Agreed Announcement by saying it has no application to the Americans while they are imprisoned. I sent you a copy of O'Neill's report to Prague with my last letter of January 30. I hope you received it. As a precaution another copy of O'Neill's report is enclosed herewith.

3. Also enclosed is a working draft of a proposed new press release ~~of~~ on travel to Communist China. It has been drafted largely with a view to clarifying the questions and ambiguities which seem to exist as a result of the events of last week. Bear in mind that this has not been approved and may undergo further changes if it is put out at all.

4. In answer to the question raised in your letter of January 28 from Prague, the Department did intend for you to have the copy of Instruction A-159 to Taipei as well as the NIE 43-56.

5. We are working hard on a replacement for Osborn. The Embassy in London is very shorthanded now in the sections which cover both FE and Middle Eastern Affairs. It would be difficult for them to spare Ed Martin at all till June. I believe we could get him then. We have your telegram 389 agreeing to Dave Popper as an interim measure if we can get him. We intend to sound out Geneva on this today and will probably authorize you to take it up

SECRET

with Gowen while you are in Geneva this week. We fear that Geneva will feel that they cannot spare Popper. We will work out some solution in any event.

6. Judge Goodman in San Francisco is still considering the Wirin request for a passport to go to Communist China. The Judge has requested Justice to submit briefs on two questions as follows:

1. Whether the Court possesses the power to compel the Secretary of State to validate Wirin's passport.
2. Whether the Cout could compel the Government to elect either (a) to validate Wirin's passport or (b) the dismissal of the indictment.

We armed Justice with quite a bit of material for the meeting which the Judge held on February 1. We endeavored to show that the Communists were using the Powell-Schuman trial as a lever to force official accreditation of ~~the~~ an officer of the Court. for activities in Communist China.

7. We are wishing you well and hoping that at the very least you will not have dental trouble to plague you this time.

Regards,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Secretary Dulles' News Conference Feb. 5, 1957
2. Interview with Huang Hua on December 28, 1956
3. Memorandum from ... in Karachi dated December 28, 1956 re Chinese Communist Prime Minister's visit.
4. Working Draft of proposed new press release re travel to Communist China.
5. Article in N. Y. Times dated Feb. 7, 1957 re American Newspaper Publishers Assoc. Resolution sent to the President.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 784, February 14, 2 p.m.

Your 815.

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GOWEN

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 787, FEBRUARY 14, 4 PM

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FROM JOHNSON

THREE HOUR MEETING THIS MORNING DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY IMPLEMENTATION.

I OPENED WITH STRONG POINT BY POINT REFUTATION HUANG HUA'S DECEMBER 28 STATEMENTS TO O'NEIL ALONG PARA ONE DEPTEL 815. WHILE AVOIDING ANY DETAILDD REBUTTAL WANG REITERATED PREVIOUS POSITION ON QUESTION RETURN NOT ARISING WHILE AMERICANS IN PRISON. THEN LED INTO LONG PREPARED STATEMENT IN COURSE OF WHICH REFERRED TO JANUARY 29 PRESS STATEMENT, SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 5 PRESS CONFERENCE, ROBERTSON'S SPEECH IN BLOOMINGTON, AND US PRESS CRITICISM OF USG POSITION ON TRAVEL CORRESPONDENTS. TERMED JANUARY 29 STATEMENT AS "GROUNDLESS CHARGES" TO COVER UP FACTS WITH REGARD TO CHINESE IN US. WITH REFERENCE SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 5 STATEMENT PRC CONDITIONING RELEASE AMERICANS ON VISITS CORRESPONDENTS "REFUTATION SUPERFLUOUS AS AMERICAN PRESS ALREADY DONE JOB FOR THEM IN DISMISSING STORY AS GROUDLESS FABRICATION". PRC APPROVAL APPLICATIONS AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS VISIT CHINA WAS GESTURE GOOD-WILL AND US ATTEMPT LINK WITH QUESTION RELEASE AMERICANS WAS "OUTRIGHT INSULT TO PRESSMEN". "US ALONE ATTEMPTING INTRODUCE LINK." ROBERTSON'S BLOOMINGTON "VITUPERATION AND SLANDER" AND "OTHER UNFRIENDLY UTTERANCES HE HAS MADE NOT EVEN WORTH TROUBLE REFUTATION". US SHOULD BE AWARE THAT "SLANDER AND THREATS COULD NOT HELP PROGRESS". CAN ONLY

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EXPECT PROGRESS WHEN I READY DISCUSS HIS PROPOSALS FMC, CULTURAL RELATIONS, AND TRADE.

I MADE LONG EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT REVIEWING COURSE NEGOTIATIONS ON PRISONERS AND REMINDED HIM OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS LINKING RELEASE AMERICANS TO "IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS". COULD ONLY INTERPRET THIS AS DEMAND POLITICAL CONCESSIONS AS PRICE RELEASE. AT OTHER TIMES HE AND PRC AUTHORITIES APPEAR BASE FAILURE RELEASE AMERICANS ON ALLEGED GROUNDS IMPRISONED AMERICANS NOT COVERED BY AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT AND THAT AT OTHER TIMES ON ALLEGED VIOLATION AGREEMENT BY US WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US. CHALLENGED HIM SHOW SINGLE MISSTATEMENT FACT JANUARY 29 PRESS STATEMENT. CITED GOI FEBRUARY 2 STATEMENT AS CONFIRMATION OUR JANUARY 29 STATEMENT WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US AND CHALLENGED HIM PRODUCE SIMILAR STATEMENT FROM UK ON SITUATION AMERICANS IN PRC.

MAJOR PORTION HIS SUBSEQUENT REMARKS DEVOTED TO TEMES: (1) "ERA LONG PASSED CHINA COULD BE BROUGHT INTO SUBMISSION BY THREATS OR PRESSURE" OR ALIENS COULD BREAK CHINESE LAW WITH IMPUNITY; (2) PRC FRIENDLY GESTURES (RELEASE AIRMEN AND OTHERS, CHOU'S STATEMENTS TO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS PRC DESIRED FRIENDSHIP WITH US AND AMERICAN PEOPLE, PERMISSION NEWSMEN VISIT CHINA, ETC.) HAD BEEN MET ONLY WITH HOSTILITY FROM US SIDE. "IF ANYBODY GOING PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AS ONLY INVOLVING QUESTION OF FEW CRIMINALS HE COULD ONLY SAY IT IS MAKING GAME OF THESE TALKS". US USES "PRETEXT" FEW CRIMINALS PREVENT IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS.

I, OF COURSE, REFUTED ALONG USUAL LINES BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD AGREED CIVILIANS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, MAJOR CONCESSIONS US HAD MADE WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US, PRC IMPLEMENTATION SEPTEMBER 10 AGREEMENT TEST OF GOOD FAITH AND FUNDAMENTAL

FIRST STEP IN IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS, ETC. ANOTHER FUNDAMENTATL STEP WAS RENUNCIATION FORCE.

HE MADE NO REPLY WHATEVER TO MY PRESENTATION ON MISSING SERVICE MEN REFERRING ONLY HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS.

HE PROPOSED AND I AGREED NEXT MEETING MARCH 14.

GOWEN

JS

789

19 E

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

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February 14, 1956

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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Letter No. 54

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Walter:

I received your letter sent to Prague enclosing the O'Neil-Huang Hua December 28 interview and the material on Wirin's travel before I left. Yesterday I also received your February 11 letter. (Fast service!) Thanks very much for both of them.

I talked with Gowen and he has agreed also to loan me Popper. He sent a telegram on this last night. I am sending you a telegram today on the contract employment of a secretary to replace Helenka. I had hoped I could use Popper's secretary who previously worked for me but she is going on leave shortly and I did not want to strain the office here by asking them also to furnish a secretary. In any event, I think that the FE budget is now getting off very easily.

As you know, I know and respect Dave Popper tremendously, but he, of course, simply does not have the specialized FE experience that would be most useful to me. He also has more than a full time job here with not much time to devote to this and the office needs him badly in many ways. I therefore hope that we can shortly shake Ed Martin or someone else loose before long. Dave Osborn has some ideas he will discuss with you.

I have been hit hard here by the press, particularly the New York Times, on the Secretary's February 5 statement on the newsmen and the Americans, wanting to know exactly how and when the Chicoms made the proposition. I have, of course, said nothing except to point out our often reiterated statements that the Chicoms were holding

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
    Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
        Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
            Department of State,
                Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

the Americans as political hostages.

In this regard there is, of course, no specific statement in the record. The most specific statements are, as you have noted, those on the "state of relations" which he long ago dropped when he saw the box into which it had placed him.

Since his last "state of relations" statement on September 28, 1955 there are only a few relatively obscure statements bearing on this that I have been able to recall or Dave has been able to find. At the 56th meeting (para 16) I picked up his remark (para 15) that a "reasonable solution (on trade) would contribute to resolution other disputes", but he sidestepped. At the 63rd meeting (para 6) he said "if U.S. had genuine desire resolve problems it should make progress in second item agenda". Both of these are very tenuous and only have any meaning at all within context.

You will recall that in accordance with my original basic instructions, at our first dinner (Mytel 585 Aug. 23, 1955) I inferentially brought up the possibility of visitors after all Americans were released, and at our second dinner (Mytel 642 August 29, 1955) made this somewhat more specific with respect to correspondents. I cannot recall that the subject again came up until the Chicoms issued their invitations to correspondents last August and at the 55th meeting I gave him a copy of our August 7 press release emphasizing the last paragraph (para 14 Mytel 135 and Wang's reply in para 19). At the 58th meeting he introduced the cultural exchange proposal and I made preliminary comments (paras 11 and 12 Mytel 303) on which I expanded at the 59th meeting.

Thus, while he took the initiative in raising "state of relations" as a factor in the timing of the release of Americans I took the initiative in specifically relating the travel of correspondents to their release. He has always been very careful not to be specific as to exactly what he meant by "state of relations" and although I have not the slightest doubt that they would have considered our permitting correspondents to travel to mainland China as a step toward "improvement of relations" I cannot point to any specific statement that says this. However, I have always felt that they would consider travel of correspondents as only one factor in "improving relations" sufficiently to release all of the Americans. That is, I have never felt that they had in mind releasing all of the Americans in exchange for the travel of correspondents, although, as you know, I felt it might produce the release of a few. I have not gone back over all my messages in this regard, but I regret if I misled you or the Secretary in any way on this.

While there was nothing new in today's meeting I think that you will find much of it very interesting reading. (Incidentally I am sending it by cable as there is no courier from here until Sunday which would mean almost a week until you received it.)

You will see that he more thoroughly developed the theme of U.S. "hostility", pressure, etc. than he ever has in the past. Throughout his presentation I could not but help think of Chou's remark to ...

that the release of the Americans would be regarded as a confession of weakness. I think that that remark and Wang's expansion on it today is the real key to their attitude. You know that I have long felt, and I continue to feel, that whatever other very useful and important purposes it may serve, the building up the issue of the release in fact works in the opposite direction. However, we are now so far down this road that I see no choice but to continue what we are doing. They have, of course, behaved very stupidly. The Agreed Announcement gave them a perfect back-drop against which to release them and they would, in fact, have gained enormously if they had done so. I am amazed that they did not have the intelligence to see it. It only goes to prove that they are not "eight feet tall". However, they have now got themselves on such a box on this that they could not do so even if they desired.

I greatly appreciated Walter having spoken to the Secretary and having obtained a re-confirmation of his desires. I am, of course, willing to go on as long as it is thought to be useful. I just wanted to make sure that this was the case. I do well see and appreciate the objectives, and will try to carry them out the best I can.

Incidentally, I have just realized that the material on missing Air Force personnel forwarded us in June has not, at least technically, been declassified. Paragraph 2 of Deptel 736 declassified the material sent me with your letter of December 7. However, as the Air Force material had been sent to us previously this does not cover that. Will you confirm to me whether I can also consider it declassified so that I can use it as occasion arises.

Pat arrived this morning just as I was leaving for the meeting. Haven't had a chance really to talk with her yet.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

790

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 1 OF 7)

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FROM JOHNSON

1. I OPENED 65TH WITH PREPARED STATEMENT:

A. ON DEC 28 1956 REPRESENTATIVE YOUR MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD UK CHARGE PEKING QUESTION OF DEPARTURE FR MCCARTHY COULD NOT ARISE UNTIL HIS PRISON TERM EXPIRED OR YOUR GOVT ADVANCED DATE HIS RELEASE. SHOULD LIKE CALL YOUR ATTENTION PARAGROUP OUR AGREED ANNOUCEMENT SEPT 10 1955 WHICH READS: "PRC RECOGNIZES AMERICANS IN PRC WHO DESIRE RETURN US ENTITLED DO SO, AND DECLARES IT HAS ADOPTED AND WILL FURTHER ADOPT APPROPRIATE MEASURES SO THEY CAN EXPEDITIOUSLY EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT RETURN..

B. DOES YOUR GOVT DENY FR MCCARTHY IS AMERICAN? DOES IT DENY HE DESIRES RETURN US? IF NOT, THEY QUESTON RETURN FR MCCARTHY TO US HAS ALREADY ARISEN. IT AROSE SEPT 10 1955, UNDER AGREEMENT INTO WHICH YOU ENTERED WITH ME ON THAT DATE. IT HAD ARISEN EVEN EARLIER IN VERY SPECIFIC MANNER IN THESE TALKS, FOR I HAD GIVEN YOU LIST NAMES, ON AUG 2 1955, OF AMERICANS DESIRING RETURN AND BEING PREVENTED FROM DOING SO, AND FR MCCARTHY'S NAME WAS AMONG THEM. WE HAD BEEN TALKING FOR SIX WEEEKS ABOUT RETURN OF PRECISELY THIS GROUP AMERICANS CAN YOU POINT TO ANYTHING IN OUR ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH WOULD WITHHOLD ITS APPLICATION FROM FR MCCARRTHY?

C. THE REPRESENTATIVE ALSO TALK UK CHARGE QUESTION FR MCCARTHY'S ENCOUNTERING OBSTRUCTION COULD NOT ARISE WHILE HE WAS IN PRISON. WHAT DOES OUR ANNOUCEMENT HAVE TO SAY ABOUT

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OBSTRUCTION? "IF ANY AMERICAN IN PRC BELIEVES CONTRARY TO DECLARED POLICY OF PRC HE ENCOUNTERING OBSTRUCTION IN DEPARTURE, HE MAY SO INFORM OFFICE OF CHARGE D'AFFIARES UK." UNDER OUR ANNOUNCEMENT, IT CLEAR QUESTION OBSTRUCTION ARISES, NOT WHEN PRC WISHES TO RAISE IT, BUT WHEN "ANY AMERICAN IN PRC BELIEVES HE ENCOUNTERING OBSTRUCTION." IS FR MCCARTHY AMERICAN IN PRC? DOES HE BELIEVE HE IS ENCOUNTERING OBSTRUCTION? THEN QUESTION OF OBSTRUCTION HAS ARISEN.

D. THE REPRESENTATIVE ALSO ON DEC 28 TOLD UK CHARGE HIS REUQEST FOR FACILITIES INVESTIGATE FACTS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE TERMS AGREED ANNOUNCEMENTS. WHAT ARE THOSE TERMS? ANY AMERICAN WHO BELIEVES HE BEING OBSTRUCTED, AND AGAIN I QUOTE FROM OUR ANNOUNCEMT, "MAY SO INFORM OFFICE OF CHARGE D'AFFAIRES UK IN PRC AND REQUEST IT MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON HIS BEHALF TO GOVT PRC. IF DESIRED BY US, GOVT OF UK MAY ALSO INVESTIGATE FACTS ANY SUCH CASE." DID FR MCCARTHY INFORM OFFICE OF UK CHARGE OF HIS BELIEF HIS DEPARTURE BEING OBSTRUCTED? DID HE REQUEST UK CHARGE MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON HIS BEHALF? DOES US DESIRE FACTS THIS CASE BE INVESTIGATED? CAN YOU POINT TO ANY OTHER TERMS OUR ANNOUNCEMENT BEARING ON THIS QUESTION OF INVESTIGATION OF FACTS? CAN YOU CITE ANY PART ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH CAN BE USED JUSTIFY REFUSAL YOUR AUTHORITIES PERMIT THIS INVESTIGATION?

E. WOULD LIKE ASK YOU IN ALL SERIOUSNESS THIS MORNING WHETHER THERE ANY PROVISION OF ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH YOUR AUTHORITIES INTEND APPLY TO CASES FR MCCARTHY AND NINE OTHER AMERICANS WHOSE DEPARTURE STILL BEING OBSTRUCTED BY YOUR GOVT. OR IS IT YOURINTENTION UTTERLY REPUDIATE OUR AGREEMENT? THIS IS QUESTION OF MOST FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR IF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES ARE TO BE PLACED ON SOME OTHER BASIS THAN THAT OF PROFOUND DISTRUST AND MUTUAL SUSPICION, IT IS UP TO TWO OF US TAKE FIRST STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION. IT UP TO

US SHOW NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAN RESULT IN UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH. IMPARTIAL TESTIMONY SHOWS MY GOVT HAS AND IS CONTINUING DEMONSTRATE ITS GOOD FAITH IN CARRYING OUT THIS FIRST AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. I CONTINUE SEEK EVIDENCE OF INTENTION YOUR AUTHORITIS DO SAME.

2. WANG SAID ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY CHINA IN THIS CONFERENCE HAS ALL ALONG BEEN RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND US SHOULD IMPROVE, DISPUTES BETWEEN US SHOULD ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT. FROM STATEMENT I HAD MADE THIS MORNING HE DID NOT SEE DISPLAY SIMILAR SPIRIT.

3. WANG (TURNING TO PREPARED STATEMENT) CONTINUED, MIGHT MENTION PRESS STATEMENT OF US DEPT STATE JAN 29 AGAIN INDULGED TOTAL INVERSION RIGHT AND WRONG TO CONFUSE WORLD. NO AMOUNT SUCH MALICIOUS ARGUMENTS CAN ESTABLISH POINT THAT MAKING AMERICAN CRIMINALS SERVE SENTENCE WHICH ACCORDANCE LAW, CHINA GUILTY VIOLATION ACCORD SEPT 1955.

GOWEN

JS

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Control: 9325
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 15, 1957
7:00 AM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 2 OF 7)

4. WANG (FROM NOTES) CONTINUED, I HAD ASKED QUESTION WHETHER AGREMNT BETWEEN US WAS TO BE REPUDIATED. HIS ANSWER WAS NO AMOUNT GROUNDLESS CHARGES COULD DISTORT FACTS THIS MATTER. GOOD FAITH HIS GOVT CARRYING OUT THAT AGREEMENT BEYOND QUESTION. I HAD ASKED QUESTION ABOUT MCCARTHY. THERE NO QUESTION AS TO HIS BEING AMERICAN AND HE MIGHT DESIRE RETURN HOME. HAD TO POINT OUT WHILE HE SERVING SENTENCE, QUESTION HIS RETURN DID NOT ARISE. IN DEALING WITH THIS AND SIMILAR CASES QUESTION VIOLATION AGREEMENT BY HIS GOVT HAD NOT EVER ARISEN. HIS GOVT WELCOMED THIRD POWER REPRESENTATIVE INVESTIGATING CASES WHERE OBSTRUCTION DEPARTURE AMERICANS FROM CHINA REPORTED; BUT HIS GOVT IN NO CASE WOULD ACCEPT INTERFERENCE ON PART THIRD COUNTRY TO ATTEMPT INVESTIGATE ANYTHING WHICH PROPERLY WITHIN SCOPE AND TERMS REFERENCE AUTHORITIES THEIR JUSTICE DEPT. HE WANTED POINT OUT NO OBSTRUCTION HAD BEEN OFFERED TO ANY AMERICAN NATIONAL IN CHINA WHO DESIRED RETURN US. IN FACT SINCE LIBERATION CHINA ALREADY MORE THAN 1000 AMERICANS IN CHINA HAD FREELY DEPARTED WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING ANY OBSTRUCTION. ALL AMERICANS DESIRING RETURN MY COUNTRY HAD DONE SO AND HIS GOVT SO FAR NOT RECEIVED SINGLE COMPLAINT OBSTRUCTION TO DEPARTURE OF ANY.

5. WANG (FROM PREPARED STATEMENT) CONTINUED, MY SIDE REPEATEDLY MAKING HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND RAISING OUTCRIES AGAINST CHINA IN VAIN ATTEMPT HOODWINK AND MISLEAD WORLD. BY NOW I SHOULD HAVE COME TO REALIZE ERA LONG PAST WHEN CHINA COULD BE BROUGHT INTO SUBMISSION OR ABANDONMENT SOVEREIGNTY BY THREATS OR PRESSURE. CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD NEVER BOW TO THREATS. ERA GONE AND WILL NOT COMEBACK, WHEN AMERICAN OR ANY ALIEN COULD BREAK LAW AND GET AWAY WITH IT. AMERICANS WHO BORKE LAW IN CHINA NOW MUST PUT UP WITH JAIL IN ACCORDANCE SENTENCES METED

OUT BY CHINESE AUTHORITIS. THIS NATURAL FOR ANY SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. UNLESS CRIMINALS DISPLAYED GOOD CONDUCT IN PRISON THEY WOULD HAVE TO SERVE OUT THEIR SENTENCES. HOWEVER PRESS STATEMENTS OF MY SIDE HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVERING UP OR OBSCURING VIOLATION AGREEMENT ON PART MY SIDE. ON RECORD, STILL REMAIN TWO GROUPS OF 52 AND 25 PERSONS WHO HAD NOT BEEN ABLE COME BACK AS RESULT ALL SORTS OBSTRUCTION BY MY COUNTRY, AND MY SIDE STILL REFUSED ACCOUNT FOR THEM. OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS OF MY AUTHORITIES NOW DEVELOPED TO EXTENT OF ENCROACHING ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHINESE AND RELATIVES. ALREADY MANY RELATIVES HAVE REPORTED CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOLKS IN US WAS BREAKING OFF. THIS APPARENT OUTCOME THREATS AND PRESSURE APPLIED BY AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. FURTHERMORE WHILE REPRESENTATIVE US GOVT CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVE PRC, AMERICAN AUTHORITITES HAD SEEN FIT CONTINUE COERCE CHINESE RESIDENTS AND SEND THEM TAIWAN. SUCH ACTIVITIES AND OTHER VIOLATION AGREEMENT CALL FOR STRONG CONDEMNATION. PRESS STATMENTS MY SIDE ALSO ATTEMPTED COVER VIOLATION AGREEMENT OF MY SIDE WITH REGARD QUESTION IMPRISONED CHINESE. MY SIDE TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION IN SUBJECTING PRISONERS TO ILLEGAL SCREENING PROCESS. INTENT THIS ALL TOO CLEAR--IT IS TO DETAIN SUCH PEOPLE THROUGH THIS ILLEGAL SCREENING PROCESS. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THEY ACCEPT SUCH PROCESS. THEY CONTINUED URGE US TAKE ACTION ON OWN INITIATIVE ENABLE THESE PEOPLE RETURN AS HAD BEEN DONE IN CASE FORMER AMERICAN CONVICTS.

6. WANG CONTINUED, DURING PAST WEEKS WORLD HAD WITNESSED TWO LEADING MEMBERS US DEPT STATE TRYING IN TURN PASS RASH JUDGEMENT ON CHINA. MR ROBERTSON'S VITUPERATIONS AND SLANDEROUS STATEMENTS FROM BLOOMINGTON ROSTRUM AND OTHER SUCH UNFRIENDLY UTTERANCES HE HAS CHOSEN TO MAKE NOT EVEN WORTH TROUBLE REFUTATION. HOWEVER PEOPLE COULD NOT FAIL TAKE NOTE STATEMENT

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-3- 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 2 OF 7) FROM GENEVA

AMERICAN SECSTATE AT PRESS CONFERENCE FEB 5. MR DULLES REPORTED TO HAVE DECLARED CHINA CONDITIONING RELEASE AMERICAN CONVICTS ON PERMISSION BY US GOVT FOR US CORRESPONDENTS GO CHINA. HE DID NOT KNOW ON WHAT GROUND SECRETARY CREATED THIS STORY. HOWEVER, REFUTATION FROM HIS SIDE SEEMED SUPERFLUOUS AS NEWSPAPER EDITORS IN US ALREADY SEEM TO HAVE DONE JOB FOR THEM IN DISMISSING THIS AS GROUNDLESS FABRICATION. ANXIETY OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS VISIT CHINA SHOWS AMERICAN PEOPLE DID NOT APPROVE OF POLICY AMERICAN GOVT IN OBSTRUCTING EXCHANGES BETWEEN PEOPLES. AMERICAN NEWSMEN DESIRED VISIT CHINA. CHINA HAD ACCEPTED APPLICATIONS. THIS GESTRUE GOODWILL CHINESE PEOPLE TOWARD AMERICAN PEOPLE. ESTABLISHMENT LINK BETWEEN QUESTION AMERICAN PRESSMEN AND RELEASE AMERICAN PRISONERS CONSTITUDED OUTRIGHT INSULT TO AMERICAN PRESSMEN, BY AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. MY SIDE ALONE ATTEMPTING INTRODUCE LINK BETWEEN THESE TWO DISTINCT MATTERS. NOTICE WHICH CAUSED MY SIDE ATTRIBUTE THIS PIECE OF PURE FABRICATION TO HIS SIDE IS NONE OTHER THAN DESIRE HOODWINK WORLD AND SLANDER CHINA AND MAKE PRETEXT FOR BARRING AMERICAN PRESS VISITS TO CHINA. HE AND I BEEN ASSOCIATED HERE LONG TIME. I MUST HAVE BECOME AWARE LONG AGO SLANDER AND THREATS COULD IN NO WAY HELP PROGRESS IN TALKS. INTERESTS OF TALKS COULD ONLY BE ADVANCED WHEN I ABANDONED THIS AND READY DISCUSS HIS PROPOSALS, NAMELY FMC, RELAXATION TRADE EMBARGO AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, MOVEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS ALWAYS THEIR HOPE.

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7:33 AM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 3 OF 7)

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7. I REPLIED HE AND I HAD SPENT LONG TIME DISCUSSING THESE SUBJECTS. I HAD BEEN AND CONTINUE BE WILLING TAKE TIME DO IT BECAUSE I FEEL ISSUES ARE OF SUCH OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE. QUESTION OF AMERICAN CIVILIANS IN HIS COUNTRY COULD NOT BE DISPOSED OF AS HIS AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY FELT IT COULD BY WHAT WE MIGHT CALL SIMPLY SWEEPING IT UNDER RUG. I HAD IN PAST AND CONTINUED TRY DO BEST TO UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE HIS POINT VIEW. FRANKLY AND AS ONE WHO HAD TALKED TO HIM NOW FOR LONG TIME, THIS SUBJECT ONE I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND. EVEN BEFORE WE CAME HERE FOR THIS SERIES TALKS WANG'S GOVT PERFECTLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO QUESTION THESE CIVILIANS. IN TERMS REFERENCE OUR TALKS IT AGREED THIS QUESTION WOULD COME FIRST. HOWEVER UNJUST WE FELT ACTION TAKEN BY HIS AUTHORITIES WAS, I HAD NOT DEMANDED UNILATERAL ACTION WITH REGARD THEM. I HAD NOT HAD AND DID NOT NOW HAVE ANY INTEREST IN ATTEMPTING HUMILIATE HIS GOVT OR OBTAIN ANY PROPAGANDA VICTORY IN THIS MATTER. THIS ONE OF REASONS THAT RIGHT AT OUTSET THESE TALKS I HAD SUGGESTED THEY BE PRIVATE IN CHARACTER. MY SOLE INTEREST WAS FINDING METHOD RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM SO THAT IT COULD BE REMOVED AS IRRITANT OUR RELATIONS. I HAD KNOWN FROM TALKS WE HAD 1954 ATTITUDE HIS GOVT WITH REGARD CHINESE STUDENTS IN US. I HAD ATTEMPTED BEFORE WE EVER CAME HERE TO MEET HIS POINT VIEW IN THIS REGARD. I HAD NOT RAISED WITH HIM ANY QUESTION US SOVEREIGNTY, US JURISDICTION, OR OTHER SUCH THEORETICAL QUESTIONS. MY GOVT HAD TAKEN ACTION TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION TO HIS SATISFACTION. MY GOVT HAD TAKEN ACTION TO ENTIRELY REMOVE RESTRAINTS WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED

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TO DEPARTURE OF SOME FEW CHINESE FROM MY COUNTRY. I HAD CONCEEDED TO HIS POINT VIEW ON DECLARATION BY US. AT SAME TIME, HE KNEW PERFECTLY WELL MY PRIMARY INTEREST WAS IN THESE IMPRISONED AMERICANS. IT PERFECTLY PROPER FOR US REACH AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDED NOT JUST CHINESE IN US BUT AMERCIANS IN HIS COUNTRY. HIS REACHING SUCH AGREEMENT WAS CERTAINLY NOT IN ANY WAY DEROGATION SOVEREIGNTY BUT WAS AN EXERCISE HIS SOVEREIGNTY. 7

8. I CONTINUED, INSOFAR AS DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO AGREEMENT CONCERNED, HE WOULD RECALL THAT THEY CONCERNED THESE IMPRISONED AMERICANS. I WOULD NOT TAKE TIME REVIEW THOSE DISCUSSIONS--HE WAS AS FAMILIAR WITH THEM AS I. HE WOULD RECALL THOUGH THAT PARTICULARLY IN DISCUSSION LEADING UP FINALLY TO USE WORLD "EXPEDITIOUSLY" IN THAT AGREEMENT, IT RELATED TO TIME WHEN THESE IMPRISONED AMERICANS WOULD BE RELEASED. FACT HE AND HIS AUTHORITES AT THAT TIME WELL RECOGNIZED THIS AGREEMENT RELATED TO IMPRISONED AMERICANS HAD BEEN WELL DEMONSTRATED BY THEIR RELEASE TEN IMPRISONED AMERICNS ON SAME DAY AND IN CONNECTION WITH ISSUANCE AGREEMENT. FOR HIS AUTHORITIES NOW TO GO BACK AND SAY THE AGREEMENT HAS NO RELATION TO THOSE IMPRIONSED AMERICANS--JUST PERSONS WE TALKING ABOUT AT TIME WE MADE THE AGREEMENT--SIMPLY NOT LOGICAL, JUST, OR DEFENSIBLE.

9. I CONTINUED, HE SPOKE OF THREATS, PRESSURE, EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY. HARD AS I TRIED UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW HIM ON THIS I JUST UNABLE DO SO. I COULD NOT SEE HOW ASKING THAT AGREEMENT FREELY ENTERED INTO BE CARRIED OUT CONSTITUTES THREATS OR PRESSURE. I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ANY GOVT ABLE SAY CARRYING OUT BY IT OF AGREEMENT, INTO WHICH IT HAS ENTERED, IS DEROGATION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. IN FACT IT SEEMS ME IT IS OPOSITE--IT IS EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. IF I OR MY GOVT WANTED SEE CONTINUATION OF TYPE RELATIONS WHICH HAD SO UNHAPPILY HERETOFORE EXISTED BETWEEN US--I CERTAINLY NEVER WOULD HAVE LAID STRESS I HAD ON IMPORTANCE RESOLVING THIS QUESTION CIVILIANS.

GOWEN

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Control: 9324
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 15, 1957
6:59 AM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 4 OF 7)

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10. I CONTINUED, FOR HIM TO DEMAND CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS FROM ME ON OTHER SUBJECTS PRIOR TO RESOLVING WHAT OUR GOVTS BOTH AGREED WAS FIRST QUESTION BETWEEN US AND PRIOR CARRYING OUT THIS FIRST AGREEMENT BETWEEN US, IS TAKING COMPLETELY UNILATERAL POINT VIEW. AT TIMES HIS AUTHORITIES AND HE HERE SEEMED TAKE POSITION THEIR FAILURE CARRY OUT THIS AGREEMENT BASED UPON ALLEGATION AGREEMENT DID NOT COVER THESE IMPRISONED AMERICANS. AT OTHER TIMES HE SEEMED HAVE TAKEN ATTITUDE THIS AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT AND AMERICANS RELEASE UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE WERE FURTHER POLITICAL CONCESSIONS BY MY GOVT ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO HIS GOVT. I COULD NOT BUT INTERPRET IN THIS SENCE STATEMENTS HE HAD MADE WITH REGARD IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN US BEING A FACTOR IN TIMING OF RELEASE THOSE PRISONEERS. AT OTHER TIMES HE SEEMED TAKE ATTITUDE BECAUSE OF ALLEGED VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT BY US WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US, HIS AUTHORITES IN RETALIATION WERE REFUSING IMPLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH REGARD AMERICANS STILL IN PRISON IN HIS COUNTRY.

CONTINUED HE HAD SPOKEN OF PRESS RELEASE MY GOVT JAN 29 AND HAD TERMED IT GROUNDLESS CHARGES. I WOULD NOT TAKE TIME GO THRU THAT PRESS RELEASE--SEEMED TO ME BE MOST SOBERT, CAREFUL PRESENTATION FACTS THIS MATTER. INSTEAD TRYNG DISMISS IT AS GROUNDLESS CHARGES I ASKED HIM SHOW ME SINGLE MISSTATEMENT FACT IN RELEASE. THIS NOT JUST MY OPINION OR OPINION MY GOVT. HE WOULD RECALL AND HAD PROBABLY NOTED WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US, FOLLOWING THAT RELEASE, FEB 2

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SPOKESMAN OF GOI STATED INDIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON HAD FOUND NO CASE OF ANY PROVED OBSTRUCTION ANY CHINESE IN US DESIRING RETURN HIS COUNTRY; THAT WHILE FEW CASES ALLEGED OBSTRUCTION BEEN DRAWN ATTENTION INDIAN EMBASSY, IN NO CASE HAD IT PROVED TRUE.

12. I CONTINUED, HE HAD SAID HERE THIS MORNING HIS GOVT HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINT OBSTRUCTION OF DEPARTURE OF ANY AMERICAN HIS COUNTRY. HE KNEW AND I KNEW GOVT UK HAD NOT AND COULD NOT MAKE STATEMENT SUPPORTING THAT ALLEGATION SUCH AS INDIAN GOVT MADE SUPPORTING STATEMENT I HAD MADE HERE THIS MORNING. TO GO INTO ANY FURTHER DETAIL WOULD SIMPLY OBSCURE THESE FUNDAMENTAL UNDENIABLE FACTS.

13. WANG REPLIED, IN MY STATEMENT I HAD TERMED MOST FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BETWEEN TWO SIDES QUESTION CIVILIANS. IN THIS REGARD, GREATER PART THIS PROBLEM ALREADY RESOLVED AS RESULT EFFORTS MADE BY CHINESE GOVT. THAT WAS TO SAY, MOST OF AMERICANS OR PRACTICALLY ALL AMERICANS DESIRNG DEPART THIS COUNTRY TO RETURN US HAD ALREADY BEEN ENABLED FREELY DO SO. NUMBER PEOPLE WHO HAD DONE SO NOT IN NEIGHBORHOOD SEVERAL SOCRES OR SEVERAL HUNDRED BUT MORE THAN 1000 DONE SO. IF I WANTED SAY QUESTION CIVILIANS SOLE ISSUE INVOLVED IN IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS, IT COULD BE SAID GOOD BASIS ALREADY ESTABLSHED HIS RESPECT. WHAT US TRYING DO WAS PRESENT THIS MATTER AS ONLY CONCERNING FEW CRIMINALS--THIS WHAT HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH. THEY FELT THAT PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES CONCERNED KIND OF ISSUES WHICH ARISE BETWEEN TWO GREAT POWERS AND ARE OF GREAT CONSEQUENCE TO HUMANITY. IF WE FAILED SEE PROBLEMS FROM THIS POINT VIEW, IT WOULD SEEM BE WHAT PEOPLE CALL LOSING SIGHT OF FOREST WHEN ONLY SEEING SINGLE TREE. IF ANYBODY GOING PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AS ONLY INVOLVING QUESTION OF HANDFUL CRIMINALS, CAN ONLY SAY IT MAKING GAME OF THESE TALKS, WITH PRETEXT OF QUESTION FEW CRIMINALS. IF WE WERE TO TAKE THAT COURSE HE AFRAID PEOPLE WOULD HAVE

PASS JUDGMENT ON THOSE WHO HAD WASTED SO MUCH TIME AND FAILED CARRY OUT FERVENT DESIRES ENTRUSTED TO THEM BY PEOPLE.

14. WANG CONTINUED, HE ALSO FOUND IT HARD FOLLOW MY LOGIC WHEN I SAID IN CONCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT SOVEREINGNTY HAD TO BE DEROGATED. THEY TOOK DIFFERENT VIEW. THEY THOUGHT IN CONCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IT SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE BUT SAFEGUARD SOVERIEGNTY.

15. WANG CONTINUED, IN DISCUSSING QUESTION RETURN CIVILIANS, ONE MUST TAKE NOTE OF FACT CHINESE GOVT ALWAYS BEEN CARRYING OUT THAT AGREEMENT FAITHFULLY. THEY COULD NEVER CONCEDE TO ANY ALLEGATION CHINESE GOVT INTRODUCED ANY OBSTRUCTION DEPARTURE AMERICANS FROM CHINA. IF SUCH OBSTRUCTION EXISTED, HOW COULD ONE EXPLAIN FACT MAJORITY AMERICANS IN CHINA HAD BEEN ABLE LEAVE. MOST CONVINCING FACT AND PRACTICAL MATTER WAS FACT IN CASES NUMBER FORMER AMERICAN PRISONERS WAS WHO REFUSED REPATRIATION WHENEVER ANY OF THESE PERSONS DESIRED RETURN MY COUNTRY HIS AUTHORITES HAD NOT OBSTRUCTED AND HAD ALWAYS GIVEN ALL FACILITIES ENABLE THEM DO SO. IN FACT NUMBER THESE ALREADY RETURNED MY COUNTRY. AS HE HAD TOLD ME IF IN FUTURE ANY OTHER PERSONS THIS CATEGORY CHANGED MIND AND DESIRED RETURN MY COUNTRY THEY WOULD HELP HIM DO SO IN SAME WAY. THIS SHOWED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ALWAYS CARRIED OUT AGREEMENT IN ASSISTING DEPARTURE ANY AMERICAN WHO DESIRED DO SO.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

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16. WANG CONTINUED THERE WERE NUMBER CRIMINALS IN CHINA AND THIS INVOLVED ANOTHER MATTER. THEY HAD SAYING IN CHINA DEBTORS MUST PAY DEBTS AND MURDERERS UNDERGO PUNISHMENT. SO THEY HAD TAKEN POSITION THAT QUESTION REPATRIATON DID NOT ARISE WITH RESPECT PERSONS SERVING PRISON TERMS. HOWEVER THEY HAD REPEATEDLY MADE IT KNOWN IF THESE PERSONS IN QUESTION HAD DISPLAYED GOOD CONDUCT THEY WOULD ALSO BE ENABLED EXERCISE THAT RIGHT. BUT IF ANYBODY TRYNG FORCE ISSUE UPON CHINESE GOVT PRESSURIZE IT INTO ABANDONMENT ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE LAW-- THIS SOMETHING WHICH SIMPLY NOT DONE IN CHINA. I WOULD RECALL WHEN WE FIRST MET IN THIS THIS ROOM 1954 I HAD TOLD HIM RESTRAINTS IMPOSED MY GOVT ON CHINESE STUDENTS MY COUNTRY MATTER JURISDICTION MY GOVT AND CATEGORICALLY DECLARED I NOT GOING CHANGE THAT LEGAL PROCEDURE MY GOVT.

17. WANG CONTINUED WITH REGARD MY ALLEGATION THAT HIS GOVT ON QUESTION AMERICAN CRIMINALS TRYING EXTRACT POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM MY SIDE. HE COULD ONLY REGARD THIS AS INVERSION OF FACT. HIS GOVT IN INTEREST IMPROVING RELATIONS MADE NUMBER CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS, BUT MY GOVT SO FAR REFUSED TAKE UP THESE PROPOSLAS--MOREOVER MY AUTHORITIES REPEATEDLY BANNED CORRESPONDENTS FROM VISITING CHINEA. THIS COULD BE TERMED ATTEMPT BY MY AUTHORITIES BY VARIOUS MEANS TRY EXTRACT POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM CHINA. IF THERE GENUINE DESIRE IMPROVE RELATIONS, ONE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO DUE CONSIDERATON VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES INSTEAD OF STICKING TO ONES OWN VIEWPOINT.

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HE SURE I AWARE PUBLIC CONVESATION MADE BY PREMIER CHOU WITH NUMBER AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS. PREMIER SPOKE ABOUT CHINA'S DESIRE FRIENDLY TERMS WITH US AND AMERICAN PEOPLE; SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT CHINESE SIDE TAKEN MANY STEPS FORWARD. IF ORDER REALLY IMPROVE RELATIONS BOTH SIDES MUST TAKE STEPS FORWARD SIMULTANEOUSLY.

18. I REPLIED, FIRST LET ME CORRECT APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING. I UNDERSTOOD HE THOUGHT I HAD SAID THAT CONCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IS DEROGATORY OF SOVEREIGNTY. I DID NOT SAY THAT NOR AT LEAST DID NOT INTEND TO. WHAT I SAID WAS EXACTLY OPPOSITE--THAT CONCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT NOT DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY-IN FACT IS EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY. INTERESTING THOUGH IT MIGHT BE MY POINT WAS NOT ENTER INTO PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT BUT MY POINT WAS THAT HIS GOVT HAVING ENTERED INTO AGREEMENT SEPT 1955, ITS CARRYING OUT THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY RATHER THAN DEROGATION SOVEREIGNTY.

19. I CONTINUED, I DID NOT BELIEVE I HAD SAID QUESTION CIVILIANS MOST FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION BETWEEN US. WHAT I HAD SAID WAS IT A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION BETWEEN US AND BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAD AGREED IT FIRST QUESTION BETWEEN US. DEMONSTRATION OUR ABILITY RESOLVE WHAT OUR GOVTS CONSIDERED FIRST QUESTION BETWEEN US CERTAINLY FUNDAMENTAL TO RESOLVING OTHERS. A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION BETWEEN US STILL REMAINS QUESTION WHETHER PERMIT OUR MISUNDERSTANDING IN TAIWAN AREA TO LEAD WAR. REMAINS STILL FOR US SAY UNCONDITIONALLY UNEQUIVOCALLY IT WILL NOT. HOWEVER TO GO BACK TO WHAT BOTH AGREED WAS FIRST QUESTION IT NOT QUESTON RESOLVING IT IN PART,FOR SOME AMERICANS OR MOST AMERICAN--IT QUESTION OF RESOLVING QUESTION.

20. I CONTINUED, WHEN WE ISSUED STATEMENT SEPT 10 WE NOT TALKING OF AMERICANS WHO ALREADY LEFT HIS COUNTRY AND RETURNED US.

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WE TALKING ABOUT 19 SPECIFIC AMERICANS STILL IN PRISON THAT TIME. NOT TALKING ABOUT AMERICAN POW WHO VOLUNTARILY DECIDED REMAIN WANG'S COUNTRY. WE TALKING ABOUT THESE 19 AMERICANS. HE HAD TERMED IT MATTER OF FEW CRIMINALS. I COULD NOT AGREE WITH HIM ON THAT. WE HAD IN PAST AND STILL CONSIDERED IMPRISONMENT THESE AMERICANS COMPLETELY UNJUST. HOWEVER I DID NOT ASK HIM AGREE ME ON THAT. I ONLY ASKED THAT FIRST PROBLEM WE CAME HERE RESOLVE BE RESOLVED AND GOOD FAITH BE SHOWN HERE IN RESOLVING IT. AS HAD POINTED OUT HERE MANY TIMES, NOT ONLY DID WE CONSIDER GOOD FAITH NOT BEEN SHOWN IN RESOLVING IT, BUT SEEM TO HAVE GONE BACKWARDS. CONSIDERATIONS WANG'S COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES HAD NOT PREVENTED RELEASE ELEVEN FLIERS DAY OUR MEETINGS OPENED HERE. IT HAD NOT PREVENTED RELEASE 10 AMERICANS SEPT 10 AT TIME WE ISSUED AGREEMENT. SINCE THAT TIME, SEEMED QUITE CLEAR THEY HAD ADOPTED POLICY REQUIRING THESE UNFORTUNATE PEOPLE SERVE WHOLE TERM THEIR SENTENCE.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

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FROM JOHNSON

21. I CONTINUED, IT PERFECTLY NATURAL IN LIGHT THIS HISTORY OF CARRYING OUT AGREEMENT AND TREATMENT AFFORDED AMERICANS HIS COUNTRY, THAT MY GOVT FELT IT WOULD BE DELINQUENT IN ITS RESPONSIBILITY PROTECT AMERICANS TO APPROVE THEIR TRAVEL TOM HIS COUNTRY.

22. WANG REPLIED, ON THEIR PART THEY HAD ALSO MANY GRIEVANCES IN CONNECTION WITH TREATMENT THEIR NATIONALS IN US. I HAD DESCRIBED THOSE MEETINGS AS GOING BACKWARD. HE AGREED WITH ME, BUT POINTED OUT THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. IF ONE OF TWO PARTNERS TRYNG GO FORWARD WHILE OTHER TRYING PULL BACKWARD, OF COURSE IT VERY DIFFICULT HAVE RESULTS. I HAD REFERRED RELEASE 11 MEMBER AMERICAN AIR FORCE ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE AND HAD REFERRED TO RELEASE NUMBER AMERICANS ON DAY AGREEMENT. THESE RELEASES HAD BEEN EFFECTED SIMPLY AS RESULT DECISION CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. ALSO TOOK THESE MEAUSRES IN EXPECTATION AND HOPE SUCH LENIENT MEASURES GIVEN AMERICANS WOULD BE EXAMPLE GOODWILL AND EVENTUALLY LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. WHAT WAS REWARD OF THIS GESTURE GOODWILL THEIR PART? US TAKEN SERIES UNFIENDLY ACTIONS AGAINST WANG'S COUNTRY AND HAD DEMANDED WANG'S COUNTRY DO THAT AND THAT WHILE MY AUTHORITIES DOING UNFRIENDLY THINGS TOWARD WANG'S COUNTRY. FOR US DEMAND THAT OTHER SIDE DO SOMETHING, AND NOT DO IT OURSELVES WOULD NOT IMPROVE RELATIONS. IN LAST PART STATEMENT I HAD REFERRED TO RESPONSIBILITY US PROTECT AMERICANS IN CHINA. THEY HAD JUST SEEN NUMBER AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS RETURNING IN SAFETY

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TO MY COUNTRY FROM VISIT CHINA. NOTHING WRONG DONE TO THEM. ONE COULD NOT FAIL NOTE AMERICAN PRESS, INCLUDING ASSOCIATION AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, REFUTED ALLEGATION THAT PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS WAS AN ISSUE. IT WAS FRIENDLY THING FOR AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS TO WISH VISIT CHINA; IT WAS FRIENDLY FOR CHINESE GOVT TO LET THEM COME, BUT US GOVT FORBIDDING THEM WAS UNFRIENDLY ACT; TO SAY IT WAS MATTER OF SAFETY WAS STILL MORE UNFRIENDLY ACT. IT WOULD BRING NO GOOD TO AMERICAN GOVT CONTINUE POSE SUCH UNFRIENDLY AND HOSTILE ATTITUDE AND SPREADING UNFRIENDLY STATEMENTS AGAINST CHINA.

23. I REPLIED, HE NAD SPOKEN OF RELEASE 11 FLIERS, AND OF 10 CIVILIANS RELEASED SEPT 10 AS MOTIVATED BY DESIRE IMPROVE RELATIONS. I SUPPOSED THEN I COULD ONLY INTERPRET CONTINUED HOLDING OF 10 WHO STILL THERE IN SPITE OUR AGREEMENT AS MOTIVATED BY OPPOSTE DESIRE. CERTAINLY HARD FOR ME BELIEVE BEHAVIOR OF 10 STILL HERE SO MUCH WORSE THAN BEHAVIOR THOSE RELEASED AS TO PRECLUDE RELEASE. LET US BE CLEAR ABOUT THIS. WE GIVEN AS FIRST TASK QUESTION CIVILIANS. THAT BEEN COMPLETELY RESOLVED ON INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF AGENCY AND GOVT WHICH HE DESIGNATED TO CONFIRM THIS WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US. EVEN THOUGH DID NOT ENTER INTO ORIGINAL DISCUSSIONS, IT BEEN RESOLVED EVEN FOR CHINESE IMPRISONED FOR COMMON CRIMES. I HAD NOT THROWN OFF FOG OF ARGUMENTS ABOUT JURISDICTION, SOVEREIGNTY, OTHER SUCH TERMS--WE HAD GONE AHEAD AND RESOLVED IT. WE STILL DID NOT SEE EVIDENCE INTENT THIS AUTHORITIES RESOLVE IT EQUALLY AS FAR AS AMERICANS HIS COUNTRY CONCERNED. WE RESOLVED IT WITHOUT ASKING ANY POLITICAL CONCESSIONS. WE RESOLVED IT COMPLETELY IN SPIRIT AND LETTER OF AGREMENT INTO WHICH WE ENTERED. WE STILL LOOK FOR SIMILAR INTENT ON PART HIS AUTHORITIES.

24. I CONTINUED, NOT ONLY HAD THEY NOT RESOLVED THIS, BUT NOT RESOLVED QUESTION AMERICANS STILL MISSING FROM KOREAN HOSTILITIES. BOTH ARE SIMPLE STRAIGHT-FORWARD QUESTIONS RESOLVABLE NOT BY TALK OR FORMULAE BUT BY ACTION. NOTHING

COMPLICATED ABOUT THEM. THEY THINK THINGS CAN BE DONE SIMPLY. WHEN I FIRST RAISED QUESTION AMERICANS STILL MISSING KOREAN HOSTILITIES HE HAD SAID NOT PROPERLY WITHIN SCOPE OUR TALKS HERE. AS I HAD TOLD HIM AT TIME, I DID NOT RAISE SUBJECT HERE IN ORDER RAISE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US--I RAISED IT SOLELY GET RESOLUTION. IT MADE NO DIFFEENCE TO ME WHERE IT WAS RESOLVED. WHEN AFTER LAPSE OF OVER YEAR I RAISED IT AT LAST MEETING HE MADE REMARKABLE ALLEGATION THIS RESPONSIBILITY MY GOVT. HE MADE THIS ALLEGATION IN SPITE RESPONSIBILITY HIS SIDE ASSUMED UNDER KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND IN SPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE HIS GOVT AT LEAST AT ONE TIME HAD INFO REGARDING THESE MEN. I HAD CITED TO HIM EVIDENCE THIS.....REASONS WE AND FAMILIES THESE MEN FELT THEY MUST HAVE SOME INFO WITH REGARD THEIR FATE. I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THAT INFO COULD NOT BE GIVEN TO US. AS SAID IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WHERE, EITHER HERE OR KOREA.

GOWEN

JS

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Control: 9585
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 15, 1957
11:48 AM

Action Assigned to
Action Taken
Date of Action
Action Office Symbol
Name of Officer
Direction to DC/R

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 7 OF 7)

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FROM JOHNSON

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25. I CONTINUED, FOR EXAMPLE ON JUNE 22 1951, PEKING RADIO BROADCAST INFO REGARDING MR CASIMIRE T. DEMOLL INDICATING TO HIS FAMILY HE ALIVE AND WELL IN PRISON CAMP AT THAT TIME. ON JUNE 27 THAT YEAR SIMILAR BROADCAST CONCERNING WILLIAM D. SCHONDER AND ON JUNE 29 CONCERNING MYRON JOHNSON. IT CERTAINLY NOT RESPONSIBILITY US THAT HOPES FAMILTES RAISED IN REGARD THESE MEN. IT CERTAINLY NOT RESPONSIBILITY US THERE NO FURTHER INFO REGARDING THEM. THESE WERE JUST FEW OF MANY MANY CASES IN WHICH IT CLEAR WANG'S AUTHORITIES AT ONE TIME HAD THESE IN THEIR HANDS AND HAD INFO REGARD THEM. I AGAIN ASKED THAT INFO BE MADE AVAILABLE US, WHETHER HERE OR IN MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION KOREA. WAS MAKING NO ALLEGATIONS; IF THESE MEN DIED, IT WAS ALL THE INFO WE ASKED FOR. I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND, THOUGH, WHY INFO WITHHELD.

26. WANG REPLIED, ADVANCE RELEASE 11 AIRMEN AT OPENING THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND RELEASE TEN AMERICAN CRIMINALS SEPT 10 1955 ALL EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE HIS COUNTRY AND HAD BEEN MADE VOLUNTARILY ON THEIR PART. THOSE RELEASES INDEED REPRESENTED VITAL EFFORT MADE HIS GOVT VIEW IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. THIS RECOGNIZED FACT THROUGHOUT WORLD. WORLD RECOGNIZED CHINESE GOVT DID NOT MERELY ENGAGE IN TALKING BUT HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN CONCRETE ACTION IMPROVE RELATIONS. DETERIORATION RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES NOT RESULT UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE TO US BUT ON CONTRARY, HAD SOLELY BEEN RESULT HOSTILE, UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE US TOWARD CHINA. EVEN AFTER SERIES FRIENDLY ACTIONS TAKEN BY HIS GOVT, US

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-2- 790, FEBRUARY 15, 8 AM (SECTION 7 OF 7) FROM GENEVA

GOVT HAD NOT IN ANY SINGLE INSTANCE SHOWN SIMILAR INTENT TOWARD CHINA. THESE ACTUAL FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. IT US LACKING DESIRE IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA, NOT ANY LACK GOODWILL PART CHINA. THEREFORE HE WOULD LIKE CALL ATTENTION TO FACT IF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE, IT REQUIRED EQUAL SIMULTANEOUS EFFORT BOTH SIDES. IF MY GOVT KEPT DEMANDING ONE THING FROM HIS GOVT ONE DAY AND RAISING ANOTHER THE NEXT, IT IS SIMPLY WISHFUL THINKING. HE WOULD REFER TO SAYING IN HIS COUNTRY THAT IF PERSON TREATS ME WELL, I WILL GO ONE BETTER BUT IF HE TREATS ME ILL, LET HIM BEWARE OF CONSEQUENCES. WITH RESPECT OTHER POINTS I RAISED MY STATEMENT HE HAD AT LAST MEETING AND ALSO THIS MORNING EXPRESSED POSITION AND WOULD NOT TAKE TIME GO OVER THEM.

27. I SAID I HAD NOT ASKED HIM TAKE ANY ACTION WITH REGARD THOSE REMAINING AMERICANS OTHER THAN WHAT HE HAD TAKEN WITH REGARD ELEVEN AIRMEN AND TEN CIVILIANS. NOT ASKED TO TAKE ANY ACTION OTHER THAN WHAT WE HAD TAKEN IN REGARD CHINESE IN US.

28. WANG REJOINED, HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TIME AND AGAIN PROGRESS TALKS DEPEND CONCERTED EFFORTS TWO SIDES.

29. WANG SUGGESTED NEXT MEETING MARCH 14. I AGREED.

GOWEN

JS

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1957 FEB 15 PM 4 06
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March 8, 1957

SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Letter No. 66

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Alex:

1. Dave Osborn returned on March 4 and received a warm welcome. His ringside report on recent developments has been illuminating and has given us a better feel of the atmosphere. He reported to Mr. Robertson briefly on March 5. Unfortunately Mr. Phleger could not attend that session. Mr. Robertson left with the Secretary March 6 for the SEATO meeting at Canberra. Mr. Robertson will visit several of our SEA and SPA posts after the Canberra meeting and will not return to Washington until March 25. A copy of his itinerary is enclosed.

2. The Secretary on March 5 personally authorized your home leave following the next meeting on March 14. He agreed that you should take your full home leave, passing up the April meeting as far as you are concerned. We will have something to say in our guidance telegram which is to go out on March 11 regarding the way you will handle the announcement of your home leave plans with Wang at the next meeting.* The instructions will also cover the action you should take if Wang should insist on a meeting at some level while you are away. SE feels in any event you should go back to Prague for two or three days after the next meeting because

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

SECRET

there may be some excitement on March 15 generated by the Hungarian issue, which might have some repercussions throughout the bloc. We assume you would not plan to come direct to the States from Geneva in any event. The foregoing is all based on the assumption that you would like to take your home leave immediately. If you would prefer to postpone it until late spring or early summer, there is no opposition on anybody's part. More on this in your guidance telegram, and possibly in a follow-up letter by Monday's pouch which should reach you on or before the next meeting.

3. We are sending you several enclosures on the issue of American travel to Communist China, including the Secretary's comments at his March 5 press conference and a memorandum of conversation he had with an executive of the UP at the Gridiron Club dinner last Saturday night March 2. Also enclosed is an excerpt from the President's Press Conference of yesterday. This whole question is probably being debated right now on the Secretary's plane enroute to Canberra. The Secretary ~~and~~ Robertson, and Andrew Berding, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, were planning to review the matter at length aboard the plane. It looks as if there certainly will be no general relaxation and we in FE are hopeful that a strong line can be maintained.

4. You will have received news of Mackensen's reported release from prison upon expiration of his sentence. But we gather that he is so thoroughly brain washed that he is likely to elect to remain in Communist China at least for the present. No Departmental comment on Mackensen's release and his apparent decision to stay in China is now contemplated.

5. We are enclosing a copy of recent correspondence regarding the cases of prisoners Edwin Pon and John Woos. In regard to the Woos case, it is the confirmed U. S. Government position that dual nationals who are not dependents are not entitled to the benefits of the Agreed Announcement. For your background, we do not consider that we are bound to extend the benefits of the Agreed Announcement to alien Chinese criminals incarcerated after our offer to Chinese aliens of last summer. The Benefits of the Agreement are being offered to Pon because it seems desirable to do so in view of the fact that he was sentenced about the time of the arrangement of last summer. But this does not constitute a binding precedent. Each case will be judged on its own merits.

6. We do not contemplate any new tack in your instructions for the next meeting. Mr. Robertson's last word was that you could and should be as tough as you wanted to be in dealing with Wang on the violation of the Agreed Announcement. He sees no reason to pull your punches on this issue.

7. I have just learned that I am slated to go to Bermuda March 20-24 for the talks with the UK.

Regards and good wishes and a hope that we shall have the pleasure of seeing you soon.

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Robertson's itinerary.
2. Correspondence on Edwin Pon Case
   Letter to Pon 3/1/57

Enclosures (continued)

Letter to Senator Kennedy 2/20/57
Letter to Senator Kennedy from Edwin Pon 1/28/57
Memo from Department of Justice to CA 2/11/57
Memo from Warden-Lewisburg to Director 2/6/57
Letter from Edwin Pon to Warden Taylor 2/4/57

3. Letter to Mr. Munsiff re John Wood 3/6/57
4. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Frank Bartholomew, UP, dated 3/3/57
5. FBIS March 6 - Text of Chou En-lai's speech
6. Press Release No. 111 - Secretary Dulles' News Conference 3/5/57
7. Text of President Eisenhower's News Conference March 7, 1957 (N. Y. Times 3-8-57)
8. Memo of Conversation 2/19/57 with Congressman Lane

* The Secretary wants you to describe your home leave to Wang as being for the purpose of consultation and a needed rest, when the time comes to inform him.

FE:CA:WPMcConaughy/ikb

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Guidance for March 14 meeting:

1. Keep discussion throughout meeting centered on growing sense outrage American people over failure Chinese Communists keep pledge of September 10, 1955. This evidence bad faith casts doubt on Chinese Communist protestations they desire improvement relations. US attitude throughout on issue been one of extreme forbearance. Chinese Communists have had ample time demonstrate good faith. However, far from showing good faith by implementing announcement they have been increasingly demanding political advantage. Chinese Communists should realize no progress can be made these talks by repudiating agreements, making false charges, or holding hostages for political ransom.

2. If Wang threatens public statement, you should point out such statements not conducive to progress, reserve right public reply and point out no amount false charges and distortions can substitute for performance. FYI We consider our case so strong this point that Communist statement can do little damage. END FYI.

611.93/3-1157

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Ans.
Rev.
Cat.

Drafted by: FE:CA:RNClough:DLOsborn/jas/emm 3/11/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: William J. Sebald WJS

Clearances: L - Mr. Phleger (in draft)

S/S-CR
MAR 11 1957 P.M.

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3. On other subjects maintain position as required, leading discussion back to civilians by pointing out essential establish some mutual good faith before considering other agreements.

4. In your discretion, cite Mackensen case as example violation Agreed Announcement. He presumably would have been released at end of term even if Agreed Announcement non-existent. Challenge Wang to show any part Agreed Announcement was applied by Communists his case.

5. If you decide on consultation and home leave at this time, suggest you inform Wang you must return to US for extended period this purpose and propose next meeting late May.

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Herter, ACTING (wy)

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Lot 72 D 415

March 11, 1957

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LETTER No. 67

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy received a message yesterday that his 86-year old father was seriously ill following a heart attack, so he flew to Alabama. He hopes to be back on Wednesday but that will, of course, depend on his father's condition.

I have only one item to add at this time to Walter's letter of March 8. The Department of Defense "Prisoner Officer," Jim Kelleher, has told us that there is strong sentiment in Defense for an official "progress report" of some kind on actions taken by State and Defense regarding the missing 450. Both departments, but particularly Defense, are under continuous pressure from relatives and interested parties in Congress and elsewhere for action. Congressman Lane's proposed resolution that this be made the "primary objective of the foreign policy of the United States" (later toned down at our suggestion) is an indication of the feeling. Unfortunately, the only progress report we could make is one which said, in effect, "no progress," but it would serve to show that we have not been idle. We would appreciate any ideas you might have as to the kind of public statement that might be usefully made on this subject. We would, of course, have to decide whether

we would

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva

we would stick to the 450 figure or use the new figure of 383, with a suitable explanation to account for the difference.

We will meet today to draft instructions for your next meeting. As Walter said, we do not expect to come up with anything new. We are all looking forward to seeing you when you come home on leave.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

FE:CA:RNClough:emm

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

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6:38 AM

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FROM JOHNSON

WOULD APPRECIATE INFO WHETHER LEE LI-CHUEN DEPARTED FEBRUARY 23 AS MENTIONED PARA 6 DEPTEL 815.

GOWEN

JS

Action Assigned to CA/OR
Action Taken Reply drafted
Date of Action 3/13
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Your 874.

Lee Li-chuen departed February 23 President Wilson ETA Hong Kong March 18

HERTER

Herter

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FE:CA:RAReinhard:jas:3/13/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
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2:04 p.m.

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Direction to DC/R file

1/6

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 881, March 14, 6 p.m.

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FROM JOHNSON

SAIGON FROM ROBERTSON

Two hour meeting this morning with no new developments. Wang opened with statement attacking "stepping up" of slanderous attacks and false charges by US spokesmen. Secretary's Canberra statement was "particular evidence this campaign poison atmosphere and try slander China in order arrest improvement Sino-American relations". This contrary attitude of even American people where even including "some occupying important positions were speaking out for change in US ostrich policy toward China". USG "trying through renunciation force doctrine induce China recognize present status American control over Taiwan". Military control over Taiwan being "incessantly intensified" extending military bases and planning install guided missiles. "Aggressive steps by US in Taiwan would only enable all Chinese patriots including those now on Taiwan recognize" US attempting enslave Chinese nation. Chinese people desire "be kindly terms" with American people. Referring to FMC, trade and cultural proposals "if there will and desire" by US improve relation should get down to serious discussions rather than entangling talks by introducing side issues.

I carried out theme paragraph 1 DEPTEL 895 pointing out PRC had agreed civilians first matter and by refusing to solve was one blocking progress. Agreed announcement was also test good faith and value of agreements but had operated only to advantage PRC. American spokesmen had and would continue express growing sense outrage of American people against PRC bad faith in carrying out

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that agreement. PRC failure resolve question American civilians belied their professions desire improve relations, et cetera. Also cited failure PRC agree renunciation force.

Give and take centered almost entirely around implementation with Wang reiterating familiar charges, and I reiterating theme only way to progress was carrying out agreed announcement, citing GOI and UK as proofs of who had demonstrated good faith with respect agreement. During course give and take informed him departure of Lee Lic-chuen.

Meeting closed on note my blunt reiteration release Americans and renunciation force essential.

He accepted my proposal next meeting Thursday April 11.

Full record by pouch leaving tonight.

Returning Prague tomorrow morning.

OWENS

AB:BAG/5

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TO: Secretary of State

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FROM JOHNSON

1. Wang opened 66th with prepared statement. As result my side dragging out talks and persisting in unreasonable demands we have failed make progress. This state affairs could not but cause them doubt that my government had any sincere desire resolve problems. Even in U.S. itself, more and more people getting fed up this attitude my side. More and more people, even including some occupying important positions, were speaking out for change in U.S. ostrich policy toward China. These people take view removal trade barriers, cultural exchange, holding of Foreign Ministers Conference, might be carried out as concrete steps leading to improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations.

2. Wang continued instead of considering these ideas, however, spokesmen of U.S. Government stepping up slanderous attacks and false charges. Recent statement U.S. Secretary of State at Canberra meeting was particular evidence of this campaign poison atmosphere and try slander China, in order to arrest improvement Sino-American relations. In course these talks, my side trying incessantly through so-called Renunciation Force Doctrine induce China recognize present status American control over Taiwan. U.S. also incessantly intensifying military control over Taiwan, extending military bases and planning install guided missiles. Such maneuvers could hardly be reconciled with purposes we should pursue in

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these negotiations. Aggressive steps adopted by U.S. in Taiwan would only enable all Chinese patriots, including those now on Taiwan, to recognize that steps now being taken by U.S. were attempt enslave Chinese nation.

3. Wang continued Chinese people desire be kindly terms with American people. Chinese people not to blame for failure bring about improvement Sino-American relations. In discussions here his side already contributed series efforts with aim improve relations between two countries. Proposals made by his side calling for meeting between Chinese and American Foreign Ministers, removal of trade barriers, and peoples contacts and cultural exchange are just such effective steps for improvement in relations between the two countries. If there still any desire on part my government for improvement relations as well as resolution questions between China and America he did not see why there should be further delay our getting down to serious discussions. Only by putting forward constructive opinions and display of good faith, rather than entangling talks by introducing side issues, can improvement in relations be effected. This what he had always tried achieve in these talks.

4. I replied he had spoken of what he alleged were attempts of U.S. entangle these talks with side issues. Impossible for me understand how he could make such statement in light history steps leading up to these talks and talks themselves. In fact I had been one who had been attempting keep us to resolution problems with which we given to deal. No amount such statements could change fact our governments gave us as first task question of return civilians.

5. I continued in Terms Reference setting up these talks his government had agreed that was first question. Even before meetings began his authorities stated this question would be easy to settle with respect

Americans detained in his country, and my authorities, even before these meetings began, settled it with respect to Chinese in my country. When his authorities agreed to those Terms of Reference and made those statements, they well knew from the talks which he and I had had here in 1954, and the subsequent contacts between respective consular officers, that my country not interested theoretical concepts or abstract theories; that it was not then concerned about Americans who appeared to have chosen to remain in his country or other irrelevant questions -- what we might term side issues. It interested solely ensuring that a specific group Americans should be able return their country -- Americans who being denied their right return either through refusal exit permits or through imprisonment. If there any possibility doubt this regard, it would have been entirely dispelled by statements I had made at very opening our discussions here. Indeed our discussions respect Americans leading up to Agreement September 10, 1955 had to do entirely with that group Americans whose names I had given him. He hAD given me every reason believe agreement proposed by him would lead to "expeditious" resolution that problem, and on that basis I had entered into Agreed Announcement.

6. I continued, results however had been precisely contrary not only to our expectations but to clear words of pledge contained that Agreement. For more than year it been apparent policy his government require all ~~xxxx~~ remaining imprisoned Americans serve full terms their sentences even down to last day. There seemed be clear intent not resolve first question with which we called upon deal, even at price violating solemn public commitment. There seemed be clear intent perpetuate this acknowledged first obstacle to improvement relations between us. American people, American Government and myself find it entirely impossible reconcile

statements he and his authorities had made with regard desire improve relations between our two peoples and continued failure carry out first agreement between us. At time we entered into that agreement I pointed out to him as earnestly and clearly as I could that if it were desire his government improve relations between us, the carrying out of that agreement was of utmost importance. I pointed out at time, agreement itself meant nothing. Only its implementation could have meaning. He was well aware at time we entered into that agreement of very favorable effects it had on public opinion my country. I pointed out to him at time that those effects would be dispelled unless it carried out. As had often pointed out here it would have been better never enter into agreement if it not to be carried out. What I had said at that time I believed had been amply borne out. Those effects had been dispelled.

7. I continued there was increasing sense outrage among American people and American Government not only over failure these Americans return, but over what we could only consider as bad faith which had thus far been demonstrated in carrying out this first agreement between us. Spokesmen for American Government could not, even if they would, conceal or ignore this feeling. They had and would continue express sentiments of American people this regard. If facts unpleasant to Wang's authorities, it was they who must blame themselves for creating this set of facts. They could not expect extract price political advantage for carrying out their already pledged word. This could not be obscured by introducing proposals on subsidiary matters. Progress could not be achieved by repudiating agreements which had been made, by making false charges or holding hostages for political advantage. It could not be concealed by charges that U.S. using these as pretext to prevent improvement relations.

8. I continued I had reiterated that his authorities had agreed that this question return civilians would be first question we should handle here. They could not conceal fact that their failure make progress this first question was what had prevented progress these talks. Attitude my government regarding this Question had throughout these long months been one of greatest forbearance. Only his authorities could remove this continuing block to progress which they themselves had established. Only his authorities could make decision that they willing renounce use armed force in achievement their objectives and accept simple and straightforward proposals we had made for renunciation force and settlement these issues only by peaceful means. If, as Wang said, atmosphere being poisoned, it not been by any action U.S. It been by failure his authorities carry out already pledged word and by failure his authorities renounce their threat use armed force achieve their ambitions. They and only they could correct this situation.

9. Wang replied every time he came here he had had determined hope my authorities would change present policy dragging out talks and preventing progress these deliberations. However, each time after he had finished listening to my words he had felt that attitude I maintained could not contribute to progress these talks. Their side had made clear in past that number American nationals in China small and resolution their problems could be made easy. If we examined course these talks from opening meeting to present with sober mind, we able readily see Chinese Government had always faithfully carried out agreement entered into with respect question civilians. All charges being poured upon his government in connection question civilians false and not true. Government which failed carry out concluded agreement on civilians none other than American Government itself.

10. Wang continued he had in past repeatedly called attention of my government to fact steps being adopted by my authorities in connection requirement Taiwan entry permit and permanent residence requirement entirely violated agreement between us. Action taken by my authorities in restricting and interfering with freedom of communication between Chinese residents in U.S. and families in China as well as action taken by my authorities in coercing Chinese residents in proceeding to Taiwan were all violations of agreement. U.S. failed up to now account for failure of return 53 Chinese in U. S. whose names he had given me and failed account for failure another group 22 persons return. Could this attitude taken by American authorities be reconciled with provisions our agreement. Although he had made repeated representations in these meetings, this failure carry out Agreed Announcement with respect Chinese in U.S. had not been corrected or improved.

11. Wang continued charges made by American Government in connection with question civilians could only be considered as tactic to cover American Government's own failure carry out agreement with regard Chinese in U.S. So far as improvement in relations between our two peoples concerned, of which I had spoken this morning, Wang's side aware there was such a desire among American people, in same way as Chinese people had desire improve relations between two countries. Statements made by American spokesmen entirely contrary to this desire of American people. I had spoken about what I called feeling of outrage against his country among American people; his side could not discover any such feeling among ~~Amer~~ American people. Rising sense of outrage seen by side was not outrage against China but rather outrage against American Government's repeated efforts try continue prevent reestablishment contact between Chinese and

American peoples. If one was going to talk about improvement relations, lip service not sufficient, but rather adoption of concrete steps toward real improvement in relations between two countries. These concrete steps include putting forward concrete opinion and steps with view to really improving relations. A single action of advantage to both sides was a greater contribution to improving relations than much empty talk. The taking of such action would not only help progress our talks, but action itself in interest both peoples.

12. I replied I believed I probably in better position speak for and represent feelings American people. However, he entirely right when said American people desired better relations with people his country. They did this in spite hostility his government demonstrated toward U.S. and its allies. He made serious error if he interpreted these expressions of desire for better relations with his country as lack concern for, or absence resentment of, fact that his country had thus far failed either to release our fellow citizens whom Wang's country holds, or to carry out first agreement between us. American people did not enjoy living in attitude of hostility with anyone or toward anyone. No one would be quicker to respond to action by others indicating desire for such friendship. He had well said that lip service not sufficient, concrete steps are what counted. This precisely what I, my Government, and American people been seeking with regard to first item agenda. This precisely what his government had not done. As I had previously said, the question resolving first item agenda by action rather than words was something which transcended even importance of individual Americans concerned. It was test whether agreements between us were to have substance and whether they to be carried out. He had talked about necessity of agreements being advantageous

to both sides. I would certainly not argue with that. What had happened with respect this first agreement between us was that ia appeared be entirely to advantage his side, with no advantage my side. In fact as I had again pointed out this morning, it seemed to have worked to positive disadvantage our side. Whereas even prior our agreement, his authorities had on occasion released Americans prior expiration full term sentences imposed, now his side not only not permitted all return expeditiously in accordance agreement between us, but even required them serve full term sentences.

13. I continued, on other hand I had from beginning fully met all pertinent points his views regarding Chinese in U.S. In 1954 we had talked of Chinese students in U.S. who being prevented returning his country. By time we met here August 1955, all orders preventing return such students had been withdrawn. Thus in that matter I had entirely met his point view. That I had done so and that any Chinese in U.S. desiring return his country could do so, was proven by official statements of very agency he himself had suggested for establishing facts.

14. I continued no amount of distorted efforts to attempt misrepresent various aspects U.S. immigration legislation could change fact, established by evidence of third power agency established for purpose, that no Chinese in U.S. desiring return to Wang's country had been or was being obstructed from doing so. Chinese steadily returning to his country whenever they desired do so. My latest information was that 277 had returned by direct route to Hong Kong since beginning our talks here. I had no way knowing how many returned other routes. He continued speak of 53 and 22 and demanded what he termed accounting for them. U.S. was under no obligation provide accounting for Chinese in U.S. What it was under obligation to do

and would do was not obstruct departure of any Chinese in U.S. who desired depart. As far as 53 and 22 concerned I had told him in past and reiterated categorically that their return not being obstructed and if they had not returned it was because they did not desire do so. If they felt being obstructed, they, along with any other Chinese in U.S., entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy. They had not done so as far as I knew. Certainly no case alleged obstruction brought to attention my government by Indian Embassy. I certainly did not propose have them cross-examined as to reasons for whatever decisions they may have made.

15. I continued there was another example of continued freedom of Chinese in U.S. to proceed to Wang's country if they desired do so. I referred to case Lee Li-chuen, whom he mentioned 64th meeting here. This man at no time prevented from returning Wang's country if he desired do so. This true even though he was seaman on ship registered by Government Republic China and had overstayed period temporary admission to U.S. and was therefore subject to deportation. According my information he had departed from U.S. on February 23 en route to Hong Kong. It my understanding he expressed intention proceeding Wang's country at time he left. However, whether he did so was of course matter his own choice.

16. I continued again as matter meeting Wang's point of view and advantageous his side, after he had raised with me question imprisonment Chinese common criminals U.S. we took measures assure any Chinese desiring proceed Wang's country able do so. The one who desired do so was enabled do so -- even though he far from having served term sentence or even eligible for parole.

17. I continued, thus situation regard Chinese in U.S. contrasted sharply with that of Americans imprisoned in Wang's country. Thus there

appeared to have been what he would term no advantage to American side in this agreement. However what is even more serious is that it calls into question whether agreements between us are to be mere forms and words or whether they to have concrete substance. It calls into question whether we to give appearance by form of words of having resolved questions between us -- or whether we to resolve them. Thus first question we called on to deal with had been resolved with respect Chinese in my country. It had not been resolved with respect Americans imprisoned in Wang's country; and it would not be resolved until they permitted to return in accordance agreement entered into 1955.

18. Wang replied I had quoted him as having said in past that whatever agreement we entered into should be advantageous to both sides. I had indicated having accepted this opinion. However when it came to concrete facts, I had always demonstrated attitude entirely ignoring interests his side, while simply seeking advantage my own side. This particularly conspicuous respect Chinese now in U.S. prisons for offenses. This group Chinese in prison in U.S. very ~~gi~~ big yet my side so far failed give his side complete full list their names. In dealing with question Chinese in U.S., my side only thus far released one of these people and allowed him return China. My side not taken steps with respect remaining prisoners. My authorities even conducted illegal screening process on them against their will. Wang's side could not believe anyone in prison could freely express his choice as to where he wished to go.

19. Wang continued he glad be informed by me concerning desire among American people improve relations between two countries. However American officials not only dared not openly make remarks expressing such desire but had deliberately insulted and made false charges against China.

Wang's side agreed that improvement relations between two countries urgent task we called upon to serve. They acknowledged question civilians had been one part of differences between us. Insofar as question civilians concerned his side already entered into Agreed Announcement and up to two sides to carry out this agreement faithfully. Frankly he had to make it clear that while his government, his side, willing continue strive for improvement relations between two countries, his government could not be made to renounce its sovereignty. What was more, question civilians was far from being sole issue between us. In addition to this question there were other questions such as Foreign Ministers Conference, removal of embargo against his country and reestablishment of peoples contacts and cultural exchange between two countries. All these questions and maybe others urgently call for solution between us. If I were going to entangle these talks by sticking to question civilians while refusing take steps resolve other important questions, he could only interpret this as deliberate attempt prevent progress our talks by using question civilians as pretext. This certainly cannot result in any benefit to our talks.

20. I replied tangling had been done by his side. If his side wanted to resolve first question civilians, could have done so August 2, 1955 by simply matching action my government already taken, that is permit civilians both sides who desire do so to return. Evidence of third parties designated under our agreement of September 10, 1955 showed who had permitted that take place and who had not. Difficult foresee value further agreements between us when first agreement not carried out and when his side refused unconditionally to say our disputes would be settled only by peaceful means.

After Wang indicated he had nothing more to say
21./ I proposed next meeting Thursday, April 11. Wang agreed.

UAJohnson/mbf

GOWEN

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E

EE- Mr. Freers

Ed,

Please read the attached letter of March 14 from Alex Johnson. I presume EUR has no objection to his proposal to take leave from about May 10 to July 1, but I would like to have definite confirmation of that before I answer his letter. I am also attaching a copy of my letter to Alex of March 8.

Walter P. McConaughy

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OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
MAR 19 1957
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

March 14, 1957

EE - Mr. Freers

SECRET

OFFICIAL -- INFORMAL

Letter No. 55

Dear Walter:

You will see that nothing remarkable developed at today's meeting. At the end I virtually dared him to make a move to break off if he wanted to but he didn't accept the challenge.

First, I enormously appreciated your letter and the authority from the Department to take home leave if I desired to do so. Please express my personal appreciation to the Secretary at a suitable opportunity. Frankly, when I wrote to EE I had no thought whatever of the possibility, and, as I told them, was thinking only of a quick trip between monthly meetings. However, I must confess that the prospect of some leave at home is most attractive, and opens up new vistas that I had not contemplated....

Therefore, to extract maximum advantage from the opportunity I took advantage of your generous offer to set my own time and did not ask for the postponement this time. My present thought is at the meeting May 9 or thereabouts to ask for the following meeting July 11. This would enable me to leave directly from Geneva following the May 9 meeting, spend the week of May 13 in the Department, start leave the week of May 20 taking about six weeks ending about June 30, and be back in Prague for the July 4 reception, and then come down here for the meeting the following week. This is, of course, always subject to any last minute developments either here

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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Lot 72 D 415

or in Prague that would clearly make it undesirable. I would appreciate your letting EE know of this plan, and confirming that neither FE or EE have any objections. I do not know how Wang will take it, but the more I think about it I think that it might not be a bad idea from the standpoint of the talks themselves. In any event, I might come back with a somewhat more sprightly approach. Frankly, I feel run out of ideas at the moment.

Now for other business. Thanks very much for your letter of March 8, as well as for Ralph's of March 11. . . .

I see that Taipei came up with about the same idea as the Secretary's on the correspondents. It seems like a very good out to me and hope that it goes through.

I have gone over the ICRC list of Korean POW's (your transmittal slip 2/28/57). While I have not had a chance to check it against our list, I am struck by some very odd aspects that appear to indicate it is in itself very incomplete. You will note that it is arranged alphabetically starting off with "Chidester" an American and continues with Americans "no materials available" through "Smith" and then suddenly shifts to "Southworth" British through "Wylie" British "no materials available" and then again starts up with Americans running from "Adamo through "Chavez". It then starts out with "Macnair-raga" an American escapee and runs alphabetically through"Zawacki" later starting with "Alcorn" as an American escapee and running through "Levitski". Subsequently it starts another alphabetical list of Americans "no materials available" with "Jensen" and running through "Ziemer", but there does not appear to be any place that the first part of that alphabetical series is given. In any event I would appreciate knowing what Defense makes of it, and whether it adds anything to what we were given at Panmunjon.

With respect to Ralph's inquiry on my views concerning a public "progress report" on this question, I certainly have no objection from my standpoint. I think that by all means we ought to use the new figure of 383 with an explanation of the difference. I have no particular thoughts on what form it might take, but perhaps a letter to a Congressional committee pegged to Lane's resolution might be the best. I have no objection, and, in fact think it ought to include what we have done here on the subject, keeping it entirely factual.

I notice that in the Secretary's statement at Canberra he spoke of the Chinese Communist refusal to renounce war "as an instrument of its policy in relation to Taiwan and Penghu", whereas we have previously been very careful to use the term "Taiwan area" so as to embrace the offshore islands. Does this have any significance? I am sure it will be noted in Peiping and Taipeh.

Has the "Wirin case" entirely subsided or is it going to raise its head again?

Tell Dave we have been moved out of our room because of the Hungarian hearings and are back where we were during the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

I hope you have a chance for a little relaxation at Bermuda. I do not suppose you are getting to make the slow cruiser trip, but it would be nice if you could.

All the best to everyone.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. Tell whoever handles it that they no longer need to send the Daily Summary extracts to me here. With the gap between meetings the copies I receive at Prague are entirely sufficient.

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March 21, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL INFORMAL

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy has just informed me that your tentative plans for home leave call for leaving directly for the States from Geneva about May 10.

I regret to have to bring up a complication but thought you should know that a meeting of the Eastern European Chiefs of Mission is now scheduled for May 10 through 13 in Vienna. Burke Elbrick will preside, and among others expecting to attend are Messrs. Henderson, Murphy, Perkins and Bill Clark from USIA. We feel it very important that you be there to present your views about the situation in Czechoslovakia at the meeting.

I hope the delay of a few days will not seriously disrupt your home leave plans. You will be receiving more specific information about the meeting very shortly.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Edward L. Freers

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva, Switzerland

Lot 72 D 415

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Rec'd: April 5, 1957
6:41 a.m.

FROM: Prague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 487, April 5, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

Wang's interpreter called Ekvall this morning and asked for postponement next meeting to May 15 as Wang was in China in connection visit Polish Prime Minister. I have replied May 15 not possible for me and have suggested any time between May 6 and May 9. Will inform Department when reply received.

JOHNSON

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Control: 4978
Rec'd: April 8, 1957
9:49 a.m.

FROM: Prague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 491, April 8, Noon

MYTEL 487.

Wang has replied not possible meet before May 15. In view desirability my meeting with him after his return from Peiping and before my consultation with Department have agreed to May 15 meeting. Usual announcement postponement meeting will be made at Geneva but have authorized PAO there inform any press inquirers on background basis postponement at Wang's request.

At May 15 meeting will propose July 11 for next following meeting.

Plan depart Geneva evening May 15 arriving Washington afternoon May 16.

JOHNSON

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April 17, 1957

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Lot 72 D 415

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

SECRET

LETTER NO. 68

Dear Alex:

The cancellation of the April meeting at Geneva has somewhat disrupted the normal exchange of letters with you there. CA has been sending to Geneva some of the material that would normally have been sent as enclosures to a letter, so as to keep down the bulk of the letter I will send you in time for the May 15 meeting. However, Defense has raised some questions with regard to the missing personnel issue, going beyond the immediate context of the Geneva meetings, and we would appreciate your preliminary thoughts on the matter, if possible before your arrival in Washington.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter from Defense asking about the current status of your efforts at Geneva, and whether it would be desirable for the UNC again to raise the issue in the MAC. The Defense letter enclosed a copy of a statement prepared by the UNC for possible use in the latter eventuality, and asked for our approval or comments. We sent Defense an interim reply to the effect we were asking you for your comments and would reply more fully when we had heard from you.

On the desirability of taking the issue up in the MAC, it is our feeling here that we can build up a better public position if we maintain a posture of

unremitting

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Embassy,
Prague.

SECRET

unremitting efforts in both forums to get an accounting, continuing to bring it up both at Geneva and in the MAC.

I think you will agree that the proposed UNC statement is not of the sort best calculated to build up a strong public position, and that it should be re-written to bring it more into line with the approach you have followed at Geneva. To be of maximum usefulness, a public position on the missing personnel question ought to be ready for disclosure by the fall, shortly before the opening of the UNGA. It would be good if, before that time, all the well-documented individual cases (i.e., those where the Communists obviously should have information, but have indicated "no data" in their accounting) could have been cited, either in your presentations at Geneva, or the MAC, or both, We also feel our position would be stronger if the UNC took more note of the Communist "accounting," calling attention to its falsifications and its inadequacies, but not simply ignoring it. For example, with regard to the "escaped" category, the UNC could ask the Communists to provide supplementary data on the time and place of escape. Naturally any presentation in the MAC should be cleared by such other of the 16 allies as have unaccounted for personnel on the list, but this ought not to prove too difficult.

If a general strategy along the above lines can be agreed upon, it would not cause much of a change from your past approach to the problem at Geneva. There would be individual presentations on perhaps four or five persons per meeting, drawing your material largely from the better documented cases in the Air Force roster (as the Air Force list was entirely in the "no data" category in the Communist "accounting"). We have sent on to Geneva material on 20 USAF personnel. However, you need not feel restricted to the use of this material, as Defense has informed us that all the information on the copy of the roster you have (Air Force included) may be used as though it were unclassified, except for actual citations of certain specific intelligence sources.

With regard to the selection of "well-documented" cases for individual citation, we believe after talking to Defense it would be better to let you choose on the basis of the material you have in Geneva, as you will in any case to work up the presentation. We will effect some coordination with the effort in the MAC by keeping Defense informed of the cases you have cited.

I would hope that when you are here on consultation we will be able to arrange a meeting on the missing personnel question with Defense representatives. We would appreciate any comments you may be able to send us before your arrival in Washington, however, as they would help prepare the ground for our discussions.

Sincerely yours,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated 3/11/57 from Gen. Erskine with attached copies of letter, and statement proposed by the UN Command.

CA:DLOsborn:emm

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(101)

This document consists of 4 pages; No. 1 of 4 copies, Series A

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
April 24, 1957.

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Walter:

I have received your letter of April 17 with regard to the next steps concerning the missing POWs.

I should have, perhaps, earlier expressed my thoughts on handling this. I have been thinking that the most useful, and also effective from the standpoint of public relations, procedure would be that of what might be termed a "whipsawing" operation somewhat in the past pattern. That is, take it up alternately in Panmunjon and Geneva along the pattern of our first exercise. That is, Panmunjon had not got any place on it, so I took it up in Geneva. Then Panmunjon took it up again and received some very small although entirely unsatisfactory results in that the other side did accept the lists and did make some small pretence of an additional accounting. I then, again took it up at Geneva, and it would now seem to me that it would be well for Panmunjon again to take it up before I make another move in Geneva on it. I am sorry that it has not been taken up again before now in Panmunjon. If and when they get no place at Panmunjon, I will again hit Wang with it in detail. In the meantime I will continue to take advantage of all suitable opportunities to mention it as a still outstanding item of business. Perhaps it would be well for me to at least touch on it again at the May meeting.

I do not see any particular advantage in attempting to exhaust by individual presentations what might be termed the well-documented individual cases. They having accepted the list of names, we are always in position accurately to tell inquirers that the individual case in which they are interested has specifically been brought to the attention of the other side. You will note that the cases I have thus far used and I believe to be by far the strongest from the standpoint of such a presentation are those in which

Walter P. McConaughy, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

Peiping had itself admitted they were at one time being held. I am under the impression that I have already used the best cases in this category, although there may be a few more. Not having the lists here I am not sure, but Dave who did all the research for me on this will undoubtedly be able to recall. In any event I will look into it on my next trip. If my belief is correct, I am now or soon will be at the point of citing cases in which the evidence is primarily unilateral from our side. While, I do not, of course, question the validity of such evidence and its usefulness in other contexts it seems to me that for Geneva purposes it is much better that I continue to make my stand on those cases where Peiping itself had acknowledged the man was being held. I have left him now with the impression that I may well still have a large number of such cases in my pocket. If I pull out any considerable number of other types of cases he will undoubtedly heave a sigh of relief that I do not have him on as bad a spot as he is with those I first cited. Therefore, I would propose that the next time I take the matter up in detail I cite any additional cases I may have in the first category, or if necessary refer back to those previously cited rather than taper off on what may be weaker cases from a Geneva standpoint.

I cannot think of anything that would be better calculated to give them the impression our sole purpose is to make a propaganda play out of this issue rather than a serious quest for information than the draft statement submitted by the UNC. While I well realize the difference in tone between the Panmunjon and Geneva meetings I should think that it would be worthwhile for the UNC to at least try a somewhat different approach on this subject. It probably will not produce any more results, but it certainly stands a better chance of doing so than the approach in the draft. Also, it seems better to me from the standpoint of the 16 and public relations when the record is published. I also thoroughly agree that any such statement must take account of the Communist "accounting" calling attention to its falsifications and inadequacies rather than simply ignoring it. I should think that this would be much more effective than building the case almost entirely around the fact that some prisoners were taken to Mainland China as in the draft, the apparent presumption being that we think that the PRC is holding all or most of those on our present list. Our primary interest is not whether prisoners were taken to China, but in information about them. From my examination of the present cases

I would doubt that many of them involve their ever having been taken to China. While they may be holding back some information, my feeling is that in fact they probably just do not have the records, particularly in the cases of those who fell into the hands of the North Koreans. This does not mean that we should not keep pressing them, but I am not sanguine we will ever achieve any substantial results.

I also do not see the point in the draft of laboring the point on PRC belligerency and "volunteers" in Korea. They seem largely to have dropped this fiction and I do not think we should seem to be going out of our way to labor the point.

I would, therefore, suggest a complete rewriting of the draft and believe that Dave Osborn should be able to do so. He thoroughly knows the subject, knows my ideas on it, and I would be content with anything he produces.

I assume the UNC has now been informed of what I have last done at Geneva on the subject. I should think it would be well to arrange to keep it informed on a current basis and ask that they do the same. Because of the GA resolution I should also think it well to keep the record clear on keeping Hammarskjold informed.

I will, of course, be very glad to discuss the subject when I am in Washington. My present plan is to spend the week beginning May 20 in the Department and I hope to be able to finish everything in that week. It will be a busy time and I hope that between you and EE you can schedule it in the most efficient way. I leave myself entirely in your hands so feel free to arrange anything you think useful. I hope that the Secretary, Walter and Hermann will be there at some time during that week.

I am leaving here May 8 for the Vienna EE Chiefs of Mission meeting which begins May 10. (There are no planes on May 9, the national holiday here, and also for various reasons I would prefer to be out of town on that day.) I plan to leave Vienna the morning of May 13 and arrive in Geneva the same afternoon. I then plan to leave Geneva the evening of May 15 for New York, and if my car is ready drive down to Washington May 16. If you want to get in touch with me while I am in Vienna you can, of course, do so through the Embassy there.

Pat is leaving here directly May 10 and will arrive in Washington May 12.

Regards to all and looking forward to seeing you soon for a real good chat, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

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No. 2 of 5 Copies. Series A.

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
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May 10, 1957

Lot 72 D 415

Letter No. 69

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy has gone off on a short trip to Alabama and expects to be back early next week. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after twice postponing his appearance before them to discuss his appointment as Ambassador to Burma, has indicated that they will call him late next week. Naturally he is anxious to complete this procedure and receive his confirmation.

Since you have not had a letter from CA for some time I will try to include here mention of the principal developments relating to your talks during the last month. We intend to begin preparation of instructions for your next meeting today and will probably meet with Mr. Robertson on Monday to put them in final form. We do not anticipate any new departure.

1. Appearances of Department Officers on Hill on March 28: Bill Sebald and Walter McConaughy appeared before the Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to answer questions about the ban on correspondents travel to Communist China. The members of the Subcommittee were quite sympathetic to our position, with only two or three members appearing to question it seriously. The majority appeared to take the position that the central question was whether or not a distinction between newsmen and ordinary citizens for the purpose of travel was justified. We have sent you separately the record of the proceedings. On April 2, Mr. Murphy went before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. He made a very forceful presentation of the Department's policy, which was put out as a press release by the Department, and a copy of which has been sent you. The Senators were somewhat less sympathetic and understanding than the Representatives had been with Bill Sebald and Walter. Their questions were sharp and the hearing was rather lengthy. Following the hearing, Senator Fulbright sent over an additional list of some 35 questions to be answered by the Department. The questions were for the most part along the same lines as the ones asked in the hearing itself, but some of them were very trickily worded. One of them, for example, was the question whether the fact of non-recognition itself made it more difficult for

the Department

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

the Department to extend protection to Americans traveling in Communist China. As you can imagine, it is difficult to phrase an answer to this question without appearing either to offer an argument for recognition or, on the other hand, to discount the validity of the argument that we cannot offer protection as one of the reasons behind our policy. Another question which appeared to be somewhat loaded was the question of whether you at Geneva still felt that removing the travel ban would have an unfavorable effect on the prospects for release of the prisoners or whether you had come to believe, in the light of the propaganda advantage that Peiping had already gained from exploiting the issue, that the ban no longer had any value in your negotiations. Our answer to this one was in effect that your position at Geneva had always been along the lines of the Department's press release of August 7, that you felt the travel of certain reporters in defiance of the ban had weakened your position vis-a-vis the ban, and that you had stressed that the Communists would probably not release the Americans in exchange for a removal of the ban. The Department agreed with this analysis, and in any case did not intend to bargain for the release of Americans. (I am enclosing a copy of the FE portion of our reply).

2. The Worthy Case: William Worthy was given a hearing on April 29 in order to inform him officially of the tentative denial of his request for a new passport. The Department, at this stage, kept the focus on the issues as defined in the passport regulations. The next step will presumably be a hearing before the Board of Passport Appeals. ~~I am enclosing the transcript of the hearing~~.

3. Cases of Downey, Fecteau and Redmond: We have already sent to Geneva a memorandum of conversation with Mrs. Downey, the mother of John Downey, in which Mr. Robertson discussed with her various possibilities growing out of a contact she had with Dag Hammarskjold. You will see that there is a possibility she might come to Geneva at the time of your next meeting for an interview with Wang. The Department did not attempt to discourage her from making the trip, although we, of course, could not give her any assurance that the interview would be granted, or that it would have any effect on the release of her son. We are attempting to find out more about Dag Hammarskjold's reported willingness to take up again the cases of Downey and Fecteau, on the grounds of their being civilians under the authority of the UNC in Korea, and therefore entitled to repatriation under the Armistice Agreement. You will recall that at the time of Hammarskjold's visit to Peiping in January 1955, although he went there primarily on behalf of the 11 airmen, we left the door open to the inclusion of the two civilians in the category of personnel who should be released under the Armistice Agreement. Also, in Wang's list of Americans in China which he gave you at the start of the talks, Downey and Fecteau are placed in a separate category from the other civilian prisoners. Of course, in anything that we might do or ask the Secretary General to do, we would have to be careful not to appear to relax our demands that the Chinese Communists release forthwith all the prisoners without regard to their status or any other distinction.

In the above connection, William Worthy has been stirring up a good deal of trouble among the American relatives of the prisoners. He tried to lead Mrs. Fecteau on into saying that the Department had for two years failed to permit her to send parcels to her son. Fortunately, Mrs. Fecteau issued a refutation of this allegation through her Congressman, Mr. Lane, to whom CA also supplied a statement summarizing our efforts to get parcels to Fecteau and all the other prisoners and making the point that, almost as soon as we learned of the fact that Downey and Fecteau were alive and in prison in Communist China, we commenced efforts to make it possible for their families to send them parcels. Worthy has also been in touch with Mrs. Redmond trying to convince her that the Department has not done everything in its power to get her son's release, and advising her that she might speed up Redmond's release if she made a trip to Peiping.

A Yonkers citizens committee for the release of Redmond has also been very active lately, demanding an interview with the Secretary, and protesting the relaxation of CHINCOM controls as a sign the Department is "aiding Red China while our boys are rotting in prison." The committee claims to have been responsible for sending Mao Tse-tung over 300,000 "polite" letters on behalf of Redmond. It also appears to be under the misapprehension that the Department made some sort of "deal" with Red China whereby Father Rigney was put at the head of the list to be released. The committee apparently attributes the success of this "deal" to the efforts of Rigney's Congressman, Mr. MacCormack, and it appears they may use this allegation in attacking Congressman Gwinn, in whose district Yonkers is. Naturally, this adds to the complications of the matter.

4. Case of Daniel Kelly: We have had some correspondence lately with an American who is interested in assisting Daniel Kelly, the son of an American father and a Chinese mother, all now living in Peiping, to come to the States to complete his pre-medical training. It would appear that the boy has a valid claim to American citizenship, but the Chinese Communists probably consider him also Chinese. We have recommended that Daniel Kelly be advised to apply for an exit permit, and if it is refused, to notify the Office of the UK Chargé. We did not want to make an issue of this case at Geneva, as we would naturally prefer to have it settled without having to cite the Agreed Announcement. It would be out of line for us to insist upon the application of the Agreed Announcement to a dual national, unless he were trying to leave in order to accompany his parents. This is apparently not the case in this instance.

5. Matador: The first elements of a USAF unit equipped with Matador guided missiles arrived in Taiwan about May 6. A press release giving the bare facts, emphasizing the defensive nature of the action and the US control of the unit was issued May 7 by Embassy Taipei and the GRC Foreign Ministry. Comment by US officials is to be limited to a minimum. The Chinese Communist reaction has already appeared in an article in the "Peoples Daily" on May 8. Copies of this article and our announcement are enclosed. Wang may bring up the matter in the next meeting.

6. Father Wagner's Condition: A despatch from Hong Kong (No. 860), a copy of which was sent to Geneva, reports Father Gross as saying Wagner's asthma is quite serious, and that there were at one time "hints" he might be released in advance of his sentence (June 1958). Despite some feeling that pressure on the Communists might prevent Wagner's early release, we are considering having the British make up representations as well as the possibility of asking you to take it up at Geneva.

7. Donald Blackwood

7. Donald Blackwood Enters Communist China: An American citizen, Donald Blackwood, with his Korean wife and son, went into Communist China from Macao April 27. He appears to have gone voluntarily but we are at a loss as to his motivation. Such information as we have on this mysterious development is contained in a summary attached. There is no reason at present to bring this matter up at Geneva but it is conceivable that it might become a subject of discussion there in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Questions & Answers for Senate Subcommittee.
~~2. UP Ticker on Worthy hearing~~.
3. Copy of article in "Peoples Daily" on Matador.
4. Copy of announcement on Matador.
5. Copy of British Despatch on Fr. Gross.
6. Summary of Blackwoodcase.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM 805

Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

1181

06120
1957 MAY 11 PM 2 41
806
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SENT TO: GENEVA FOR JOHNSON

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Origin

Guidance for May 15 meeting.

1. Concentrate on continued failure Chinese Communists implement Agreed Announcement. There is no justification whatsoever for Communists to continue hold eight Americans twenty months after they promised to take measures permit them expeditiously exercise right to return. So long as promised action not taken, result can only be to deepen distrust Peiping's pledges and render sterile present talks.

2. As further instance Communist retrogression on implementation cite Communist abandonment any pretense considering humanitarian factor, as exemplified by continued imprisonment Father Wagner, who reported seriously ill.

3. If Wang attacks MATADOR deployment, review entirely defensive nature our collective security arrangements with GRC and point out MATADOR being sent Taiwan by agreement with GRC as part these security arrangements. Defensive measures obviously required in

situation

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611.93/5-1157 CS/A

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611.93/5-1157

C/U
Anal 40
Rev.
Cat.

Drafted by: FE:CA:RNClough:DLOsborn:dd 5/11/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Walter S. Robertson

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Jones (in draft)

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situation where Communists continue pose threat of hostile action and continue reject meaningful renunciation of force.

4. Maintain position other issues.
5. Set July date for next meeting.

Dulles

= DULLES

OUTGOING TELEGRAM (806)

Department of State

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07131 887

1957 MAY 14 PM 5 56

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA PRIORITY 1193

Origin

FOR JOHNSON. 611.93/5-1157

Supplementary guidance regarding paragraph 3 Department's telegram 1181.

Public policy on MATADOR deployment to Taiwan has been to emphasize defensive nature of move and treat weapon on same basis as any other piece standard US Air Force equipment. You should take same line, emphasizing need for US defensive arrangements in Taiwan area, but avoiding discussion of propriety this particular weapon if Wang should attempt draw you into discussing this.

Dulles
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611.93/5-1457

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DC/R
Anal 40
Rev.
Cat.

Drafted by:
/CA:RNClough/FE/P:JWHenderson:hk 5/14/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Walter S. Robertson
~~xRRx- Howard P. Jones~~

Clearances:
CA - Mr. McConaughy WPMcC
FE - Mr. Jones HPJ

S/S-CR

MAY 14 1957 P.M.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1166, MAY 15, 1 PM

PRIORITY

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FROM JOHNSON

ONE HOUR AND FORTY MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING.

I OPENED MEETING WITH STATEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION ALONG LINES PARA ONE AND TWO DEPTEL 1181. WANG REPLIED ALONG USUAL LINES WITH DETAILED PRESENTATION CASE OF DR. LIN LAN YING (SPELLING UNCERTAIN) WHO DEPARTED SAN FRANCISCO PRESIDENT WILSON JANUARY 6, 1957. WAS SYLVANIA ELECTRIC EMPLOYEE. ALLEGED GREAT PRESSURE BY FBI AND INS, INCLUDING AT STOP IN HONOLULA, PERSUADING HER NOT TO RETURN. ON DEPARTURE SAN FRANCISCO THOROUGH SEARCH INCLUDING BODY SEARCH AND TAKING FROM HER ALL NOTEBOOKS AND $6,800 IN TRAVELERS CHECKS. PROTESTED "ROUGH HANDLING"AND ASKED FOR RETURN PRSONAL PROPERTY INCLUDING NOTEBOOKS AND TRAVELERS CHECKS.

WANG ALSO MADE STRONG STATEMENT RE STATIONING GUIDED MISSLES TAIWAN. SPOKE OF GUIDED MISSILES BEING ATOMIC WEAPONS. STATEMENT INCLUDED "STRONG PROTEST IN NAME OF HIS GOVERNMENT" AT THIS "ACT OF AGRESSION", "HOSTILE ACT AND ANOTHER SERIOUS PROVOCATION" PROVING FALSITY US PROFESSIONS PEACEFUL INTENT. "US MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CONSEQUENCES THIS ACT AGRESSION". IF US PURPOSE IS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT GOOD FAITH SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED BY ACTS, ETC. IF US WERE NOT IN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF TAIWAN REUNION WOULD HAVE BEEN REALIZED LONG AGO. CHINA WILL NEVER TOLERATE AND CERTAINLY WILL LIBERATE, ETC. ETC.

I REPLIED ALONG LINES PARA THREE DEPTEL 1181 AND DEPTEL 1193 INCLUDING

611.93/5-1557

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MAR 2 1959

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INCLUDING REAFFIRMATION LAWFUL ADMINISTRATION TAIWAN BY GRC, MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH GRC AND THAT THOSE WHO HAD NO AGRESSIVE INTENT HAD NOTHING TO FEAR.

WITH RESPECT DR. LIN POINTED OUT SHE HAD, IN FACT, RETURNED IN CONTRAST THE EIGHT AMERICANS STILL IN CHINESE PRISONS AND THOSE WHO WOULD NEVER RETURN BECAUSE OF DEATH UNDER MISTREATMENT. CITED FACT SHE HAD NOT CONTACTED INDIAN EMBASSY IF, IN FACT, SHE FELT SHE WAS BEING OBSTRUCTED. ALSO STRONGLY MADE POINT AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT THUS FAR NO ADVANTAGE BUT RATHER DISADVANTAGE TO US.

INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IN TODAY'S MEETING FOR FIRST TIME WANG CONSISTENTLY MUSED TERMINOLOGY "GENEVASAGREMENT" IN REFERRING AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT AND TO "GENEVA TALKS".

NEXT MEETING JULY 11.

POPPER

RSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1957 MAY 15 PM 2 06
BUREAU OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* **ACTION COPY**

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: Unnumbered, May 15, 1957 (Via Pouch)

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Foreign Service of the United States of America

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1957 MAY 20 AM 11 28

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May 15, 1957

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FROM JOHNSON

via pouch

1. After Wang declined open, I opened 67th. It had been 20 months since he and I first entered agreement here to resolve first question with which we called upon to deal. It had been 20 months during which the high hopes of myself, my government, my people, that this problem of civilians could be resolved, had been disappointed. It had been 20 months during which failure his authorities carry out this agreement between us had blocked improvement relations between our two countries. So long as his authorities continued fail carry out this agreement between us, it could only have result increasing our distrust and increasing doubts a/ concerning intent his authorities carry out agreements into which we entered. So long as this situation continued we could not expect anything other than the sterility which had thus far existed in resolving other problems in these talks.

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Apparently it was intent his authorities emphasize that none of persons whom we had been talking about in the Sept. 10 agreement would be released until expiration their sentences. Last two persons released, Reverend Mackensen and Father Gross apparently held until very last day their sentences, thus emphasizing this pattern.

2. I continued entirely apart from question of obligation of his authorities under Agreed Announcement, he had often spoken of his authorities' humanitarian and lenient approach toward unfortunate victims of their oppression. It difficult for me not conclude even this had now been abandoned. For example, we know Father Wagner was in hospital and seriously ill. I would have thought any policy of leniency and humanitarianism would certainly have dictated release Father Wagner long before this. I wanted express hope Father Wagner could certainly be released at latest next month at time Father McCarthy and Father Houle due to be released so he could accompany them. I would have hoped he would have for me this morning some indication his intent, not only about Father Wagner, but about other imprisoned persons -- and his intent concerning carrying out our agreement so that this block to progress in dealing with matters we called upon to consider could be removed.

3. Wang replied (from prepared statement) he also had feeling although more than twenty months had passed since we entered talks, yet problems we called upon consider remain as

deadlocked as ever. People of our two countries held high hopes with regard talks between us; however they seem be disappointed in this hope. Must be made clear that he and I entered into this series talks for purpose achieving peaceful settlement problems between China and US. Therefore, good faith of each side must be demonstrated with regard reduction tensions and improvement relations between two countries.

4. Wang continued, however, for an extended period, agressive acts of my side in Taiwan area entirely contrary this purpose. My government had recently taken new steps to aggravate tensions in Taiwan Area by flagrantly stationing guided missiles units on territory of Taiwan, thus turning Taiwan into launching ground for attacks against China. This hostile act of US could only be regarded as another serious provocation against China. This act also served prove pronouncements of our peaceful intent, which I had made repeatedly in past, were entirely false.

5. Wang continued, in name his government he lodged strong protest. My side must be held responsible for all consequences this act agression. Inside Conference Room my side continued stalling tactics, refused discuss tensions Taiwan Area and refused discuss his proposal removal embargo and cultural exchanges, etc. Outside of Conference Room my side tightening grip on Taiwan in attempt obstruct efforts Chinese people liberate Taiwan and continuing war-like acts

to increase tension. One could not but doubt serious good faith my side.

6. Wang continued, so far as question civilians concerned, charges I had made were unacceptable to him. Ever since we had entered into Sept. 10 agreement his government had always been dealing with question civilians in accordance that agreement. As contrast to this there still remain 33 Chinese civilians in US prisons. So far as other Chinese nationals in US concerned, they still encounter repeated obstruction on part US authorities. He had raised such matters with me repeatedly in previous meetings. This morning he wanted take up case Chinese student Dr. Lin lan ying (spelling uncertain) who returned early this year. Since this case involved performance of US authorities in carrying out agreement of Sept. 10 and this related to ability thousands Chinese students in US return China, he felt it necessary call my attention to her complaint.

7. Wang continued, Dr. Lin graduated University Pennsylvania in US and employed in Sylvania Electric Co. in Philadelphia till her return in January, 1957. She departed San Francisco Jan 6, 1957 on SS President Wilson. Succeeded return homeland only after going through series unreasonable obstructions by US authorities. Let us follow story of unhappy lady and see what American authorities were doing in so-called carrying out of our agreement. When Dr. Lin was known to desire return, agents of U.S. Immigration Service came early December, 1956 interrogate her, used every vicious slander in intent intimidate

~~her used every [illegible]~~

her and compel her change mind. This sort interrogation and intimidation repeated Dec. 20, 1956, this time by agents FBI, who intruded in her apartment to do this. When these FBI agents failed to intimidate her they tried induce her move her family out of China.

After these two attempts failed to shake her resolve return, US authorities resorted to rough handling. On Jan 6 1957 when Dr. Lin waiting for embarkation San Francisco FBI agents suddenly turned up, made search all her baggage. What was more insulting was forced body search. In disregard her protests, agents also took away all notebooks and private property of $6,800 in travellers checks. When liner arrived Honolulu US authorities made last attempt by sending immigration agents aboard attempt influence her against continuing journey.

8. Wang continued, my authorities had remarkable record attempts hinder return Chinese students. Dr. Lin only one among many such unfortunate victims. That many more Chinese students so far unable return, due to our obstructions, was beyond question. Dr. Lin was Chinese student who had never offended our laws, yet subjected to rough handling by our authorities merely because she desired return and invoked Geneva accord to return. What was there to assure freedom of Chinese in US to return? He urged my government actually take necessary

measures stop all violation of agreement to return Chinese from US. With view safeguarding legitimate interests of Chinese nationals, Wang also asked me request my authorities return to Dr. Lin her private property of $6,800 and all notebooks taken from her and give assurances against all recurrences such incidents, in addition. If I had any information with regard 52 and 22 persons who failed return, as well as concerning Chinese confined in our prisons, he glad hear it.

9. I replied, with regard Dr. Lin, I noted two things. First by his own statement she had returned to his country. Eight Americans who covered by our Agreed Announcement had not returned. There were other Americans who would never return -- who had died from treatment they received in his prisons. There were others who had returned broken in mind and body. Virtually without exception they tell stories of most violent mistreatment. Second point I noted with regard Dr. Lin: if in fact there was basis for statements which he said she had now made and if in fact she felt being obstructed from leaving, she was at all times free to communicate with Indian Embassy. Fact that she apparently did not do so, fact that Indian Embassy not yet called to our attention single substantiated case obstruction among thousands Chinese in US, was incontrovertible evidence of faithfulness with which my authorities been carrying out our agreement. This has been affirmed also by public statements issued by Government of India and Indian Embassy.

10. I continued, with regard first part his statement I must flatly reject his completely erroneous statements that

US had, or had intent carry out any acts aggression. We had to start with recognition of fact, whatever the views and policies of his government might be, the territory at Taiwan was lawfully occupied and administered by a government with which US had long had diplomatic relations, by a government recognized as a lawful government by majority of nations of world, by a government also so recognized by UN. US had with that government a treaty of mutual defense which had been published and registered with UN. That treaty and all our arrangements and understandings with that government were publicly and irrevocably defensive in their nature. Very first article of that treaty very specifically sets forth the agreement of both parties to it to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means. This an element which common to all our treaties with like-minded countries who entered into arrangements to pool defensive strength against aggression. US adherence to this principle without exception and without equivocation amply demonstrated to world in recent months. None who did not have aggressive intent, none willing accept principle peaceful settlement disputes had anything to fear from any defensive arrangements US might make with countries of like mind. No threat to use force being posed by US anywhere in world, including area Taiwan.

11. I continued, I wanted point out on October 8, 1955 I made proposal here that force be removed in settlement our disputes including dispute in Taiwan area. That was proposal

which he thus far rejected. Threat hostile action Taiwan area thus still being maintained by his authorities. US would be deficient in carrying out international obligations and lacking in responsibility if it did not recognize this fact and take whatever defensive measures appeared be prudent. This posed no threat to his country or anyone of peaceful intent. I still hopeful he would accept proposal I had made for unconditional renunciation force in Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. No one of truly peaceful intent could object to that proposal.

12. Wang replied, cases Chinese civilians residing US who encountered unreasonable obstruction on part American ~~A~~ authorities appearing every day. Experience of Dr. Lin to whom he referred this morning was only one of many similar such cases. Actions taken by American Immigration authorities in case Dr. Lin assumed such scale one could only term it plain robbery by taking away private property and confiscating all her notebooks. I had just now argued Dr. Lin returned Wang's country after all. He wanted point out she did not return freely as entitled to under Geneva Agreement. Succeeded returning only after encountered series unreasonable obstructions by American authorities. Fact that Dr. Lin succeeded returning did not absolve US authorities of responsibility for obstructing her return. As to allegations I made this morning regarding alleged ill-treatment Americans in China, he could only term them entirely unfounded and irresponsible allegations. There were facts to prove even

persons released out of prison, desired remain in his country of their own free will. These facts would shatter all unfounded rumors and slander against his country.

13. Wang continued with regard protest he had lodged with our side this morning regarding act aggression by US government by stationing guided missiles atomic unit on Chinese territory Taiwan, he could not accept statement I had just made. It was entirely due to military occupation by US government that Taiwan still not united with Chinese mainland. Unreasonable stand taken by US government in supporting in Taiwan the KMT regime to oppose the Chinese government also met a disapprobation by all peace-loving peoples of the world. Underlying factor in existing tension Far East entirely created by US in military occupation Taiwan. Had there not been American military occupation in Taiwan, reunion between Taiwan and Chinese mainland would have been realized long ago. Chinese people would never tolerate occupation of Taiwan by US. Chinese people certainly will liberate Taiwan. No force on earth could ever deter this determination on part Chinese people. No amount rationalization and argument offered by me could ever cover acts of aggression by US government demonstrated in their latest military threats, posed in the Taiwan area in form of stationing guided missiles until on Taiwan.

14. Wang continued, had been common practice by aggressor governments in history always speak of aggressive arrangements as if these aggressive arrangements entirely for defensive

purposes. The stark fact at present is that it is US government occupying ~~Taiwan~~ Chinese territory and not Chinese government occupying any territory of US. Fact is at present US posing threats against China and not China posing threats against US. If one desires talk of renunciation of force he should make good his words by actual deeds. In face of latest tension created by US in Taiwan area, how could anyone believe any more in any peaceful promises by US. Chinese people would oppose to end such open aggression, provocation. If US had any peaceful intentions, it should demonstrate sincerity by concrete acts. This what he always looked forward to.

15. I replied, nothing he had said changed fact that it his government which still posed threat use force in Taiwan area. There was vast difference between saying willing settle disputes peacefully if other side surrenders to your point of view and saying unconditionally you willing settle disputes peacefully.

16. Wang replied, facts show who was advocating peaceful settlement dispute Taiwan area and who was willing use force that area. These facts could not be distorted. Today when people everywhere oppose policy of war threats, latest steps taken by US government in Taiwan area can never be explained as resulting from peaceful intent. Latest military threat posed by US government in Taiwan could never succeed in frightening people. On the contrary, they can only stir up indignation and hatred.

17. I replied, our problem not to reach agreement on situation in Taiwan area. Problem is to agree we will not use force to settle it. That and carrying out of first agreement between us are still the essential steps in bringing about that improvement in relations which we, on our side, seek.

18. Wang replied he had made clear his point of view that this series talks here in Geneva should have as purposes relaxation international tensions and improvement relations between our two countries. In accordance this purpose he had made series proposals advantageous to both peoples, both governments. Believed these proposals advantageous to both sides. They continued hope there should be progress in these talks between us.

19. I replied I accepted first proposal he had made here. I accepted it with understanding it would be advantageous to both sides. I could not see that there had been any advantage -- in fact, it seemed to have been disadvantageous.

20. Wang rejoined whether advantageous or ~~a~~ disadvantageous, only the facts could prove.

21. Wang had nothing more to say, and I had nothing more. I suggested next meeting July 11. Wanted him know I planned return this evening to Washington for consultation and short rest with my family.

22. Wang agreed.

Popper

UAJohnson
DPopper:FVreeland:sg

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☑ Reviewer ________ Date ________

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Lot 72 D 415

SECRET Lex #7 July 5, 1957

Dear Alex:

I haven't a great deal to add to our conversation last Tuesday. I have discussed the matter of your instructions for the next meeting with Dave Osborn and Howard Jones, and we have some ideas on how to meet the problem which you mentioned to the Secretary. We plan to discuss the draft instructions with Mr. Robertson either today or Monday and will also send them up to the Secretary.

The problem of travel of newsmen to Communist China remains unresolved and the Secretary is currently considering the latest proposal for some kind of pool arrangement. We still feel here that if newspaper men are permitted to go, it would be very difficult to hold the line on travel of others.

With respect to the missing military personnel, we are still thinking in terms of having the next move take place in Panmunjom. We have been urging Defense to move on this, but they have not yet indicated when they will be ready to do so. I hope that it will be before your next meeting so that we could then shift the attack to Geneva if it seemed desirable. We are tentatively thinking that if new efforts at both Panmunjom and Geneva bring no results, it might be useful to publish a joint State-Defense report on this subject, going into some detail as to the criteria for placing names on the list, mentioning our various attempts to obtain an accounting from the Communists and giving examples to show how defective has been the accounting we have received.

Tseng Kuang-chih, the student from Purdue University who has been in the statemental hospital at Logansport, Indiana was deported June 13 aboard one of the President liners. Other cases of whom the Chinese Communists have or may have knowledge are:

Lin Lan-ying	(memos attached)
Chang Chih-ye	(memo attached)
John Woos	(copy of letter attached)
Edwin Fon	(copy of letter attached)

We have been informed by Immigration and Naturalization Service that Fon is leaving July 7.

We will try to cover in your instructions the various subjects which Wang might raise, and suggest appropriate lines of reply. We have sent

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

SECRET

to Geneva various items of background material which we thought might be useful to you and are attaching to this letter certain others. As a general practice, we send materials as soon as they come to hand rather than hold them to enclose with a letter, since letters have become too infrequent.

We will be watching with interest to see whether Wang presents anything new. We don't really expect him to, but many remarkable things have been happening in the Communist world of late and he may surprise us.

It was a great pleasure to see you the other day. You can count on us to support to the best of our ability your tedious but skillful endeavors at Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough
Director for Chinese Affairs

Enclosures:

1. Dept. of Defense Press Release re Aircraft Carrier Hornet
2. FBIS Item re"Armistice Meeting Request Backed" dated June 28, 1957.
3. FBIS Item re Korean Ambassador's Statement re Korean Armistice Agreement.
4. Despatch No. 631 from Taipei re "Cause and motivations for riots of 5/24."
5. Chronology of mob attack on U. S. Embassy and USIS at Taipei.
6. Memo for files re "Increased Temp of Hostilities around Offshore Islands"
7/ Copy of letter to Edwin Pon dated 6/25/57.
8. Article from New York Times dated 6/13/57 re "U. S. Carrier Plane Hit by Red Chinese Gunfire".
9. Telegram from CINCUNC Tokyo No. FE 208197 re/76th meeting of the MAC.
10. Telegram from CINCUNC Tokyo No. FE 208123 re 75 meeting of MAC.
11. FBIS item dated June 13, 1957 entitled "US Chiang Planes Invade Kwangtung".
12. FBIS item dated June 13, 1957 entitled "U.S. Die-Hard Group Hostile to China".
13. Defense Department News Release dated June 21, 1957
14. Copy of Memo dated 12/11/56 from FBI re Lin Lan-ying with its enclosures.
15. Copy of memo dated July 3, 1957 from Mr. Aylward to Mr. Clough re "Dr. Lin Lan-ying - removal of $6,800 in Travelers Checks at San Francisco".
16. Item from New York Times, June 24, 1957, re U. S. Missionary Dies in China.
17. Memo from Aylward to Osborn April 4 re Deportation of Chinese Aliens.
18. Memo from Aylward to Clough 6/15/57 re Chang Chin-ye
19. Paper entitled "Interim Assessment of Riots of May 24 in Taipei".
20. Communique re Kishi visit, dated June 21, 1957
21. Copy of letter from Father Rigney, dated June 21, 1957

Enclosures (Continued)

22. Statement by Mr. Robertson before the Foreign Operations Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations 6/27/57.

810

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FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for July 11 meeting:

1. Remind Wang one of basic obstacles progress in talks and peaceful discussion and settlement problems threat posed by Communist insistence on use force if necessary.

This also basic cause of tension Far East, which imposes heavy burden on peoples of area. Essential first step to remove threat and tension is reciprocal renunciation force. Step deserves serious discussion long as necessary to reach agreement. Responsibility cannot be evaded by submitting number of drafts which reflect no serious attempt meet US view, then attempting shift discussion to corollary problems as Wang did year ago.

611.93/7-957

Dist. Desired (Offices Only)

2. Tell Wang your trip to US brought home depth concern American people for six prisoners. This ought to be short-run problem which, need not require long discussion. Only requires measures promised by Communists in Agreed Announcement. American people cannot understand failure take such measures. FYI We hope that shifting usual order presentation

3

Drafted by: DLO 7/9/57
FE/CA:DLOsborn:RNClough:ikb:emm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: John Foster Dulles
~~Walter S. Robertson~~

Clearances:
~~See The Secretary~~
FE - Mr. Jones (in draft)
FE - Mr. Robertson (in draft)

SECRET FILE

L W/S

611.93/7-957

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foregoing subjects and emphasizing fundamental nature renunciation force problem and US willingness undertake prolonged discussion if necessary may help counter possible Communist belief that release remaining prisoners would result in prompt withdrawal US from talks END FYI.

3. Regarding Wang's inquiry on Lin Lan-ying, inform him search made accordance customary procedures and with customary safeguards. She was allowed take money required for trip and excess taken from her as required by long-standing regulations and placed in blocked account. Note that Chinese Communist regulations strictly limit funds Americans permitted take out of Communist China. If Wang inquires about Tseng Kuang-chih or Edwin Pon inform him they left US on June 13 and July 9 respectively for Communist China. If he mentions Woos, inform him Woos entered US 1922 as US citizen by birth and Agreed Announcement not applicable US citizens.

4. If Wang attacks UNC decision introduce modern weapons Korea or US despatch missile unit Taiwan point out actions taken only in response long-term Communist introduction modern weapons Korea in violation armistice agreement and in case Taiwan as reaction to continued build-up military facilities opposite Taiwan and refusal renounce force.

5. Wang may refer to Secretary's San Francisco speech, Taiwan riot or plane incident Swatow, probably as part generalized attack on US policies in Far East. Your response should demonstrate, using material from speech and elsewhere, that US policies of which Wang complains made necessary by

threatening nature of Communist policies. It should not be necessary be drawn into discussion of either plane incident or riot which would place you in undesirably defensive position.

Dulles
DULLES

(811)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* **ACTION COPY**

31

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Action
FE

Control: 6373
Rec'd: JULY 11, 1957
8:59 AM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 30, JULY 11, 10 AM

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Date of Action

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Name of Officer

Direction to DC/R

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FROM JOHNSON

HAMMARSKJOLD SAW ME THIS MORNING TO SAY HE WANTED CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH ME ON QUESTION MISSING MILITARY PERSONNEL AND DOWNEY AND FECTEAU. HE SAID WITH RESPECT MISSING MILITARY PERSONNEL SOMEONE SUGGESTED RECENTLY PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION MAKES IT DESIRABLE TAKE SOME NEW ACTION. HOWEVER, HIS VIEW WAS THAT AS MATTER NOW PRIMARILY IN MY HANDS HERE AND AT MAC BEST THAT HE NOT CROSS WIRES AND WOULD DO NOTHING ADDITIONAL UNLESS WE ASKED HIM. I SAID I AGREED.

WITH RESPECT DOWNEY AND FECTEAU SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLIES. IN REPLY MY QUERY AS TO WHAT HE THOUGHT HE COULD DO HE SAID THAT AS CHOU HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE RAISING THEIR CASES WITH HIM HE COULD READILY GO BACK TO CHOU WITH PERSONAL COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THEM. HE SAID ARGUMENT SOME MADE AGAINST THIS WAS THAT IT WOULD SINGLE OUT DOWNEY AND FECTEAU FROM OTHER CIVILIANS STILL HELD. I SAID LATTER CONSIDERATION DID NOT SEEM TOO IMPORTANT TO ME AS DOWNEY AND FECTEAU WERE NOT ONLY COVERED BY AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT BUT ALSO BY KOREAN ARMISTICE AND THUS WITHIN SCOPE U.N. RESOLUTION UNDER WHICH HE ACTING. I WAS THEREFORE INCLINED TO FAVOR SUCH APPROACH BY HIM AT THIS TIME. I DID NOT SEE IT COULD DO ANY HARM AND IT MIGHT DO GOOD IN INDICATING THAT U.N. INTEREST IN THEM STILL ALIVE. SAID I WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON AND AMBASSADOR LODGE WOULD BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH HIM CONCERNING MATTER.

GOWEN

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MAR 2 1959

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 31, JULY 11, 3 PM

Control: 6471
Rec'd: JULY 11, 1957
10:46 AM

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Action Taken ____

Date of Action ____

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Name of Officer ____

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FROM JOHNSON

TWO HOUR TEN MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING.

WANG OPENED WITH GENERALIZED STATEMENT ATTACKING "POLICY OF HOSTILITY" AND "AGGRESSIVE POLICY" AIMED AT OVERTHROWING PRC SET FORTH IN SECRETARY'S SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH AS WELL AS REFERRING STATIONING GUIDED MISSILES ON TAIWAN AND PLANE INCIDENT. NO RPT NO MENTION KOREA. POLICY SET FORTH BY SECRETARY WAS MEETING INCREASING OPPOSITION ABROAD AND IN US AS WELL AS MEETING WITH DEFEAT AS EXEMPLIFIED BY RECENT ACTIONS OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES CONCERNING EMBARGO. "EVEN IN TAIWAN PATRIOTIC PEOPLE HAVE RISEN IN PROTESTS AGAINST THIS POLICY." US PROPOSAL OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE WAS "DECEPTIVE AND HYPOCRITICAL EXCUSE." THEN CONTINUED WITH STATEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION REFERRING PREVIOUS INQUIRY ON DR LIN AND MAKING STATEMENT TSENG KUANG-CHIH. SITUATION WITH REGARD TO CHINESE IN US CONTINUES TO BE UNSATISFACTORY.

I REPLIED WITH LONG STATEMENT ALONG LINES PARAS ONE AND TWO DEPTEL 36 AS WELL AS MAKING STRONG COUNTERATTACK ON PRC RECORD OF HOSTILITY TOWARD US, PRC ATTACK ON US IN KOREA, PRC ATTEMPTS AT SUBVERSION OF AND SUPPORT OF REBELLION AGAINST ASIAN STATES FRIENDLY TO US, ETC. MADE DETAILED REPLY ON DR LIN POINTING OUT THAT THOUGH SHE ATTEMPTED TAKE US FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF US REGULATIONS SHE WAS PERMITTED TO PROCEED. ALSO MADE DETAILED REPLY ON TSENG USING MATERIAL DEPTAL 40 WHICH MUCH APPRECIATED

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MAR 3 1959

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AND MOST USEFUL. CHARACTERIZED OUR HANDLING BOTH DR LIN AND TSENG AS MOST CONSIDERATE FOR WHICH WE SHOULD RECEIVE APPRECIATION RATHER THAN COMPLAINT. WISHED PROBLEM IMPRISONED AMERICANS WOULD BE HANDLED WITH SAME CONSIDERATION. SOLUTION PROBLEM OF IMPRISONED AMERICANS "WOULD PERMIT US DIRECT UNDIVIDED ATTENTION TO QUESTION RECIPROCAL RENUNCIATION OF FORCE WHICH REMAINS FUNDAMENTAL TO SUCCESSFUL DISCSSION OTHER ITEMS UNDER SECOND PART OUR TERMS REFERENCE."

SUBSEQUENT GIVE AND TAKE LARGELY RESTATEMENT RESPECTIVE POSITION ON RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. PRC WILL NEVER AGREE TO ANY FORMULA WHICH VIOLATES ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. MANY PRC PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS HAVE NOT RAISED "RESPONSE OR ECHO" FROM US.

NO SURPRISES OR NEW DEVELOPMENTS, LINE TAKEN BY WANG BEING VERY MUCH ALONG LINES ANTICIPATED BY DEPTEL 36. HIS PRESENTATION, THOUGH, WAS LARGELY PRO FORMAS AND CARRIED NO INTIMATION ANY INTENTION BREAK TALKS OR MAKE NEW MOVE. AT ONE POINT WHEN I USED TERM "NEW DEPARTURE" IN REFERRING TO RENUNCIATION OF FORCE HE EAGERLY PICKED IT UP AND USED IT AS TAKE-OFF POINT FOR URGING NEW DEPARTURE BY US IN TALKS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT BOTH SIDES AGREED TAIWAN AREA TENSION IS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM. GAVE NO INDICATION WHETHER HE CAUGHT MY POINT ON WILLINGNESS CONTINUE TALKS EVEN IF ALL AMERICANS RELEASED.

NEXT MEETING AUGUST 8. DETAILED RECORD BY POUCH ARRIVING DEPT MONDAY.

GOWEN

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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31
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Control: 10890
Rec'd: July 18, 1957
2:44 p.m.

FROM: Geneva (via Pouch)

TO: Secretary of State

NO: Unnumbered, July 11.

1/6

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

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FROM: Geneva VIA POUCH
TO: SECSTATE
NO: UN

July 11, 1957

1957 JUL 15 PM 2 41
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CC/1

SENT: SECSTATE WASHINGTON

VIA POUCH UNNUMBERED

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FROM JOHNSON

1. Wang opened 68th with prepared statement. As he had repeatedly stressed, purpose of talks was for both sides to arrive at peaceful settlement of disputes between two countries. In this desire his side had put forth series of practical and feasible proposals each of which could lessen tensions and open up prospects of improved relations between China and America. But what had history of talks shown? My side had not only shown no intention of contributing to that realization, but had not abandoned its hostility toward China. My side was only interested in working up tension and stepping up threat of armed force against China. This wilful policy of U.S. was increasingly meeting with defeat. For example, a great number of Western countries relaxed embargo in face U.S. objections. U. S. policy of hostility against China did not conform to interests of peace or of American people. Even people in U.S. criticizing that policy.

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2. Wang continued, in San Francisco, Secretary of State Dulles not only clung to that outworn policy but called for even more aggressive policy. American Secretary of State was not yet willing to reconcile himself to fact PRC had existed for eight years. His speech did not hide intention subverting and overthrowing PRC. Dulles called PRC passing phase and pledged self to contribute to this passing. Could this be called sincere desire for settlement disputes and relaxation tensions between two countries? U.S. not ONLY unwilling renounce occupation Chinese territory Taiwan but had installed guided missile bases on Taiwan. An American squadron had intruded in Chinese territorial waters and 66 sorties of carrier-based planes violated Chinese air space. However, this U.S. policy of creating tension and threat of aggression against China could not achieve its ends.

3. Wang continued, not only was this policy opposed by Chinese people but it being condemned by all peaceful people. Even in Taiwan, under close control American aggressor, all patriotic people can no longer endure being enslaved nor countenance Taiwan being turned into American base; they have therefore risen in protest against this policy and against outrageous slaughter of Chinese people. 600 million people

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would never forget this and other bloody crimes committed by American aggressor against China.

4. Wang continued, after seizure of Chinese Territory Taiwan, my side has been proposing what it calls Renunciation of Force. During these negotiations my side had never slackened aggression against China, and continued set up bases for aggressive guided missile atomic warfare against China. My side continued create provocation incidents to increase tensions. Under these circumstances the Renunciation of Force proposal was a deceptive and hypocritical excuse. As long as U.S. did not change its policy of hostility and aggression tensions would not be relaxed, disputes would not be settled, relations would not be improved and there would be no results in our talks and the U.S. would be held entirely responsible for the consequences.

5. Wang continud, he had another matter to bring up. At previous meetings he had given examples of unreasonable obstructions. Last year on February 9 at the 36th meeting he had given me a list of names including Tseng Kuang-chih. Tseng had now returned to China but story he had to tell was appalling one.

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Wang had thought my side would have taken measures concerning, and give accounting of, individuals on that list. He understood Tseng taken away in handcuffs under orders Immigration Service and confined in solitary confinement in mental institution. Until recently Tseng had been subject to deportation although he had not violated any laws. It is hard to understand under what authority so many have been detained, and, in the cases of Mr. Tseng and Mr. Liu, imprisoned in mental hospitals. REPITITION Repi~~tio~~n of this kind of treatment shows US authorities pay no heed to our Agreed Announcements. This situation increases our anxiety concerning the fate of the 50 and the 32 people who not yet returned. Wang urged me impress on US authorities that they should stop violating Agreed Announcement and give accounting of those being detained. With regard to detention of Dr. Lin which he had mentioned last meeting he would like to hear any comments I had and would like to know whether US prepared to return property to owner.

6. I replied during past two years we had long and frank discussions of certain questions existing between our two countries. Although our differences unhappily remain deep and fundamental I believed he would share my view that it had nevertheless been desirable and useful to have such a direct exchange

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of views between us. We had though, at times, tended to digress from what both of us agreed was a fundamental matter, and I first wanted briefly to return to that this morning. I referred to the question as to whether we were going to permit the clash of our policies and in particular our differences with respect to the Taiwan area to lead to a clash of arms. He would recall that at the very beginning of our discussion of this subject I had proposed the simple first step of a reciprocal renunciation of force couched in terms that would make it clear that neither of us were renouncing any policy objectives that we considered ourselves legitimately entitled to achieve.

¶ I continued, Wang had this morning again spoken of what he called the policy of aggression and hostility of U.S. government against his country. He could not ignore fact that from beginning these talks it was U.S. which had made proposal we renounce force as means achieve national ~~[illegible]~~ POLICY, objectives and especially with regard clash our policies in general and specifically with regard Taiwan area. From very beginning of the time when his authorities took control of Mainland China they exhibited policy of undisguised hostility toward my country and everything for which my country stood. This hostility not only extended to my country but also to countries with which my country stood in relationship of friendship and alliance. It was

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authorities of his country who had grossly mistreated U.S. OFFICIALS and made impossible the maintenance of U.S. official establishments on territory under the control of Wang's authorities. It was the authorities of his country who expelled, mistreated and imprisoned Americans who attempted remain in territory under control Wang's authorities. U.S. never had threatened, and never would initiate the use of arms against Wang's country. It was Wang's country which had attacked U. S. forces in Korea who were there on a lawful mission under the authority of the U.N. It was his authorities who had supported AND fomented rebellion in the territory of countries friendly to the U.S. I would not take time further to review record but that record clear one of undisguised hostility of his country toward my country.

8. I continued it was with hope bringing about fundamental change in that situation and thus opening of way to peaceful settlement in those disputes that I had made my proposal for peaceful settlement of disputes between us. It not possible to ignore the fact that one of basic obstacles to progress our talks here and peaceful discussion and settlement of our problems continued to be unwillingness of his authorities to agree to this simple proposition. It was a source of deep disappointment and concern that they continued to insist on their intention to use force if necessary to achieve their policy objectives. This was basic

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cause of tension in the whole Far East which imposed a heavy burden on the people of the area. Neither those people nor the United States and its allies could ignore this threat nor fail to take such steps as were within their power to meet the possibility of its implementation. It was absurd to say that the steps taken by the U.S. and other like-minded countries to meet this threat were the cause of tension. The cause of tension came not from those who took reasonable and sensible precautions to defend themselves against the publicly announced threat of attack but rather from those who refused to renounce such threats. It was equally absurd to say that if those subject to such threats would only not take any precautions and supinely leave themselves defenseless against such threats there would be no tension. Of course, there would be no tension if all who were subject to threats in this world would meekly surrender to those who attempt to arrogate unto themselves the authority to tell peoples and countries how their lives should be ordered. However, it hard to believe that those who take such point of view understand the meaning of negotiation and settlement of differences by peaceful means between self-respecting sovereign countries.

9. I continued therefore essential first step remained removal of this threat, and tension it caused, by a reciprocal

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renunciation of force. This step was of such transcendental importance to the peaceful settlement of our differences that I considered that it deserved discussion as long as necessary to reach agreement rather than ignoring it or pretending that the problem did not exist. Neither can the problem be evaded by submitting numbers of drafts which reflected no serious attempt squarely to face the issue and then shift the discussion to other purely corollary problems. Such a course could not contribute to progress in our talks here.

10. I continued, as Wang knew, I had just returned from trip to U.S. I want him to know that my conversations there not only with officials of my government but also with private individuals brought home to me depth of concern of American people over Americans still imprisoned in his country. They also concerned over failure give us that information about Americans still missing from hostilities in Korea which his authorities must have. Question of imprisoned Americans ought to have been and still could be short-run problem which need not require long discussions. All it required was that his authorities take those measures for their release that were envisaged in the Agreed Announcement. It was evident that none with whom I talked was able to understand the failure to carry out the promise contained in the Announcement. Neither could I. Chinese in U.S. desiring to return their country,

continued be entirely free do so. In fact, to best of my kmx knowledge at least 345 had done so since beginning our talks here.

11. I continued, in accordance with request made at our last meeting which Wang had repeated here this morning, I had looked into the matter of Dr. Lin Lan-ying who returned to Wang's country early this year. Contrary to the statements Wang said she now makes, she at no time prior to her departure made any allegation that she was in any way being obstructed or prevented from departing and very fact she did depart is best evidence that there was no such obstruction. At the time of her departure a search was made by the Customs Authorities -- not by the FBI as Wang asserted -- in accordance with customary procedure and with all customary safeguards to determine whether there was any attempted violation of law. It was found that Dr. Lin was, in violation of a long standing regulation of which she must have been perfectly aware, attempting to take with her an amount of U.S. dollar funds far in excess of any reasonable needs for the trip. In spite of this attempted violation of our laws and regulations no action was taken against her and she was permitted to xxxxxxxxxx proceed without hindrance. Excess funds she was attempting to remove from the country had not been confiscated as

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implied in Wang's statement but had rather been deposited to her credit in a blocked account. Further search was made only to determine whether she was attempting to remove additional matter or information in violation of U.S. law and rather than delay her departure she was told that written matter carried by her would subsequently be examined for such information. Not only is this a matter entirely within the competence and authority of my government but I had noted that Americans who had returned from Wang's country reported that Wang's authorities had very strictly limited the amount of funds they had been permitted take with them. Thus, I saw no grounds whatever for any complaint with regard Dr. Lin who, in spite of attempted violation of U.S. law, was freely permitted proceed to Wang's country.

12. I continued Wang had this morning mentioned AND his ~~xixE~~ radio had carried reports making entirely erroneous statements concerning Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih. Purport [illegible] statements was after Tseng indicated desire return Wang's country, Tseng arrested and falsely handled as person mentally unsound. Facts of matter were quite different. Mr. Tseng entered U.S. on January 30, 1948 and originally entered as student Maryland University. In somewhat more than a year he showed signs of mental illness. Between June 1949 and March 1950 he was treated in Johns Hopkins Hospital

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in Baltimore and Spring Groves State Hospital in Maryland. He improved and was released and entered into study at Ohio State University, then Illinois University, then Purdue University. Although visa for admission into US expired Sept. 1955, he was permitted remain. Although Wang had included his name on ~~that~~ list given Feb. 9, 1956 as person who desired return Wang's country, Tseng himself in March 1956 formally and specifically applied for extension his stay in U.S. It became evident to authorities at Purdue University where he studying that he again becoming mentally ill. They made arrangements for his admission to Wabash Valley Sanatorium on April 18, 1956. At recommendation of doctors in that hospital, he was admitted to Logansport Indiana State Hospital on May 25, 1956. At time moved from Wabash to Logansport he placed under restraint at recommendation of doctors for own protection. The restraint immediately removed on admission Logansport Hospital. Any implication that this done on recommendation Immigration Servic- entirely false. It done entirely on recommendation doctors for own protection and those around him. Student advisor at Purdue remained in touch with him to see what could be done for him. After admission to hospital, he indicated to student adviser that he desired return to Wang's country. Student adviser communicated with Dept. of State and there was also communication ~~with Indian Embassy concerning his case Dept~~

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with Indian Embassy concerning his case. Doctors treating Tseng certified not advisable nor was he competent to travel alone. Thus there arose question payment for attendant for him during his travel. Indian Embassy said not authorized pay for an attendant. I would not go into details, but in January of this year Mr. Tseng informed the Indian Embassy that in order to facilitate question of attendant, he had informed U.S. Immigration Service of desire leave country. Embassy replied they had no objection ~~it~~ if he desired use facilities INS rather than Embassy. INS then arranged for an attendant to accompany him. INS paid cost of such an attendant as well as cost of travel. He now returned safely to Wang's country and arrived there. I thought handling this case by authorities my country showed utmost care in assisting him as well as facilitation his return to Wang's country. Rather than ill-considered complaints, I should have felt an expression of appreciation would be more in order. I regretted that cases of Americans imprisoned in Wang's country desiring to return had not been as considerately handled as our authorities had handled cases Mr. Tseng and Dr. Lin. This problem of Americans remaining in prison in Wang's country was readily resolvable by his authorities so that further discussion of it between us would not be necessary.

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The solution of this problem would permit us to direct our undivided attention to the question of reciprocal renunciation of force, which remains fundamental to successful discussion of other items under second part our terms of reference.

13. Wang replied question of taking effective steps and means to relax tension Taiwan area and settling disputes between our two countries was at center of terms reference leading to present talks between us. In talking about causes and sources tension Taiwan area and disputes between our countries he had to flatly reject my statement which he could only consider arbitrary. It entirely reversed and obscured the facts. It failed to take into account facts of situation. Liberation of China and establishment of PRC entirely natural development of internal forces China and no foreign country should have any right to interfere in this affair.

14. ~~Wait~~ Wang continued, since establishment PRC U.S. been pursuing policy downright hostility to China and policy which did not recognize existence of PRC. Furthermore, U.S. taken series steps in opposition to PRC. It was U.S. which had initiated policy embargo and blockade against China. It U.S. started aggression in Korea and brought about armed threat against his country. It U.S. who still occupied by armed force their territory Taiwan

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and established aggressive military bases against his country. It was U.S. which carried out threatening and aggressive activities around territory his country. It was U.S. which did everything it could deprive PRC of right take part in affairs of international community.

15. Wang continued, objectives this series hostile policies and activities was interfere in internal affairs his country and as Dulles announced object of US was try subvert Wang's government. No amount statements could cover up the series arbitrary and gross violations of standards international conduct, and of Charter U.N., against Wang's country. Wang's country could not be shaken by such aggressive and hostile policies by ~~XXXX~~ U.S.. China would exist forever and would become consolidated and stronger. Those who would suffer would be persons who tried play with fire in this respect.

16. Wang continued, today's situation was that U.S. stationing military bases on territory other countries. It was U.S. threatening and attempting subvert Wang's country rather than Wang's country trying subvert my government. It was no more than deception to present this sort of policy of hostility as being steps for defensive purposes. In point of fact people in Asia as well as all other places rising to protest against U.S. policy of ~~Nos~~ creating tensions. This was underlying cause present

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~~TENSIONxIN~~

tension in Far East, and cause failure achieve relaxed situation there. This was reason he proposed discuss question relaxing tension in Far East. They on their part had made ~~a~~ repeated efforts and made series of proposals in course talks in order that tension in Taiwan Area may be relaxed.

17. Wang continued, ~~h~~ we had discussed for nearly two years and still had not achieved anything. He had ~~always~~ always been dissatisfied with the situation. It not his side who stalling in this question, not his side who had digressed from this problem. Still remained to see whether serious efforts would be made in these talks to relax tension in Taiwan Area. In this regard no ~~empty~~ empty words would settle the problem.

18. I replied all I had to say was important thing not that we agree on past history. Important thing was we take new departure . I proposed that new departure two years ago. That departure was to make it unequivocally clear that we were not going to use force or threat of force to settle our differences. His government still publicly and in this room maintained threat use force if it could not otherwise achieve its objectives. Nothing that had been said could change that fact. Once that threat clearly and unequivocally removed so negotiations could take place free from that threat, attempts to resolve them could be undertaken with some hope of success. To say

"Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without

U.S. in conjunction with allies would renounce common sense measures taken to meet that threat was not serious attempt at negotiation, but rather a call to surrender to Wang's point of view. What I have asked ~~not~~ and still asked was that the threat be renounced.

19. Wang replied, in course past two years he had repeatedly said we should take active steps to settle dispute in Taiwan area. They had time and ~~a~~ again expressed dissatisfaction at fact meetings being stalled and problems remained unsettled. They had made various concrete proposals but these had not aroused either a response or an echo. I had mentioned need of taking up new departure -- new starting point. This would be welcomed on his part. This would mean one should not further drag out these talks but take steps to push talks forward, to stop empty statements, and one should take concrete action. Even more important would be to see concrete action coming out from new departure I had referred to.

20. I replied, ~~N~~ new departure I had referred to was renunciation threat force proposed by my side. It was departure he still refused to undertake. It was departure which was fundamental.

21. Wang replied I had said that relaxation tension in Taiwan

area was fundamental problem to be dealt with between us. To this he agreed. Question remained by what formula disputes between us were to be settled. Any proposal for settlement this problem which violated sovereign rights of one side was unacceptable. Any proposal to solve this question should be based on respect of sovereign rights. He had made this ~~[illegible]~~ fully clear in course our discussion and in proposals his side put forth on renunciation force. Method of dragging out talks could not settle these problems between us. ~~Ho~~ Now it remained for us to see what action U.S. would take to bring about genuine settlement this dispute.

22. I replied, first problem not question settling one way or other sovereign rights nor settling formulae or forums in which this matter may be discussed. I had tried to make it clear first question was to agree we were not going to fight -- that is, that the threat to use force had been withdrawn. I had offered him various formulae ~~to~~ for draft declarations which would enable him fully to preserve his position and enable him to pursue his policies ~~free from the~~ WITHOUT USING threat of force. He had come back with various formulae and drafts which in themselves in the light of discussions here, and of public statements, made it clear he preserved right threaten and use force. He asked that I negotiate substance of question itself under that threat. I had

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tried make it as clear as I could this is what I could not and would not do. However, once that threat removed in clear and unequivocal statement we could then in that atmosphere discuss further steps to be taken.

23. Wang replied, in settlement tension in Taiwan area, the question of sovereign rights could not be put aside. If sovereign rights were discarded, then a state could no longer be considered a state. I had stated the central problem was avoiding war between us. But China not proposing to start a war with U.S. They ~~had~~ WERE prepared to settle problems between us by just methods but this did not mean surrender to any side. It would not serve useful purpose to repeat old words which had been repeated many times. Repitition of old words and remarks did not constitute new departure. With respect my remarks this morning concerning Chinese civilians in U.S. he could not be satisfied with those remarks. He reserved comments for next meeting.

24. I had nothing more and suggested next meeting August 8. He agreed.

Gowen

UAJohnson:sg

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[illegible]

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102

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Geneva, Switzerland

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Letter No. 57

July 11, 1957

CA

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Ralph:

I want to thank you most heartily for your letter of July 5 and the very full enclosures which, together with your most welcome telegram on Tseng enabled me to be fully armed for today's meeting. As you will see I was able to smother him with detail on Tseng and he had no comeback whatever at today's meeting.

As far as comment on today's meeting is concerned, I have nothing to add to my telegram. I, of course, did not expect he would in any way overtly react to my effort to put across the point we would not necessarily stop the Talks if the Americans were released, and it is hard for me to tell whether it went across. It may not have, and I will work on this as opportunity arises. Tell the Secretary I greatly appreciated his personal message on this and will continue to play it as best I can. While it is only a factor in their failure to let them go, it is perhaps one that I will be able to remove.

It was good to have Ed here but was sorry to learn after his arrival that it meant again busting up his vacation.

With Ekvall now staying in Paris between meetings there will be no one here to receive messages, handle correspondence or sort out incoming material. (Incidentally, I told Wang that Popper would be the contact here for any messages between meetings.) Therefore, I have several suggestions for handling material along the lines of our conversation.

First,

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director. Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

First, on the understanding that CA will screen and transmit to me all pertinent material from the FBIS, I suggest that FBIS be told no longer to transmit its file to me.

I would suggest that insofar as is practical a copy of such material be sent directly to me as well as to Ed as it appears without waiting for the now monthly letter.

I would suggest that press statements on our part, records of MAC meetings, speeches and similar unclassified material be similarly handled.

In general, it would be best that classified material such as the FBI reports on Dr. Lin or other classified material for which I may have a need in meetings continue to be sent to me here. This obviates the problem of my having to carry classified material with me on the plane.

Also, please tell whoever handles it that they can cease sending me here the tear sheets from the Daily Summary but I would appreciate continuing to receive them at Prague.

I am asking Mrs. Gross, who is my secretary on a contract basis, to come in once a week to go through and sort out incoming mail, but what I suggest above will reduce its volume. I may well have other suggestions later.

With regard to Ekvall he has been told by the MA office in Paris that he should be in the States two months before his retirement date which is the latter part of February. They have told him that he should therefore plan to depart in December. Therefore, if we want to hold him through the January meeting DA should say something to the MA in Paris. So that both of us know where we stand I suggest you get someone to work on this right away with the DA and get the date definitely established.

Vreeland is also leaving but I have been able to arrange with the Consulate to have Cameron Le Clair replace him beginning next meeting.

I forgot to mention in my telegram, but you will notice from the full record that I threw in a short reference to the missing military personnel at today's meeting. I felt that in the context of mentioning my trip to the States and the press stories on the Congressional Resolution its omission by me at today's meeting would have been ~~compromising~~. conspicuous.

I hope Walter Robertson is getting along all right. Give him my best.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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Control: 7038
Rec'd: July 12, 1957
6:08 a.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 37, July 12, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

Reference Hong Kong NIACT to Department 62, repeated information London 5, Geneva 2.

Johnson-Wang Talks.

Johnson left Geneva by air for Prague this morning. Reference telegram repeated Prague.

GOWEN

DT

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MAR - 2 1959

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July 12, 1957

Letter No. 71

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Alex:

I have just received your letter of July 11 and will not try to comment on it in detail at this time. Needless to say we will proceed to act on your various suggestions, none of which seems particularly difficult to accomplish.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Secretary, Mr. Berding and Mr. Robertson are meeting today with representatives of American press media to see whether a formula can be worked out which would permit limited travel by correspondents to Communist China without too seriously compromising our China Policy. Whether it will be possible to devise any effective safeguard against a gradual erosion of all travel restrictions, I rather doubt. However, it looks very much as if we will make the attempt.

If we should undertake a limited relaxation of our travel ban to permit correspondents to go to Communist China, do you see any advantage in announcing this to Wang at Geneva simultaneously with or prior to public announcement? Since we took a firm position last year that we would not authorize such travel so long as the Chinese Communists refuse to release the imprisoned Americans, it is hard to see how we could get any mileage out of announcing to Communist China that we are backing down on this point. On the contrary our action might simply confirm the Communists in their apparent belief that time is on their side and that we will eventually make the concessions they desire without their releasing the Americans or taking any other step which they might regard as concession to us. This of course would be the case whether we announced our action in the Geneva forum or not.

We would appreciate your views on this as soon as possible. There is enclosed a draft press release which will give you an idea of the type of announcement which is being considered. It is by no means final and may undergo many further changes.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure:
Press Release

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Prague.

Copy sent to Martin

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#9 7/11/57

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

The policy of the United States with reference to Communism in China, non-recognition, no commercial or cultural relations and related matters has been recently restated by the Secretary of State in his address of June 28, 1957, at San Francisco. In application of this policy, there are relevant laws and executive orders, notably the Trading with the Enemy Act and determinations there-under. Generally speaking, it is not consistent with United States policy, or lawful, that there be travel by Americans to the areas of China now under Communist control.

However, the Secretary of State has determined that, in view of the desirability of additional information respecting current conditions within China, it may prove consistent with the foreign policy of the United States that exceptionally, there be travel by a strictly limited number of American news representatives to the China mainland to permit direct reporting by them to the American people about conditions in the area under Chinese Communist control.

The Department of State is therefore willing on an experimental basis to issue passports not restricted as regards travel to and on the mainland of China to not more than ten to fifteen experienced professional American news representatives. These representatives will be designated, not by the Department, but by the major news media—newspapers, radio, television and magazines — as they have in other situations requiring a limitation of numbers. The Department notes that representatives of many news media have already suggested that a representative from each of the twelve organizations which maintained full-time American correspondents in China at the time of the Communist assumption of power be included in the designated correspondents, and the Department is prepared to adopt this suggestion if there is substantial agreement by the major news media. The provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the regulations issued thereunder will be suspended to the limited extent required by this experiment. The experiment will be carried out on the following assumptions:

(1) That the present validation of passports will be for a

period expiring December 31, 1957.

(2) That those traveling to mainland China do so knowing that they face abnormal personal risks due to the failure of the Chinese Communist regime to treat American citizens in accordance with the accepted code of civilized nations.

(3) That all of the representatives designated by the major American news media on this basis receive Communist permission to enter the China mainland, with the understanding that they intend to travel, get information, and freely report as to real conditions in China. It is hoped that American correspondents in mainland China will be able to report on the condition and treatment of the Americans illegally held in Chinese prisons, as to whose fate there is — deep concern on the part of the American nation. It is also to be understood that the United States will not accord reciprocal visas to Chinese bearing passports issued by the Chinese Communist regime.

(4) The Department emphasizes that the limited exception here suggested is upon an experimental basis. If for any reason it cannot be carried out substantially in accordance with the conditions stated

above, or is otherwise found by the Department to have direct or indirect consequences adverse to the foreign policy of the United States, then the experiment will be discontinued.

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103

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KB
hold
for UAJ
reference

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
July 26, 1957.

SECRET

Dear Ralph:

The couriers have just brought in your letter of July 18 and I am sending this reply back directly with them. I entirely agree that there is nothing to be gained by my making any statement to Wang on a partial relaxation of our travel ban on correspondents for Communist China if that should take place.

On a hurried reading of the draft press release I am somewhat struck by the word "experiment". It appears in it several times. Would perhaps "trial period" be preferable?

Hurriedly yours,

UAJ

U. Alexis Johnson

Lot 72 D 415

cc: Edward W. Martin

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Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director,
Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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Geneva Look

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
SECRET

Letter No. 72

August 2, 1957

Dear Alex:

We have just received your letter of July 26 with your recommendation against mentioning at Geneva any partial relaxation which may take place in our ban on travel to Communist China. The results of the meeting to which I referred in my letter of July 18 were inconclusive as you will see from the enclosed memorandum of conversation. The Department has just written to all news organizations which maintain at least one full-time correspondent abroad, inquiring whether they would station a correspondent in China if it were possible to do so. It is hoped on the basis of the replies to reach a more realistic estimate of the number of American correspondents who might be stationed in Communist China on a more or less permanent basis. The matter will then be discussed further with the press.

Wang's comments on the Secretary's speech have been paralleled by other Chinese Communist statements, notably a speech to the National Peoples' Congress by Chang Han-fu (copy enclosed). Judging from these statements I would expect Wang to maintain his rather hard line at the next meeting. We have just received a report from a highly sensitive source to the effect that Mao Tse-tung in his speech of February 27 stated that the most appropriate time to establish diplomatic relations with the United States would be during the third 5-year plan (1962-1967) , since the disparity between the two countries in economic power would be considerably reduced by that time. However, he added that the Formosa problem would have to be resolved first. This confirms indications we have received from other sources that the Chinese Communists do not expect any early progress in the direction of formal relations with the United States and are willing to bide their time.

A correspondent telephoned Mrs. Fecteau to tell her that the press was about to be permitted to send representatives to Communist China. Her immediate and spontaneous response, which was picked up by the wire services, was that if

they

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

SECRET

Lot 72 D 415

they went she wanted to go too and see her son. She has not yet made any request of the Department, but certainly if correspondents go we can expect immediate pressure from relatives of the prisoners to be allowed to do so.

I have sent you a copy of the memorandum of conversation with Mr. Dalal from the Indian Embassy concerning the impounding by Treasury of a sum of money from another departing Chinese, Hsiao Chi-mei. We have since furnished Mr. Dalal at his request copies of pertinent extracts from the Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the trade control regulations of the Department of Commerce. I have explained to him that these regulations apply to everyone alike and that there is nothing in the Agreed Announcement which requires us to discriminate in favor of returning Chinese with respect to export of goods on money to Communist China.

Defense is instructing Panmunjom to make a statement in the MAC on the missing 450. The text of the statement is the one you approved while in Washington of which I am enclosing a copy. We do not know yet when the UNC will make the statement, but we hope it will be before your September meeting.

At the request of Fathers McCarthy and Houle, the American Red Cross sent a telegraphic plea to the Chinese Red Cross in Peiping for the release of Father Wagner on humanitarian grounds. A curt message just received by the American Red Cross reads" Authorities contacted not consider release J.P. Wagner."

We have been in correspondence with John Dexter, who is being trained in Taiwan to replace Bob Ekvall as interpreter next January. Present plans are for him to leave Taiwan September 15th and receive an additional month's training in the Department's Language Services Division following his leave and before going to Geneva. We are negotiating with EUR in the hope that we can have him put on the EUR payroll as a regular member of the Consulate General staff, but with the understanding that he would be available to you as desired and that he would receive further language training at the Ecole des Interpretes between meetings and in addition to his regular duties. He is one of our most talented young Chinese language officers and has been working hard in preparation for this assignment. I am confident you will find him satisfactory, although I realize it will be quite a jolt to part with Bob, who has the work so well in hand. We want John to have a week or two of consultation with Bob either in Washington or Geneva depending upon how the schedule of meetings is running at that time. The ideal thing would be for him to sit in with Bob at a meeting before he takes over on his own.

Mr. Robertson will be away the last two weeks of August and I am hoping to take off the last week myself. It would therefore be much more convenient for us if your September meeting could fall on September 12 rather than September 5th.

Regarding the sorting and preparation of material received in Geneva during your absences, I believe that if we keep the volume down to the necessary minimum, and follow your suggestion of sending copies whenever possible to Ed in London as well as to Prague, it should prove possible for Bob or Ed to arrive in Geneva a few hours ahead of you and complete the sorting in that time.

We have asked that the FBIS Daily Reports no longer be sent you, and will scan them here for items of interest to you. However, we asked that the ticker service for the few days before each meeting be continued, as the volume should not be too great, and as otherwise you might miss something of importance.

I believe that we have taken care of the other points you raised in your letter following the last meeting. However, we received only the original of that letter, and it had to be routed to the front office, where it seems temporarily to have disappeared. I hope you will remind your secretary to send us a carbon in the future, and if you have a copy of the last letter we would appreciate your enclosing it in your next.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation of July 13 re Meeting with Radio and Press Representatives.
2. Copy of Text of speech by Chang Han-fu.
3. Copy of Draft Statement for use in MAC.
4. Copy of Exchange of Telegrams between ARC and Chinese Communist Red Cross re Release of Fr. Wagner.
5. Copy of letter to Mr. Dalal with extracts from the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
6. Copy of Memorandum of C/2 to Mr. Clough on Currency & Commodity Controls on Chinese Aliens Departing for Communist China.

cc: Amembassy London, Mr. Martin

RNClough:DLOsborn:erm

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FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for August 8 meeting:

1. Review course negotiations on renunciation force. When talks began situation existed particularly in Taiwan area which threatened peace. This situation still exists and in some respects threat increased. U.S. has from beginning insisted essential prerequisite to discussion other matters at issue is to remove this threat by reciprocal renunciation force. However, Chinese Communists have been unwilling for over year discuss seriously renunciation of force, having instead shifted discussion to side issues. Renunciation force deserves more serious consideration. Hence your statement last meeting you considered vital discuss long as necessary reach agreement.

2. Remind

611.93/8-557

611.93/8-557

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Drafted by:
FE:CA:DEOsborn:RNClough:dt

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: John Foster Dulles

Clearances:
FE - WSRobertson (in draft)
FE - Mr. Jones HPJ

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2. Remind Wang he promised under Agreed Announcement take certain measures enable imprisoned Americans exercise right return. Only measures taken with regard any of Americans still remaining have had contrary effect. Challenge Wang to cite any measure taken by Chinese Communists to carry out Agreed Announcement with respect to Downey, Redmond, Fecteau, McCann, Wagner or McCormack. It would have been simple matter for Chinese Communists demonstrate sincerity and good faith by release these prisoners had they desired do so. Such action even now would have favorable effect on atmosphere these talks.

3. Maintain position other matters also.

DULLES

820

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35-36
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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 138, AUGUST 8, 8 PM

Control 353
Rec'd: AUGUST 8, 1957
9:56 AM

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Date of Action

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Direction to DC/R

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FOR JOHNSON

TWO HOUR AND FIVE MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING.

I OPENED WITH LONG STATEMEMT REVIEWING RENUNCIATION OF FORCE DISCUSSIONS CLOSING THIS PORTION OF STATEMENT WITH "I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS VITAL ISSUE AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT, AND WHEN THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WE CAN GO ON TO DISCUSS OTHER TOPICS UNDER AGENDA ITEM TWO." I CONCLUDED STATEMENT WITH IMPLEMENTATION STRONGLY NOTING NO PRISONERS RELEASED SINCE DEC 1955 PRIOR TO COMPLETION ON SENTENCE AND ASKING HIM "CITE ONE SINGLE MEASURE" TAKEN TO CARRY OUT AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT WITH RESPECT TO REMAINING SIX.

HIS REPLY ON RENUNCIATUON ADDED UP TO NO FURTHER INTEREST OR INTENTION ON SERIOUSLY DISCUSSING UNLESS AND UNTIL BASIC US POLICY OF "HOSTILITY" TOWARD PRC CHANGED. "FUTILE WISHFUL TININKING TO EXPECT PJC WILL EVER RECOGNIZE UNDER GUISE OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE US OCCUPATION TAIWAN." "IF US NOT GOING GIVE UP POLICY OF HOSTILITY AND SUBVERSION AND AGRESSION AGAINST PRC AND INDULGES IN EMPTY TALK OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE THIS CAN ONLY BE TERMED AS A DECEIVING TACTIC." HE REPEATED USUAL CHARGES ON IMPLEMENTATION ALLEGING TSENG KUANG-CHIH "ALWAYS DESIRED TO RETURN" AND WAS THROWN INTO MENTAL HOSPITAL AS "ACT OF REPRISAL" AND TO FRIGHTEN OTHER CHINESE STUDENTS; BRIEFLY MENTIONED HSIAO CHI-MEI AS EXAMPLE OF "DETAINING FUNDS TO DISCOURAGE RETURN; AND YY TEH-YUN

WHO DEPORTED

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MAR-3 1959

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-2- 138, AUGUST 8, 8 PM, FROM GENEVA

WHO DEPORTED FROM NEW YORK MARCH THIS YEAR AND "NEARLY LOST LIFE BECAUSE SERIOUS STOMACH AILMENT NOT PROPERLY CARED FORD DURING HIS DETENTION."

DURING COURSE GIVE AND TAKE I RETURNED HARD TO THEME AMERICANS HAD DERIVED NO BENEFIT FROM AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT AND SITUATION OF IMPRISONED AMERICANS REMAINED SAME OR EVEN WORSE THEN SITUATION PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT. HIS REFUTATION WEAK AND CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF COUNTER-ATTACKING WITH RESPECT CHINESE IN US. "UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CHINESE RESIDENTS IN THE US CONTINUE MEET OBSTRUCTIONS IN DEPARTURE ONE CANNOT DEMAND ANYTHING EXTRAORDINARY" WITH RESPECT TO AMERICANS IN CHINA.

NEXT MEETING SEPT 12. FULL RECORD BY POUCH LEAVING GENEVA AUGUST 10.

GOWEN

CV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1957 AUG 8 PM 1 13
BUREAU OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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(Security Classification)

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1959
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : U. Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador to Prague now at Geneva

UNNUMBERED
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 8, 1959
DATE

REF : **LIMIT DISTRIBUTION**

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Action Taken

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	REC'D 8-12		OTHER

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Direction to DC/R

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SUBJECT: China Talks - 69th Meeting

1. I opened 69th with following statement:

a. "In looking over the record of our nearly two years' of negotiation on the vital topic of renunciation of force, I am concerned that despite the many months of discussion there has been no progress since early 1956. Indeed I might even say that with the submission of your draft of May 11, 1956 much of the progress which had been achieved before then seems to have been wiped out. I am deeply concerned with this because the threat to peace in the Taiwan area which prevailed when we first began discussion of this topic still exists and, in some respects, has increased. Your side has continued building up its armed strength in the Taiwan area while at the same time continuing to make clear that it will use this armed strength if necessary to achieve its policy objectives.

b. The basic views of my government as to the question of renunciation of force remain those which I set forth in our meeting on October 8, 1955. You will recall that I stressed that the U.S. was not proposing that either side abandon its views or give up the right peacefully to pursue its policies, or that either side renounce the right to defend itself. I simply sought, and I still seek, an agreement whereby both sides would renounce force as a means of pursuing their respective policies, both generally and particularly in regard to the Taiwan area. Such a reciprocal renunciation of force we regarded, and still regard, as an essential first step toward the peaceful settlement of differences between our two governments.

c. At our October 27 meeting you submitted a draft agreed announcement dealing with the subject of renunciation of force. As you will recall we found your draft deficient in its omission of any reference to the right of self-defense and in its failure to relate renunciation of force to the Taiwan area. We also felt that your suggestion for a foreign ministers

meeting

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meeting was, at best, premature at that stage when your side was still unwilling unequivocally to renounce the use of force with respect to the Taiwan area. In our draft agreed announcement of November 10 we attempted to use language which would be mutually agreeable, not prejudicing the substantivepposition of either side and yet meeting the fundamental requirements. Thus our draft made it clear that renunciation of force would not prevent either side from peaceably pursuing its policies or deprive either side of the right of self-defense, but it would have application to the Taiwan area as well as general application.

d. With these two drafts before us we continued our discussion of the problem of renunciation of force during our 26th and 27th meetings and at our 28th meeting on December 1 you submitted a draft which was brief and couched in rather general terms. While this draft of December 1 did not entirely meet the requirements of the situation it did represent, we felt, a distinct step forward toward agreement. We were still disturbed, however, by the absence of specific reference in your December 1 draft to the Taiwan area or to the right of self-defense, and on January 12, 1956 we suggested two simple amendments to your draft designed to cover these two points.

e. In our meetings during the next six weeks much of our discussion centered around the two amendments which we had proposed at our January 12 meeting. You will recall that I drew a distinction between the claims and views of the two sides with respect to the situation in the Taiwan area and the question of renouncing force as an instrument of policy. Our proposals with respect to the draft declaration on renunciation of force were not designed, and are not now designed, to bind your side to an acceptance of our policies with respect to the Taiwan area any more than our agreement to such a declaration binds us to accept your policies respecting the Taiwan area. In an effort to reassure you that our proposed amendments did not seek to prejudice your policies with respect to Taiwan, we submitted on April 19 further proposals, revising those we had put forward on January 12.

f. Nevertheless, you declared our further efforts to meet your point of view unacceptable and in your arguments made it clear that what you objected to in our April 19 draft was really that it failed to prejudice the U.S. position -- not that it prejudiced your side's position. You made it clear that your side would consider acceptable only a declaration which permitted it to continue to exploit the threat of the use of force. Then on May 11 you submitted a new draft announcement which wiped out completely the fairly extensive area of agreement which had seemingly been achieved by the submission of your December 1 draft. Your May 11 draft, unfortunately, included every element of your side's position to which we had expressed opposition together with new unacceptable points not previously put forward.

g. I have reviewed in some detail the course of our negotiations on renunciation of force because of my deep concern that we should not relax our efforts to reach agreement on this fundamental issue. Since the submission of your draft of May 11, 1956, which, as I have just pointed out, represented an unfortunate retrogression in the progress of our negotiations, we have made no progress on this subject, and I have felt that you have not been sincerely interested in reaching agreement on it, but rather have attempted to obscure our discussions by bringing up subsidiary side issues. This tactic will not get us anywhere, for only by resolving satisfactorily the issue of renunciation of force can we expect to make progress on other topics under item two of our agenda. As I said at our last meeting I am prepared to discuss this vital issue as long as necessary to reach agreement, and when this has been accomplished we can go on to discuss other topics under agenda item two.

h. Mr. Ambassador, it is unfortunate that nearly two years after we had reached an agreement under agenda item one I should still find it necessary to come back to that item in these meetings. It is difficult for the American people and I must confess for me, Mr. Ambassador, to understand how six of the Americans whose cases we came here two years ago specifically to discuss can still remain in prison in spite of our agreement. Once again let me stress, too, that it is not only a matter of American inability to understand how this situation can exist, but a matter of strong and deeply felt indignation on the part of all Americans that it does exist.

i. As far as I can see, Mr. Ambassador, if there have been any measures taken by your government since the agreed announcement respecting the Americans who remain imprisoned in your country, they would seem to have had an effect opposite to that which was clearly set out as your intention in the agreed announcement. Otherwise, how can it be explained that during the whole year of 1956 and up to the present in the year 1957, not a single imprisoned American citizen has been released by the authorities of your country until his full sentence was completed? Is this by any stretch of the imagination an indication that measures have been taken to help these unfortunate citizens return to their country? Is it possible that not one American who remained in your jails after December 1955 could be credited with good behaviour which might have enabled the authorities in the normal course of events (regardless of the agreed announcement or of these discussions) to have released the prisoner a few weeks or months before the expiration of his sentence? On the record of the past year and a half, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, Mr. Ambassador, that the agreed announcement solemnly made between us has in no way expedited the release of the imprisoned Americans. If this is not so, I would appreciate it if you could cite one single measure taken by the authorities of your government to carry out the agreed announcement with respect to Messrs. Downey, Redmond, Fecteau, McCann, Wagner or MacCormack.

j. Release of these imprisoned Americans, all of whom have served many years in jail already, would have been an action not only in keeping with the letter and spirit of this agreed announcement but also a demonstration of sincerity and good faith on the part of your authorities. I profoundly regret that your side has not seen fit to take such action. Even now, however, release of these prisoners would have a most favorable effect on the atmosphere of our meetings here as we continue to discuss the other issues before us."

2. Wang replied. He had listened carefully to the review I had made of the two year old negotiations on which I had tried to draw a balance sheet for the past two years. However, he could discover no new factors or elements in the new statement which I had made at great length and taking great time. The essential issue before us is an old one, that is, how are we going to settle disputes between our two countries and how tensions between us in the Taiwan area are going to be relaxed. In the course of the negotiations we have disputed at great length our respective points of view on this issue. Now let us recognize that we could not b ring about agreement in respect

to the

to the positions of the two sides. If we could have done so, he would assume we would have already reached agreement long before. However, to repeat old arguments and old positions gives no help to the present discussions.

3. Wang continued. They have agreed to the idea of making a declaration by the two sides on the renunciation of force. Indeed, they have put forward a number of drafts of such a declaration. The objective of any declaration must be to find ways and means for settlement of disputes between the two countries in the Taiwan area so that tension there could be relaxed. The proposals my side has put forward under cover of so-called renunciation of force, and unreasonable position contained therein have long been refuted by his side. Our side's attempts to get them to recognize the present situation of American occupation of Taiwan under cover of what we call right of self-defense are futile and wishful thinking.

4. Wang continued. During long discussions during the two years of these talks U.S. side has shown it does not have serious desire to improve Sino-American relations or relax tensions in the Taiwan area because our side continues to carry out a hostile policy toward China. Even in the course of these talks, our side has never ceased to create tensions in the Taiwan area and around the territory of his country. That is the fundamental problem which still exists.

5.

5. If the United States is not going to give up a policy of hostility and subversion and aggression against the PRC, and indulge in empty talk of renunciation of force, this can only be termed as a deceiving tactic. He did not see how it would get us anywhere or give us any help ih our present talk to repeat the old arguments made this morning.

6. Wang continued. ~~HM~~ I had suggested at the last meeting a new departure. However, he did not feel my statement this morning is prompted by the idea of a new departure.

7. Wang continued. Insofar as implementation of the agreement on the first item of the agenda is concerned, if anyone is disaatisfied it is his side. As is generally known, since the opening of the talks all Americans who desire to return have done so except criminal offenders serving prison terms, whereas on the U.S. side the Chinese who are imprisoned in jails there still remain in these jails without any change in their situation.

8. Wang continued. Our side consistently obstructs the return of the Chinese nationals who wish to return. Those persons who returned all spoke of the unreasonable obstruction by our authorities. Our authorities have employed many means of obstructing their return. One of the familiar patterns is when one of their citizens lets it be known that he wants to go, threats are made, political questions are asked, and he is even threatened with being sent to Taiwan or resort is made to inducements by offering him what is known as permanent

residence. When the above threats failed, the next step is rough~~t~~ handling. The individual is detained for immediate deportation and is not allowed a reasonable time to prepare for deportation, including persons who are sick.

9. Wang continued. Hu Teh-yun, who was deported from New York in March of this year has experienced this suffering. Mr. Hu nearly lost his life as his serious stomach ailment was not properly cared for during his detention.

10. Wang continued. As to the practice of our authorities in putting Chinese students who want to go home in mental hospitals, Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih has provided a solid example. He must refute my explanation made at our last meeting on this case. Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih always desired to return. For this reason Wang gave me his name at last meeting. Yet instead of taking measures in accordance with the agreed announcement our authorities had to put him in hospital for fourteen months despite the fact that his studies and work were normal. Confining him for mental illness was evidently an act of reprisal. It ~~w~~ also was to frighten other Chinese students who wanted to return. When our authorities failed to stop his leaving they retarded his departure.

11. Wang continued. In the case of Dr. Lin Lan-ying and Mr. Hsiao Chi-mei they also reported similar incidents.

12. Wang continued. He must point out this obstruction is the policy of our side and also violates our agreement

and

~~XNEXXXX~~

and all humanitarian principles. He demanded an accounting 42 and 47 persons who still have not yet returned.

13. I replied that I regretted that I could not find in anything he had said here this morning the slightest indication that his government is willing to renounce its threat to use force/if it ~~XXX~~ could not otherwise obtain its policy objectives in the Taiwan area. This is the difficulty we ~~£~~/ faced when came here to find a method of peacefully settling our differences and the difficulty we still face. No amount of words or misrepretation of the plain words in the proposals we have put forward can change this fact.

14. I continued. With regard to the first item of our agenda he entirely ingnored the genesis and history of our talks on this subject. We are not here to put forth ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ propaganda statements for the public which obscure the issue, but we are here to discuss on the basis of facts and, between the two of us, to settle these issues.

15. I have tried calmly, objectively and frankly to deal with him on the questions that we face. A statement such as "since the opening of these talks all the Americans who desired to return have done so except for a few criminals serving sentences" does not contribute to a settlement of this issue. Both of us perfectly well know when we came here we were discussing precisely those Americans who were in prison.

I accepted the proposals and suggestions he made which he said would expeditiously resolve the problem. As I have again pointed out this morning, rather than resolve, it appears to have worked in the opposite direction. Since December 1955 not a single prisoner has been released even a day before the completion of his sentence. I again pointed out, entirely apart even from the agreed announcement, it is common practice even under normal procedure for prisoners to be given time off for good behavior. However, each of these prisoners has been held right up to the last day of his sentence. I asked him this morning how the agreed announcement could be said in any way, under the most liberal or strained interpretation, be said to have been applied to them. I asked him to cite one single measure taken by his authorities with respect to the six who still remain in his prisons. I still await his answer.

17. I continued. With regard to the Chinese in the United States his vague, unsubstantiated and erroneous charges of obstruction to their return does not obscure two basic factors. The first fact is the Chinese who desire to do so are steadily and regularly returning to his country. To the best of our knowledge not less than 353 have returned since the beginning of our talks here. The second fact is that the very agency which he suggested for the purpose has not called to our attention a single case of any obstruction to departure.

18.

18. I went on to say that such statements as "On the United States' side Chinese still imprisoned remain without any change in their situation", as he was well aware, did not correspond to the facts. Every Chinese in our prisons who desired to do so has been permitted to go home without regard to length of sentence and without regard to his eligibility for normal parole and release.

19. I continued. ~~Axxfar~~ As far as Mr. Tseng is concerned, I pointed out that less than a year and a half from his entry into the U.S., that is, in June 1949, he showed signs of and was treated for mental illness. I also pointed out to Wang that when Mr. Tseng asked to return to his country and it appeared that he was able to make a decision, he was given every assistance in doing so . The Indian Embassy with which he was in correspondence was kept informed of his case. Not only was he permitted to return but an attendant to care for him during his trip was furnished by the United States Government. As I said at our last meeting, rather than ill-founded complaints, an expression of appreciation for the care offered him would be in order.

20. I continued. As far as the Chinese returning to his country violating laws and regulations of the United States concerning the export of funds or regulations are concerned, all I can say is that they (no more than any other alien or American citizen) would not be permitted to do so. These

long-standing laws and regulations are applicable to all persons. It is my understanding that his country has comparable laws and regulations which have been/rigorously applied to Americans leaving his country. Dissatisfied as we may have been, I did not and have not raised this question with him. What I was interested in was that these Americans be permitted to return.

21. Wang replied with regard to the question of civilians he had already made it quite clear that U.S. residents are free to return without any obstruction. His position in this regard is exactly in conformity with the agreed announcement between us. Insofar as American civilian offenders are concerned the facts also have given evidence that of the 40 persons in this category at the beginning of our talks there now remain only six. We have noted that many Chinese are imprisoned in the United States . Of 34 persons whose names I gave him, there still remain 33 in prison.

22. Wang continued with reference to the question of an expression of their will, while these persons still are being kept in prison, he had made it clear that it was/hard for him to believe persons in these circumstances are able to express their free will. The number of Chinese in the United States is very great. The number of Chinese students alone is about some 5,000 persons. The number of persons who have returned to his country is very

small.

23. Wang continued. There are still many Chinese in the U. S. who desire to return and are not able to do so. Those who did return did not return easily but only after they have experienced all sorts of obstruction and all sorts of threats or inducements have they succeeded in coming home. Persons are even dealt with as mental patients without any reason at all and are handcuffed as criminals. No amount of words can cover up these facts. If any side is dissatisfied over this question, it is his side. It is his sincere hope that the American Government will change this obstructive behaviour so that all Chinese who desire to do so can return without encountering any obstruction.

24. I replied that he had made to me the statement that American residents in China are free to return. As I recalled it, this was precisely the same statement he had made to me on August 2, 1955. We then discussed the question of Americans in prison. I had entered into the agreed announcement with a clear understanding that that would have an effect on their situation and enable them expeditiously to return. As token and confirmation of my understanding, on the same day as the agreed announcement, he announced to me the names of ten persons who were released. Since December 1955 not a one has been able to return prior to the full completion of his sentence.

25.

25. I went on to say that I had asked him this morning and again asked him in what way had the agreed announcement been applied to or in any way affected the ability to return of those persons since December 1955 or those six who still remained. I found not the slightest evidence of what the effect had been, except apparently for the worse.

26. Wang replied that the action we had taken on this question of civilians wholly conformed with what they had said in public. Nobody can ever point out an incident in which an American resident in China has been obstructed in returning. This even extends to those former prisoners of war who refused repatriation at the end of the Korean war. Whenever any one of this group indicated he had changed/his mind and wanted to return, they did everything they could to help him realize his wish.

27./ Wang continued. Nobody could ever cite any evidence that they had either in the past or at present called the American criminal offenders in prisons ordinary civilian residents in China. There had been no change whatsoever in their policy or practice with regard to this group of criminal offenders. Any allegations or charges which did not conform to reality are not acceptable to his side.

28. Wang continued. In dealing with such an issue thought must be given to the situation existing on both sides. Under circumstances in which Chinese residents in the United States continue to meet obstruction in departing one could not demand

anything extraordinary on his side's part. He had consistently been concerned with the question of improving the situation of residents abroad.

29. I replied that he would recall that when we were negotiating the agreed announcement he first asked for the inclusion of an exception for persons in prison. However, I had opposed this and finally we had agreed upon the elimination of any such reference. I had asked him and I again asked him in what way the agreed announcement had in the slightest affected American citizens in China as compared with the situation before its existence.

30. Wang replied that the matter is quite clear. They had never mixed up these two groups of Americans -- ordinary American residents and American criminal offenders. This was quite clear and he presumed no such confusion will be consented in any other country.

31. I responded that he had not answered my question.

32. Wang replied that if I did not want to recognize a distinction between the two groups, that was unilateral thinking on the part of the U.S. If they had at that time settled on the basis that there was no distinction between ordinary Americans and American criminal offenders what would have been the use of entering into an agreement. They could have simply released everybody.

33. I responded by asking what the purpose of the agreemant was.

34.

34. Wang replied that the purpose of agreement was that ordinary residents and nationals of both countries could return to their countries freely. As a matter of fact, many Chinese in the U.S. who desire to return have as yet not been able to do so. This is a matter to which the United States government must give attention and carry out the agreement strictly. In addition to many Chinese imprisoned in the U.S., even innocent Chinese in the U.S. who have never offended against any law are still prevented from returning.

35. I replied that Wang said, before we ever entered into the agreement, what he called ordinary Americans could leave his country. But what he now seemed to be saying was that the agreed announcement did not and was not intended by his government to bring about any change in the situation which existed prior to the agreed announcement. All I could say was that this was flatly contradictory to my understanding and to the plain words of the announcement itself.

36. Wang replied that this was only an American statement. It was no use making such a statement. They always acted in accordance with the agreement. However, Americans who have offended against the laws of China must be dealt with in accordance with those laws.

37. As neither of us had anything further to say, I suggested September 5 for the next meeting. Wang countered by suggesting September 12 to which I agreed.

U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

UAJohnson:sg

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~~R.F.C~~

Copy to
WSR

SECRET
OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

August 8, 1957

Letter No. 58

Dear Ralph:

Well, another meeting went off just about as expected. I decided not to follow up more at today's meeting on renunciation but save it for the next meeting. Of course, the result will be that he will more flatly refuse to discuss it, but nevertheless think that I can write a pretty good speech on it tieing back to what he said today. The same on implementation. He went further today than he has for a long time in taking the position that the agreed announcement did not apply to prisoners until they were released, and I can renew the attack next time on that. As always, any new ideas any of you may have will be welcomed.

He must be reading your mail to me. Frankly, I was going to disregard your suggestion for the next meeting on the 12th. As there did not seem too much new that would require attention from you and Walter, I thought it best to retain the four-week pattern, and I had personal plans involving my children and saving money on getting them back to the States that made it much better for me to meet on the 5th. I suggested the fifth, and he came back with the 12th, to which I, of course, agreed. Thus, once again I have been able to carry out the Department's thought on extending the period between meetings with the record of the meetings showing that the initiative has always come from him.

The sending of the material to me is working out fine and I have no further suggestions. As you will see from a separate despatch I am sending in, the Consulate here received a fearsome bawling-out from Communications on my having sent in the record of the last meeting in telegraph form, and I am, therefore, sending this one in by despatch form. If you do not get fast enough service on it at your

end

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

end, I leave it to you to fight it out with Communications and tell me how to handle it.

I am not surprised at Mrs. Fecteau's reaction to the possibility of travel of correspondents. From my talk with her I am certain that you will be receiving the same thing from Mrs. Downey and it seems to me that if the correspondents' travel goes through it is going to be most difficult to resist the appeals of these two.

If Dexter is not going to arrive until January I presume that you will do the necessary with the Army to make sure that Ekvall can stay here until the January meeting.

Thus the third year has begun. Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure:

1 copy of letter No. 57

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This document consists of 2 pages; No. 1 of 4 copies, Series A.

Geneva

HJ

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OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Lot 72 D 415

SECRET

American Embassy,
Prague, Czechoslovakia,
August 29, 1957.

Dear Ralph:

Thanks very much for so promptly getting to me the text of the release on the travel of correspondents which I was very happy to see. I suppose that we should have anticipated the Peiping reaction which, I believe, was mostly triggered by the specific statement that we would not give reciprocity. They probably found this, together with the rest of the statement, too much publicly to swallow. The press have been so intent on the Department being their only block that they have utterly failed to take into consideration the possibility of Peiping not giving the visas. Thus, things have now been worked around to where they should be -- that is, the controversy is between Peiping and the press, rather than between the Department and the press, and Peiping is really put on the spot. If they grant the visas they will appear publicly to a degree to be acquiescing in the Department's position as set forth in the statement. If they do not grant them, they will be incurring the rising wrath of the American press expressing its outrage at what it feels is a double-cross by Peiping. It seems to me the best thing for the Department to do is to sit quiet and let Peiping and the press fight it out. My guess is that Peiping will try to find a way out by again inviting a few correspondents (perhaps some on our list and some not) for a limited trip. However, this is certainly not going to make the press happy, particularly those that do not receive invitations. It seems to me that they have pretty much shut the door, at least for the time being, on granting visas to all twenty-four.

As far as the next Geneva meeting is concerned it does not now seem likely Wang will take the initiative in raising the matter, except perhaps by oblique reference to the Department's statement in characterizing them as not civilized, etc., as another example of "hostility". I do not believe I should take the initiative in any way raising the matter, but if he should do so I would have considerable material for rebuttal that would fill up time. I could, of course, refer to his previous statement to me that they were not asking reciprocity for Chinese correspondents to visit the United States, and on the "civilized" aspect I could come back to implementation.

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington.

SECRET

Of course, there may be further developments by the time of the next meeting that may change the picture, but I wanted to pass on these thoughts at this time.

Sincerely,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

cc: Edwin W. Martin, Esquire,
American Embassy, London.

P.S. After writing the above I have just seen in this morning's paper an August 27 Washington story quoting the Secretary as saying that we will "consider" applications of Chinese Communist correspondents. If the Secretary was correctly quoted this may put a somewhat different light on the possibilities of the subject coming up at the next meeting, and the desirability of my taking the initiative on it. I believe it is something on which I might make a little mileage. It certainly goes a long way to give Peiping a way out of the box in which they are now in if they want to use it. Of course, "consider" certainly does not mean we will grant any visas, but it would seem to me that it does mean we would accept applications to be "considered" on their merits and our laws and regulations. I know that you will send me at Geneva the full text of the Secretary's statement, which the article I have seen in the Herald-Tribune does not give, together with as much amplification as you can to enable me to handle it with Wang whether or not you want me to take the initiative. As far as the legal aspects are concerned the only thing I find in the Regulations is section (a) of 22 CFR 41.12 which contemplates the possibility of issuing visas to holders of passports of non-recognized governments. I suppose this frequently comes up in issuing visas to officials of non-recognized governments to attend the UN. However, I do not know of any case in which we have issued such a visa to non-officials although the principle would presumably be the same. Of course there is also the whole background of waivers being required for members of the Communist Party, etc. In the case of recognized Communist governments this has usually been handled by giving correspondents official visas which do not require a waiver. However, it would seem to me that this would be entirely out of the question in the case of an unrecognized government.

U.A.J.

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September 6, 1957

SECRET

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Letter No. 73

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Alex:

Your letter of August 29 was very timely reaching us yesterday in time to permit me to comment on it prior to your meeting next week.

I anticipate as you do that Peiping will eventually admit only a few American correspondents. However, they may now seek to use the reciprocity issue as leverage on us to admit Chinese Communist correspondents to the U. S. As you will see from the enclosed copy of the Secretary's August 27 press conference, the door to that possibility has been left ajar. So far no application for entry of a Chinese correspondent has been received.

The decision to authorize limited travel to Communist China by correspondents has greatly reduced the pressure on the Department over this issue. Some of the correspondents waiting in Hong Kong have criticized the wording of the Department's announcement as predisposing the Chinese Communists to reject the proposal but for the most part the onus now appears to be shifted to Peiping.

I think you are wise in not wishing to take the initiative in raising the travel issue with Wang at the next meeting. Wang may raise it taking the same line as the original Peiping reaction to our announcement. But his position is an awkward one and you will have no difficulty in handling it. It is possible that a Chinese Communist newsman will apply before the next meeting to be admited to the U. S., in which case you could simply reiterate our position that such individual applications would be considered on their merits and in the light of the applicable U. S. laws and regulations.

We are trying to get a copy of the new law on fingerprinting passed by Congress last week but may not have it in time to enclose with this letter. Briefly it authorizes the Secretary of State and the Attorney General jointly to waive fingerprinting requirements in certain cases for persons coming to the U. S. as temporary visitors. This will make it possible to admit visitors from iron curtain countries and even from Communist China without fingerprinting and without

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva

declaring the individuals to be officials which as you point out would be out of the question in case of an unrecognized regime.

I enclose a copy of the order issued by the Federal District Court in the Powell-Schumann Sedition Case calling on the Chinese Communist courts for judicial assistance. This was sent by the court direct to Peiping. The Executive Branch of the Government did not participate in any way, and legal opinion in the Department is that such action has no bearing on the matter of recognition. Once the necessary showing has been made as to the availability of witnesses and the substance of their testimony, the Judge will have to decide whether he would be justified in dismissing the case should the Department continue to refuse the defense counsel a passport for travel to Communist China.

We have been assured by Major Hoffman in the Attache Branch in the Department of Defense that Bob Ekvall will be permitted to stay in Paris until mid-January next year. We will have Dexter in Geneva before that time.

In regard to Hu Teh-yuin, the deportee Wang alleged "nearly lost his life" because ~~of~~ a serious stomach complaint was not properly cared for during his detention, Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us there is no record of Hu's having complained of any illness during his detention prior to deportation. He surrendered himself in New York for deportation on March 12, and was held in the immigration detention center there for two days before being transferred to Los Angeles. The records of the center have been examined, and there is no record of his having reported any complaint. Between March 14 and March 16, when he boarded the President Cleveland in Los Angeles, Hu was confined at the Chula Vista camp. The records of that camp also show that Hu was in good health and registered no complaints. Medical service was freely available in both the New York camp and at Chula Vista. It is of course possible that Hu may have suffered from indigestion aboard ship, as this has been known to happen aboard the President line ships. However, if he did, he would have had the same medical attention that any other passenger would have received.

We have been considering the possibility of having Hammarskjold take up the cases of Downey and Fecteau in a letter to Chou En-lai, in line with your conversation with the Secretary General. This would

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involve, so far as we have tentatively thought it through here, making the following points: (1) Downey and Fecteau were under the juriddiction and authority of the United Nations Command at the time of capture; (2) they were, accordingly, entitled to repatriation under the Korean Armistice Agreement, even though civilians; (3) however, their existence was concealed by the Chinese Communists until after the negotiations on repatriation at Panmunjom had been concluded; (4) by the time their existence was disclosed, we had already established a contact at Geneva which was considered an appropriate forum for arranging the return of the two men; (5) the two men were covered by our Agreed Announcement of September 10, and it was anticipated they would be released in accordance with that agreement, hence no separate representation was made on their behalf under the Armistice Agreement; (6) in view of the long lapse of time since the Agreed Announcement and the continued failure to release the men, we desire to remind the Communists of their responsibility to repatriate them under the Armistice Agreement; and (7) it makes no difference whether the men are released under the Agreed Announcement or under the Armistice Agreement, but until they are released the Communists will be in flagrant violation of both agreements.

Defense has sent out to the UNC instructions for a new meeting of the MAC on the subject of the missing personnel. We have already forwarded you a copy of the draft statement sent out for the use of the UNC. We do not know yet when the meeting will be held, but presumably it will be in the near future. We will let you know as soon as the results of the meeting are received, so that you will be able to plan your next presentation to Wang on this issue. Of course, if the occasion arises in the meeting on the 12th, you should restate our position on the missing personnel item, but it will probably be wise to defer an extensive, detailed presentation until after the MAC meeting.

I would appreciate your comments on the approach to Hammarskjold, particularly with regard to the tie-in with the Korean Armistice Agreement. We are of course consulting with the other people involved here in Washington, both in NA and Defense, and the points outlined above are entirely tentative at this point.

Mr. Robertson has been away for nearly three weeks on leave and I have just returned to the office from two weeks off. Mr. Robertson will be back in time to participate in the preparation of the instructions for your next meeting. We do not anticipate any new departures. It is interesting to note the importance placed by the British on continuation of the talks as indicated by Ed's letter of August 20.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

SECRET

Enclosures:

1. Court Order
2. Copy of letter to Congressman Alger
3. FBIS re "Offer to U. S. Newsman Termed 'Deception'."
4. Press Release No. 460 dated August 13,1957, "Personal Message from Acting Secretary to American Citizens Contemplating Travel to Communist China."
5. Press Release No. 480 dated August 27, 1957- "Secretary Dulles' News Conference of August 27, 1957".

6. Two tickers dated Sept. 6 from Reuters

P. S. The News Division has just informed us that there is a ticker in advising that the Chinese Communists are allowing the students visiting Peiping to see the American prisoners held in Communist China. I am enclosing a copy and we will let you know by telegram of any further significant developments in this regard.

cc: Edwin W. Martin, London.

(825)

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA PRIORITY 244

FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for September 12 meeting:

1. State that reciprocal renunciation force applicable to Taiwan area fully as essential today as when talks began two years ago. Refusal Chinese Communists renounce force and terminate their military threat in Taiwan area is fundamental obstacle to lasting peace.

2. Failure release remaining six Americans as required by Agreed Announcement continues constitute standing indictment Chinese Communists for not honoring public commitment. Again call attention Wang's gross distortion of record at last meeting in attempting distinguish between QUOTE ordinary Americans UNQUOTE and QUOTE criminal offenders UNQUOTE. Incontrovertible meaning of plain language Agreed Announcement is that all Americans have right leave Communist China expeditiously. No distinction stated or implied between Americans in prison and those out. Wang has in past admitted Announcement applied prisoners, who were only Americans under discussion when Announcement agreed on. Attempted

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LWS

Drafted by: 9/10/57
FE:CA:DLO[illegible]rn:RNClough:ikb:emm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Ralph N. Clough

Clearances:
FE - Mr. Robertson (in draft)
FE - Mr. Jones (in draft)

S/S-CR

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previously without foundation assert term QUOTE expeditious UNQUOTE as applied prisoners had to be interpreted in light seriousness offense, behavior, etc. Now apparent even Wang unable any longer stretch term QUOTE expeditious UNQUOTE to encompass delay over two years, hence he attempting further distort Announcement.

3. If Wang raises question reciprocity re newsmen, remind him this reversal his position year ago when he stressed Chinese Communist invitation US newsmen not conditioned on reciprocal US action. If they now desire exclude American correspondents, that entirely matter their choice. If Wang requests assurances US will admit specific group of Chinese Communist newsmen or other exchange arrangement, advise him applications individuals will be accepted at any American Foreign Service post and considered on merits, like any other application.

4. If Wang mentions Hu Teh-yun and his alleged stomach complaint, tell him careful check of records at places Hu detained during four days prior deportation reveal no medical difficulty or complaint his part. Any illness which developed during voyage would have been treated by ship's medical staff on same basis as that any other passenger.

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(826)

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 235, SEPTEMBER 12, NOON

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ONE HOUR TWENTY FIVE MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING MOSTLY DEVOTED TO CORRESPONDENTS. WANG PROPOSED AND I REJECTED DRAFT AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT (FULL TEXT BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM) UNDER THIS PRC RPT PRC AND USA "AGREED TO GIVE PERMISSION, ON AN EQUAL AND RECIPROCAL BASIS, FOR CORRESPONDENTS" TO ENTER THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. IN REJECTING I MADE EXACT STATEMENT IN PARA 3 OF DEPTEL 244 INCLUDING LAST SENTENCE. AT CLOSE OF MEETING WANG STATED THEY WERE GOING TO RELEASE TEXT DRAFT AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT BUT DID NOT INDICATE TIMING.

WANG OPENED WITH LONG STATEMENT IN HARD TONE REFERRING TO MY "GENERAL REPETITION OF WORN-OUT ARGUMENTS" AT LAST MEETING AND GENERAL ATTEMPT TO PLACE BLAME FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON PRC, "CONSISTENTLY HOSTILE ATTITUDE" OF U.S. AND LEADING INTO CORRESPONDENTS BY REFERENCE TO CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROPOSAL SEPTEMBER 22. 1956. "IN SPITE OF US OBSTACLES" STEVENS, HARRINGTON AND WORTHY CAME TO PRC AND "COMPLETED THEIR PRESS COVERAGE" IN SPITE OF STABLES US YOUTH DELEGATION HAD ALSO ENTERED PRC AND WERE BEING "WARMLY WELCOMED AND WITH AN ABUNDANCE OF GOOD WILL". "DOES NOT THIS SHOW THAT NO OFFICIAL BAN CAN PREVENT CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES FROM SHOWING THEIR DEMAND FOR BETTER CONTACTS". AFTER NEARLY A YEAR US HAD ON AUGUST 22 UNDER GREAT PRESSURE GIVEN PERMISSION CERTAIN NUMBER OF CORRESPONDENTS VISIT PRC. "IN SAME BREATH STATEMENT IN ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE TERMS REFUSED ACCORD RECIPROCAL VISAS TO CHINESE NEWSMEN. SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HAVE NOT ALTERED THIS". US AUGUST 22 STATEMENT SET TASKS FOR US CORRESPONDENTS IN PRC AND THUS ULTERIOR MOTIVE

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AND US UNDISGUISED ATTEMPT INTERFERE IN PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS ALL TOO CLEAR. NONE COULD CONCEIVE PRC WOULD ACCEPT AUGUST 22 STATEMENT WHICH DISREGARDS RECIPROCITY AND EQUALITY. PRC BELIEVES EXCHANGE VISITS OF CORRESPONDENTS IS A PRACTICAL AND CONCRETE STEP TO IMPROVING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THEREFORE PROPOSES AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT. TEXT MEETS NEED FOR EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY.

IN REPLY I "FOUND IT ASTOUNDING" THAT HE HAD "ENTIRELY REVERSED" POSITION HE HAD TAKEN LAST YEAR WHEN HE HAD STRESSED PRC WAS NOT ASKING RECIPROCITY FOR ADMISSION CORRESPONDENTS. ALSO UNDER US LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSURE RECIPROCITY. THEREFORE IN LIGHT THESE TWO FACTS STATEMENT RECIPROCITY INCLUDED AUGUST 22 STATEMENT. ALSO FOUND IT ASTOUNDING THAT HE NOW CHARACTERIZED ENTRY OF US CORRESPONDENTS MANY OF WHOM WERE SAME MEN TO WHOM THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED INVITATIONS AS UNDISGUISED INTERFERENCE THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, IF THEY NOW DESIRE EXCLUDE US CORRESPONDENTS THAT ENTIRELY MATTER THEIR CHOICE. PRC HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY RAISED QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY NOR HAS ANY PRC CORRESPONDENT APPLIED FOR ADMISSION TO US.. "IF ANY JOURNALIST FROM YOUR COUNTRY DESIRE TO ENTER THE US HE IS ENTIRELY FREE TO MAKE APPLICATION TO ANY FOREIGN SERVICE POST FOR A VISA AND IT WILL BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS JUST THE SAME AS ANY OTHER VISA APPLICATION". " I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING WITH YOU ANY MORE THAN I AM WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT THAT A FULL AND EQUAL NUMBER OF CORRESPONDENTS BE ADMITTED TO THE US OR THAT ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL WILL BE GRANTED ADMITTANCE TO THE US. NEITHER DO WE MAKE ANY SUCH DEMAND FROM YOUR SIDE. IT IS ENTIRELY UP TO YOUR OWN DECISION AS TO WHETHER YOU WISH TO ADMIT ANY INDIVIDUAL OR ANY NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS". PURPORT HIS SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT WAS THAT DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT ON RECIPROCITY IN AUGUSUT 22 STATEMENT HAD ENTIRELY ALTERED NATURE OF QUESTIONS AND CLOSED DOOR ON EXCHANGE VISITS OF CORRESPONDENTS. RESPONSIBILITY LIES ENTIRELY WITH U.S..

I REITERATED SUBSTANCE PARA 3 DEPTEL 244 AND SAID THAT I EXPECTED THEY WOULD CONSIDER APPLICATION VISAS ACCORDANCE THEIR LAWS AND REGULATION IN SAME MANNER AS US WOUWD DO AND THAT I WOULD NOT ATTEMPT DICTATE THEIR ACTION ANY MORE THAN I WOULD ACCEPT DICTATION FROM THEM OUR ACTIONS. IF THEY DECIDED REFUSE VISAS CORRESPONDENTS COULD NOT IN ANY WAY SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY TO U.S. THAT WAS THEIR OWN DECISION.

FULL REPORT

-3- 235, SEPTEMBER 12, NOON, FROM GENEVA

FULL REPORT OF MEETING FOLLOWS BY TELEGRAM.

NEXT MEETING OCTOBER 10.

GOWEN

DMJ

Note: Mr. Clough's office (CA) notified 9/12/10:40 a.m. EMB(CWO)

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FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 240, September 12, 5 p.m.(SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

PRIORITY

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FROM JOHNSON

1. Wang opened 70th today with statement that at last meeting I wilfully tried present course two year talks in false light. My repetition old worn-out arguments was vain attempt shirk responsibility my side for dragging out talks. Facts before US are clear; namely with respect to agreement reached under first agenda item, my authorities during past two years have employed 101 means of obstruction to prevent those who can return from doing so and even those who have returned home met all kinds of obstruction.

2. Wang continued that on second agenda item he still protests our seizure of Taiwan and continued inadmissable interference in internal affairs. He added my side refuses to discuss foreign ministers conference, removal of embargo, cultural exchanges and peoples contacts. At same time threat peace by my side increases, tensions are continued by my side following hostile policy towards China. This is display complete lack of good faith toward his country. His side consistently worked for improvement Sino-America relations. With view to promoting tradition friendship, they have put forth proposals for cultural exchanges and human contacts at our 58th meeting.

3. Wang continued I will recall both sides agreed adopt measures promoting contacts between two nations. In an earlier move to demonstrate good faith, his government on own initiative permitted entry number US press representatives. They had believed that there was no reason why such a proposal of equality

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of equality and mutual benefit should not be accepted. My side, however, refused discuss proposal and also refused permission enter. It thus clearly tells on which side Iron Curtain hangs after all. In spite of the obstacles, Stevens, Harrington and Worthy came to our country and completed press coverage. Recently the American Youth delegation visited China despite instructions and were warmly welcomed and with an abundance of good will. Does not this show that no official ban can prevent Chinese and American people from showing their demand for better contacts. Again does not this explain why US Government policy of preventing exchanges is bound to lead to an uproar and pressure on the part ot the American people.

4. Wang continued. Nearly a year has passed since the proposal of the 22nd of September last year. On August 22 this year US Government made statement under great pressure permitting a certain number of newsmen visit China. In same breath press statement, in utterly unreasonable terms, refused accord reciprocal visas Chinese newsmen. Subsequent statements have not altered this. This press statement shows my government ignorance international practice and is an insult to China. That my government has an ulterior motive in sending newspapermen to China is all too clear. In its August 22 statement my government absurdly tried to specify the tasks of newsmen and instructed them to report on prisoners in China. This is virtually an undisguised attempt to interfere in Chinese internal affairs in telling US newsmen to serve American policy.

5. Wang went on. This move of the US Government, which it nominally passes for consent, in its true light it is a maneuver to dupe public opinion because no person of average intellect would conceive that China could accept such a move disregarding reciprocity and equality. His side absolutely cannot agree to unilateral decision of the US because it runs counter to desire of peoples for better relations and mutual understanding. They believe, however, that exchange of visits US newspaper correspondents is practical and concrete step capable of improving Sino-American relations. Based on their consistent policy will and in line with their proposal of 22 September 1956 he proposed that we discuss and adopt the following agreed announcement. (Text sent separately).

GOWEN

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FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 240, September 12, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

PRIORITY

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FROM JOHNSON

6. Wang continued. Adoption of above agreed announcement meets demands of peoples of both sides and meets desire of news correspondents for news coverage. Perusal of text of agreed announcement above will enable me to see that it promotes privilege of equality and reciprocity of both sides. He would like to hear any views I had.

7. I replied I would address myself first to statement he had made regarding the travel of correspondents. I said let me say I found it utterly astounding that he had entirely reversed position he took last year in this regard. I well recall that at time we discussed this last year he stressed to me that this invitation to American correspondents was not conditional reciprocal action by the US. I recalled that he made statement to me here and if I recollected rightly it was also made in public statement by his Government or press. Next point I wanted to make was that under our laws the US is not in any position to assure or guarantee full reciprocity. Therefore, in light of these two facts and in order that there can be no misunderstanding, the August 22 statement of Department of State made this fact clear.

8. I continued I found it incomprehensible and astounding that he now reversed his position and said that because reciprocity cannot be granted, he did not intend to permit the entry of American correspondents. I also found it

astounding that

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astounding that he now characterized the entrance of American correspondents into his country many of whom had previously been in receipt of invitations from the authorities of his country, is an undisguised attempt to interfere in his internal affairs. If it is the decision of his authorities to reverse their previous position and exclude American correspondents, that was of course a matter to his own Government's choice. As far as I was aware neither he nor his Government had ever previously raised the question of reciprocity nor has any journalist from his country ever applied for entry into the US. If any journalist from his country desired to enter the US he is entirely free to make application at any Foreign Service Post for a visa and it would be considered on its merits just the same as any other visa application. I was not in a position to enter into any agreement or understanding with him any more than I was with any Government, that a full and equal number of correspondents be admitted to US or that any particular individual would be granted admittance to US. Neither did we make any such demand from his side. It was entirely up to his own Government's dicision as to whether he wished to admit any individual or any number of individuals.

9. Wang replied it is consistent belief of his side that exchange of visits is an important step toward gradually improving relations between two countries. The simple reason is that such mutual exchange of visits corresponds with the interests of both peoples and countries. Through such exchanges mutual understanding and trust can be expected to increase. It was in this spirit that his Premier made his statement at Bandung conference of 1955 that traditional friendship existed between Chinese and American peoples, and his Government has consistently worked in direction of improved relations between China and America. This attitude of his Government could be testified to by all proposals made during our talks of past two years. However, they found that insofar as matter was concerned, there are two entirely different attitudes and practices. In handling matters within realm of relations between our two countries, his Government has always acted in accordance with created international practice while he has always acted in contrary sense. In

handling matters

handling matters of Sino-American relations his Government has always worked to remove obstacles to intercourse and exchanges whereas US is consistently engaging in obstacles.

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Control: 7770
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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 240 SEPTEMBER 12, 5 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

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FROM JOHNSON

10. WANG CONTINUED, IN THEIR HANDLING OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP THEY HAVE ALWAYS OBSERVED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY, THAT IS, THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT WHEREAS THE US HAS ALWAYS VIOLATED SUCH A PRINCIPLE. HE WILL JUST CITE AN INSTANCE. AS I WAS PROBABLY AWARE, SOMETIME DURING THE CHINESE OPERA COMPANY'S TOUR OF EUROPE, IT HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION TO STAGE PERFORMANCES IN THE US. HIS AUTHORITIES, IN OBSERVANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY AN INVITATION TO AN AMERICAN COMPANY TO GIVE PERFORMANCES IN CHINA. AS A RESULT OF OBSTRUCTION ON PART OF AMERICAN GOVT SUCH AN EXCHANGE COULD NOT BE REALIZED.

11. WANG CONTINUED, IN ORDER TO DEVELOP MUTUAL VISITS AND CONTACTS HIS GOVT IN ADDITION TO 22 SEPT PROPOSAL ALSO ON OWN INITIATIVE HAD GIVE PERMISSION TO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS TO VISIT CHINA FOR NEWS COVERAGE. AFTER STUBBORN OBSTRUCTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON PART OF U.S. GOVERNMENT THREE AMERICAN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES IN PERSON OF STEVENS, HARRINGTON AND WORTHY SUCCEEDED IN GOING THERE AND COMPLETING THEIR COVERAGE WHEN THEY DID SO, THEY EXPECTED THAT FOLLOWING THIS STEP ON THEIR PART THE US WOULD ALSO TAKE CORRESPONDING MEASURES IN THIS RESPECT. NOW THE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY IN INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE FAMILIAR TO EVERYBODY. HE WAS AFRAID THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO QUOTE ANY REMARKS OF THEIR SIDE TO EFFECT THAT ONLY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS COULD ENTER CHINA

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WHILE NO CHINESE CORRESPONDENTS COULD ENTER US. NOW THE AUGUST 22 STATEMENT OF MY GOVERNMENT SAYS ARROGANTLY IN EFFECT THAT ONLY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS ARE GOING TO CHINA WHILE NO CHINESE CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ALLOWED INTO US. NOW ANYTHING IN COMMON BETWEEN THIS STATEMENT AND THE FRIENDLY GESTURE INDICATED BY HIS SIDE? SUCH A HAUGHTY AND ARROGANT STATEMENT BY U.S. IS AN INSULT TO CHINESE PEOPLE AND CHINESE PEOPLE CAN IN NO WAY ACCEPT THAT.

12. WANG CONTINUED. NOW IT NOT HIS INTENTION TO ENTER INTO DEBATE WITH ME ON US LAW. WHAT HE PROPOSED AND WAS INTERESTED IN WAS MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLE AND MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. IT SHOWED HE RECOGNIZED THAT NO QUESTION CAN BE RESOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE IF WE ADOPT AN ATTITUDE OF IMPOSING ONE'S DECISION ON THE OTHER. THE UNILATERAL DECISION OF THE US DEPT OF STATE HAS NOT ONLY CAUSED GREAT INDIGNATION ON PART OF PEOPLE OF CHINA BUT HAS ALSO MET WITH CONDEMNATION INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION.

13. WANG CONTINUED THAT PROPOSAL HE MADE THIS MORNING WOULD OFFER REASONABLE SOLUTION TO QUESTION OF NEWS COVERAGE BY TWO COUNTRIES. IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS MATTER. HE BELIEVED THAT THIS STEP WOULD BRING SOMETHING GOOD IN OUR TALKS.

14. I REPLIED THAT I FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION ON THE BASIS FOR WHAT HE CALLED INDIGNATION. SOME TIME AGO HIS AUTHORITIES INDICATED THEY DESIRED VISITS OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS. THE US HAS NOW RPT NOW AGREED TO VALIDATE PASSPORTS FOR SUCH TRAVEL. THE US WAS CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT IMPOSING ANYTHING ON HIM. IF HIS GOVERNMENT HAS NOW CHANGED ITS MIND AND DECIDED TO NOT GRANT VISAS THAT WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR DECISION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. I COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT IMPOSE DECISION ON HIM THAT HIS GOVERNMENT GRANT VISAS FOR THESE CORRESPONDENTS.

15. I CONTINUED. HE SAID THAT AUGUST 22 STATEMENT SAID THAT ONLY AMERICANS COULD GO TO CHINA AND NO CHINESE COULD GO TO

THE US

-3- 240, SEPTEMBER 12, 5 PM, (SECTION THREE OF FIVE) FROM GENEVA

THE US. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING OF THE KIND. IT SIMPLY SAYS THAT THE US IS NOT IN A POSITION TO ACCORD RECIPROCITY WHICH IS A LEGAL FACT I COULD NOT CHANGE. ONLY NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME SO FAR AS I KNEW HAS QUESTION OF CHINESE GOING TO US EVEN BEEN RAISED. AS FAR AS I KNEW WE NEVER RECEIVED EVEN AN APPLICATION FOR ANYONE TO GO TO US. AS I HAD TOLD HIM HERE THIS MORNING, IF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR NUMBER OF CORRESPONDENTS MAKES APPLICATION, THEIR APPLICATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON SAME BASIS AS ANY OTHER APPLICATION.

GOWEN

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Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 12, 1957
4:53 PM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 240, SEPTEMBER 12, 5 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

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16. I CONTINUED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN OF HIS GOVERNMENT AS ALWAYS ONE WHICH HAD WORKED TO REMOVE OBSTACLES AND THAT THE US ALWAYS CREATED OBSTACLES. I WAS ASTOUNDED THAT IN FACE OF RECORD HERE THAT HE COULD MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. EVEN BEFORE WE CAME HERE WE MADE IT ENTIRELY CLEAR THAT MAJOR OBSTACLE WAS THAT OF IMPRISONED AMERICANS IN HIS COUNTRY. WE ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO RESOLVE THAT PROBLEM. YET IN THE FACE OF THE VERY EXACT WORDS OF THAT AGREEMENT AND WHOLE HISTORY OF OUR TALKS HERE, HE HAD TEMERITY TO ALLEGE THAT AGREEMENT DOES NOT EVEN APPLY TO THE AMERICANS THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT. AND IN FACE OF THIS HE PROPOSED EVEN ENTERING INTO FURTHER AGREEMENT.

17. I CONTINUED HE SURELY COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT I OR MY GOVERNMENT WAS THAT NAIVE. WE ENTERED INTO THE FIRST AGREEMENT AND HERE TWO YEARS LATER THE SIX AMERICANS STILL IN HIS PRISONS STAND AS AN INDICTMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR NOT HONORING ITS COMMITMENTS. IF HIS GOVERNMENT REALLY WANTED TO REMOVE OBSTACLES INSTEAD OF TALKING ABOUT IT, AND REALLY WOULD HONOR THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, THIS AGREEMENT WOULD LONG SINCE HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AND THIS OBSTRUCTION REMOVED. APPEALING TO SUPPOSED VIOLATIONS BY THE US WHICH HAVE NO BASIS IN FACT, IN NO MANNER RELIEVES HIS GOVERNMENT OF OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT THIS AGREEMENT. VAGUE AND UNSUPPORTED STATEMENTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE FACTS NOR TAKE PLACE OF FACTS. FACTS ARE THAT THE VERY AGENCY

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WHICH HE SUGGESTED FOR SEEING THAT AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT HAS NOT CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO A SINGLE VIOLATION IN ANY WAY.

18. WANG CONTINUED THAT WHEN WE GOT TO QUESTION OF RETURN OF CIVILIANS, THE PRINCIPLE OF LOOKING AFTER INTERESTS OF BOTH PARTIES STILL APPLIED. FROM TIME WE BEGAN TALKS TO PRESENT, IT CAN BE SAID THAT ALMOST ALL AMERICAN RESIDENTS IN CHINA INCLUDING CRIMINAL OFFENDERS HAVE RETURNED TO U.S. WHEREAS IN US PRISONS ALONE, US IS STILL HOLDING SOME 30 CHINESE THERE. IT WOULD BE A DISTORTED INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT IF ONE OF SIDES ALWAYS SEES HIS OWN INTEREST DISREGARDING OTHERS INTERESTS. ON QUESTION OF EXCHANGE OF VISIT BETWEEN PEOPLES OF TWO COUNTRIES, HIS SIDE ALWAYS MENTIONED A CLEAR CUT POSITION.

19. WANG CONTINUED, AS FAR AS WHOLE QUESTION OF CORRESPONDENTS WAS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES TAKEN BY AUTHORITIES HIS COUNTRY LAST YEAR TO PERMIT ENTRY WAS ONE MATTER. THE STATEMENT OF AUGUST 22 OF MY GOVERNMENT DENYING RECIPROCITY WAS ANOTHER MATTER. THIS STEP ALTERED NATURE OF PROBLEM AND CLOSED DOOR ON EXCHANGE OF VISITS OF CORRESPONDENTS. IF OUR AUTHORITIES INSIST ON AUGUST 22 STATEMENT THEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBSTRUCTING VISITS OF CORRESPONDENTS ENTIRELY LIES ON U.S. IF THE IDEA OF SIMULTANEOUS VISITS BY CORRESPONDENTS IS ACCEPTED, THEN HE CANNOT SEE WHY THE STATEMENT PROPOSED THIS MORNING CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.

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Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 12, 1957
4:51 PM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 240, SEPTEMBER 12, 5 PM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

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/6

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM JOHNSON

20. I REPLIED THAT ALL I COULD SAY WAS THAT IT WAS ENTIRELY UP TO HIM WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO PERMIT THE VISITS OR NOT. I HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DICTATE TO HIM ON THAT ANY MORE THAN I WOULD ACCEPT DICTATION FROM HIM. IF HIS GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO GRANT VISAS,HE WAS CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO HEAR ANY PROTEST FROM ME. ALL I COULD DO WAS TO EXPRESS SURPRISE AT THE CHANGE IN HIS DECISION AND EXPRESS EVEN GREATER SURPRISE THAT HE COULD ALLEGE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DICTATED HIS DECISION.

21. I CONTINUED. THE QUESTION OF WHO IS TO BE PERMITTED ENTRY INTO A COUNTRY IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE OLDEST ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THAT EXISTS. IT IS UP TO HIS GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHOM IT WOULD HAVE ENTER INTO HIS COUNTRY JUST AS IT IS UP TO MY COUNTRY TO DECIDE WHO WILL ENTER THE UNITED STATES. IF ANY CHINESE CORRESPONDENT APPLIES FOR ENTRY INTO THE US HIS APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO OUR LAWS JUST AS I EXPECT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER APPLICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS LAWS.

22. WANG REPLIED BY EXPRESSING HIS SURPRISE AS TO WHY WE COULD NOT COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH MATTERS. HE STATED THAT WORDING IN THEIR PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT WAS VERY CLEAR. NOTHING IN IT IMPOSED ANYTHING ON ANY PERSON. IN ORDER TO MAKE THEIR POSITION ON WHOLE QUESTION CLEAR THEY WOULD FIND IT

NECESSARY

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-2- 240, SEPTEMBER 12, 5 PM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM GENEVA

NECESSARY TO MAKE TEXT AVAILABLE TO PUBLIC. HE REGRETTED THAT I COULD NOT FIND MYSELF ABLE TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT PROPOSAL MADE THIS MORNING.

23. WANG PROPOSED NEXT MEETING 10 OCTOBER. I AGREED.

GOWEN

MLJ/21

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1957 SEP 13 AM 6 54

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106

UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECRET
OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Letter No. 59

September 12, 1957

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Ralph:

Finally, after these long months we again had a little excitement. Thanks very much for your prompt action on my phone call. I am glad everyone agreed it was best quickly to put out something here. I am also glad everyone agreed that I had done right by immediately turning down his proposal rather than temporizing on it in any way until next meeting. It seemed to me clearly within my instructions to do so, and I felt any temporizing could only lead to confounding the confusion.

I sent you the full record by telegraph as there is no courier until Saturday, the meeting was fairly short and I thought it best to let you know exactly what was said in case anything further arises. You will note that I became very sharp in tone toward the end on implementation, and that I did not bring up "renunciation". As the meeting had developed I felt it better to end on this sharp note, and that to have gone any further into implementation or into renunciation would have been anti-climactic. I made no move to suggest the next meeting and he came up with that.

As far as the correspondents are concerned I do not believe they have entirely closed the door but have left themselves some freedom of action. If they were really intelligent, from their standpoint, instead of just attempting to act clever, they would now give visas to a few Americans, have a few Chinese apply to us, and then

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

indicate they were waiting to see what we did before acting on the other American applications. At the same time they feel they have a very good theme in "reciprocity and equality", particularly in Asian States and can be expected to play this hard.

They have just brought me in a Reuters ticker from Washington which I am enclosing. You can see this goes far beyond the line I was instructed to take today and is certainly no help to me here. I carefully avoided committing ourselves to admitting any correspondents, and indicated no interest in any agreed announcement on the subject whether the word "reciprocal" was used or not. I understood my instructions to refer to any "exchange arrangement". If, as is likely, this issue is still alive by the time of the next meeting, I hope you will be sure that my instructions are as full and clear as possible.

Incidentally, I wonder if we are perhaps entering into some semantic difficulty. As I interpreted, and I believe Peiping interpreted, our August 22 statement it meant that the U.S, would not give any visas to any correspondent bearing a Chinese Communist passport. As subsequently interpreted by the Secretary, we were prepared to accept applications from Chinese Communist correspondents but could not give any advance assurance as to whether any or what number would be approved. If we are in fact prepared to give favorable consideration to a qualified applicant it seems to me we are in fact giving reciprocity. In short, it does not seem to me as commonly used "reciprocity" necessarily involves one for one exchange. As a minor point in this connection, Bob and Ed have noted that the Chinese terms used for "equal and reciprocal" in his draft today are not the same as used for those terms in the "Five Principles". (I am enclosing a copy of the Chinese text.)

Would you have Ekvall's travel authorization 8-0200 of July 1 amended and his subsequent orders read so as to cover travel from any point in France on which he is on official duty to Geneva rather than just from Paris. Believe it or not he started his previous trip from Roquebrune which is closer and cheaper to Geneva than Paris, but Embassy, Paris refuses to pay him anything for it because his orders read only from Paris! Such are some administrative minds.

Regards to all.

alex

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Reuters ticker
2. Copy of Chinese text of proposed agreed announcement

reut 51542

following recd es Washington:
an exchange of american and chinese communist correspondents may be worked out if China does not insist on the use of the word "reciprocal" in any agreement, informed sources said today.

Immediate state dept reaction to the Chinese proposal at geneva that american and chinese reporters should be allowed to enter each others country on such a basis, was to go no further than the position recently expressed by mr. j. f. dulles the secstate.

a department spokesman said: "if any chinese communist newsman applies for a visa, his application will be considered in the light of relevant laws."

but informed sources indicated that the united states might eventually agree to exchange approximately equal numbers of reporters with china.

"if the chinese would agree to avoid the word 'reciprocal' something probably could be worked out," one u.s. official said.

"i dont think it would be exactly twentyfive americans for 25 chinese, but the numbers could be nearly equal."

中华人民共和国和美利坚合众国政府大使级会谈协议声明

（草　案）

1957年9月12日

王炳南大使代表中华人民共和国政府、约翰逊大使代表美利坚合众国政府，作如下声明：

中华人民共和国政府和美利坚合众国政府同意，在平等互惠的基础上，双方允许对方的新闻记者到各自的国家，进行新闻采访，以增进中美两国人民之间的相互了解。

829

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** ACTION COPY

For Geneva

823b

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32
Action
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Info
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Control: 10897
Rec'd: September 17, 1957
1:07 p.m.

FROM: Prague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 145, September 17, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 145 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 8

LONDON PASS TO EDWIN W MARTIN

I have now received from Geneva text Wang's September 16 press statement which I understand has been transmitted Department by USIS Geneva. My opinion statement does not introduce any new element and requires no reply except recommend Department reply to inquiries on his charges concerning Chinese in US by referring fact no representations yet received from Indian Embassy on single case alleged obstruction.

While CHICOMS now demanding US recognition principle "equality and reciprocity" with respect this matter, his statement strengthens my belief they not necessarily insisting on one for one exchange.

JOHNSON

JFP

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Action Taken Noted

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
57 SEP 17 PM 5 16

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PAR

Geneva [illegible]

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Lot 72 D 415

Official-Informal
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Letter No. 74

September 27, 1957

Dear Alex:

We have been pondering the Communist actions with respect to the newsmen in order to reach some conclusions as to where we stand on this question and what we may expect from the Communists. I have embodied the results of our thought and discussion in the enclosed memorandum on which I would appreciate having your and Ed's comments. If you have any comment which you think might influence the formulation of the instructions for your next meeting, please telegraph them as a letter would probably not reach us in time. I expect to be writing again next week but wanted to get this memorandum to you earlier so that you would have more time to consider it.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Chinese Communist Actions with
Respect to Newsmen.

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Embassy,
Prague.

CC: Edwin W. Martin
CA:RNClough:emm

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October 4, 1957

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

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Letter No. 75

Dear Alex:

I suspect the principal subject at your forthcoming meeting will be the newsmen issue. As pointed out in the memo attached to my letter of September 27, it seems doubtful that the Chinese Communists are in a hurry to resolve the present impasse. It seems more likely that for a while at least they will continue to exploit it in their propaganda and press you hard for some sort of recognition in principle of equal and reciprocal treatment for newsmen. We will try to anticipate possible moves on their part at the next meeting and make your instructions as complete as possible. We feel we are in a satisfactory position if we continue to refuse any general agreement by holding the door open for any Chinese Communist newsmen to apply for a visa if he wishes.

We have been informed by Justice that the Court has again denied Wirin's request that the Court order the State Department to issue him a passport valid for Communist China. The case has not yet reached the posture at which the Judge would have to decide whether the refusal of a validated passport to Wirin would justify dismissing the case. When that time comes, we have told Justice we will consider our position once more.

We have sent you a copy of Hammarskjold's message to Lodge that he was writing to Chou En-lai concerning Downey and Fecteau. I am not sanguine that this will accomplish anything but it certainly can do no harm. We still have no word from Panmunjom that the matter of the unaccounted for personnel has been taken up in the MAC. I think it is just as well for you not to make any elaborate presentation on this issue pending word from the MAC. I suppose it is possible that Wang will seek a little publicity after the next meeting if he should come up with some new proposal. If it seems appropriate to do so we could consult by telephone concerning a press release by you. We felt that your release last month was quite effective.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

cc - Edwin W. Martin

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
Geneva.

Lot 72 D 415

832

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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366

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA

FOR JOHNSON

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Origin

Info:

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Guidance for October 10 meeting:

1. Take Wang to task for increasingly evident Chinese Communist responsibility for preventing progress in talks. On September 10, 1955 they declared all Americans entitled expeditiously exercise right return. Instead of carrying out promptly this public commitment, they adopted specious argument that term QUOTE expeditiously UNQUOTE must be interpreted in light length sentence, behavior of prisoners. At last two meetings Wang even argued that Agreed Announcement applied only to QUOTE ordinary UNQUOTE not QUOTE offending UNQUOTE Americans. Plain words of announcement do not support this view and Wang well knows that at time announcement issued, U.S. concerned only about prisoners, hence announcement must have referred to them or been meaningless.

2. Communist responsibility for lack progress/~~xxxx~~ also apparent from refusal renounce use force. Reciprocal renunciation force applicable to Taiwan area merits full attention for whatever time necessary attain goal

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Drafted by: FE:CA:DLOsborn:RNClough:emm 10/7/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: John Foster Dulles

Clearances: NSR FE - Mr. Robertson FE - Mr. Jones HPJ

S/S -

OCT 8 1957 P.M.

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of terminating military threat to peace that area. Interests of two countries and world not served by introduction of subsidiary issues.

3. If Wang raises question newsmen's travel and his draft agreed announcement of September 12, reaffirm U.S. position applications individual newsmen for visas will be considered on individual case basis. If Communist China wishes approve or deny newsmen visas on group or blanket basis, that matter its choice. U.S. will act in accordance its own laws, subjecting applications individually to criteria specified in law.

4. If Wang presses for yes or no answer on principle reciprocity and equality or for assurance one or several Chinese Communist newsmen would be admitted, remind him U.S. newsmen applied individually for visas, that he himself stated these applications would be considered individually and we are only asking that Chinese Communist newsmen do the same. U.S. cannot approve visas in advance on blanket or hypothetical basis.

5. Your 190 considered in formulating above.

Dulles

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☑ Reviewer ________ Date 7/6/8

October 8, 1957

Official-Informal
Unclassified

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Alex:

I looked into the matter of a possible amendment for Bob Ekvall's travel authorization, along the lines of your letter of September 12, but it appears the administrative mind works the same in Washington as it does in Paris. The orders on which Bob travels to Geneva were issued by State, whereas his orders for travel within France are paid by Army; to have him perform a trip employing both sets of orders, however amended, would entail all sorts of budgetary complications involving overlapping agency responsibilities, which our administrative people would rather not contemplate. However, if Bob can work out some procedure acceptable to the Embassy in Paris, I will try to have our executive office take another look at the problem.

Best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough
Director for Chinese Affairs

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

CA:DLOsborn:ssm

Unclassified

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Pech

ACTION COPY

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37-36

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Assigned to CA/OR
Control: 6379
Rec'd: October 10, 1957
10:09 a.m.

Noted

Action 10/10
Action Office Symbol CA
Name of Officer
Direction to DC/R file

001/7

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 347, October 10, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - FROM JOHNSON

One hour twenty minute meeting this morning with no new developments.

I opened with statement along lines paragraphs 1 and 2 DEPTEL 366. Wang's reply was along familiar lines but with particular stress on "principles of equality, mutual benefit and reciprocity" and ended with correspondents which example of renewed U.S. violation of these principles. "PRC demands US subscribe to principle of equality and reciprocity." In reply I stressed US interested in substance not words and that facts of performance under September 10 agreed announcement as witnessed by UK and India glaring example PRC failure carry out their principles. Then made point paragraph 3 DEPTEL 366.

During course rebuttal Wang made statement that PRC had never tried prohibit Chinese correspondents going to US and Chinese correspondents make own decisions this matter which I picked up to reply that then there is apparently no problem, no Chinese correspondents having applied to go to U.S., apparently none desire to do so. Pointed out American correspondents travel to most countries of world including Communist countries and correspondents from most of those countries travel to U.S. without any agreements between governments. If any of those governments asked agreement similar that asked by PRC, our answer would have to be same as to PRC. At this point Wang conferred with aide and said he had nothing further.

I suggested

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I suggested next meeting November 7. Wang countered with November 14 and I accepted. Full report by pouch.

GOWEN

LMS:BDW/7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1957 OCT 10 PM 3 11
BUREAU OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIORITY
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(Security Classification)

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FROM : U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador to Prague
now at Geneva

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

Action Taken
October 9, 1957
DATE

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	REC'D 10-17		OTHER

Date of Action
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SUBJECT: China Talks - 71st Meeting

1. I opened 71st with following statement:

a. "Mr. Ambassador, in our last meeting you made the allegation that while your government has been the one which has always worked to remove the obstacles in the path of improvement of relations between our two countries, the United States Government was always creating such obstacles. I expressed my astonishment that you should feel it possible to make such a statement. It seems to me that the record of our 70 meetings since August 1, 1955 has demonstrated very clearly that it has been the attitude adopted by your authorities which has placed serious obstacles in the way of the improvement of relations.

b. When our talks first began I emphasized the vital importance attached by my government, and by the American people, to the question of the release of Americans imprisoned in your country. The first six weeks of our negotiations were taken up entirely with this subject and were culminated in the issuance of the Agreed Announcement of September 10. It was, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the understanding of my government that this Announcement applied to all Americans in the territory controlled by your authorities, including those who were imprisoned. No other interpretation can logically be placed either on the wording of the announcement, or on the negotiations which led up to its issuance.

c. It was our sincere hope that, with the issuance of the Agreed Announcement, a solemn commitment had been made by your authorities to eliminate one of the major sources of friction between our countries. Unfortunately, we were to be disappointed in this hope. Hardly had the Agreed Announcement been issued than you began to interpret it in such a way as to distort the clear meaning of the words used, and thus to try to excuse the failure of your authorities to implement the Announcement. You lost no time in making the specious argument that the term "expeditiously" must be interpreted in the light of the behaviour

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REPORTER

of the prisoners and of the seriousness of their alleged crimes, and so forth.

d. An even more serious distortion of the Agreed Announcement has been the argument which you have put forward during the last two meetings, as well as on previous occasions, that the announcement applies only to so-called ordinary Americans residing in China and not to those who are alleged to have committed offenses. Neither the words of the Announcement itself, nor the record of the negotiations leading up to it, support this argument. The clear intention of the Agreed Announcement was to bring about the expeditious release of all Americans who were against their will prevented from leaving your country, including most obviously those who were imprisoned. By their failure to implement this clear intention, your authorities deliberately sought to deprecate the value of agreements between us. Your authorities have thus been careful to maintain what they full well know is one of the principal obstacles to the improvement of relations between us and to progress in these talks. No amount of words can change these facts or obscure the full responsibility of your side.

e. In all frankness, Mr. Ambassador, I must also make the same indictment of your side on the question of the renunciation of the use of force. Again it has been the intransigeant attitude adopted by your authorities which has prevented us from making progress on this vital matter. We dealt at considerable length at our meeting in August with this extremely important question and I do not propose to review today the various arguments which I put forward then. I do wish to stress, however, that in the view of my government the reciprocal renunciation of force with respect to the Taiwan area is a step which is fully as essential today as it was when these talks began more than two years ago. I earnestly wish to point out once again, Mr. Ambassador, that the refusal of the authorities of your ~~countries~~ country to renounce force and to terminate their military threat in the Taiwan area remains a fundamental obstacle to the attainment of lasting peace. The removal of this obstacle certainly merits our full attention for whatever time is necessary to achieve results. Introduction of subsidiary issues by no means serves the interests of our two countries nor of the world."

2. Wang replied. He had repeatedly pointed out during the course of the talks that in order to improve relations between our two countries, it is necessary that obstacles lying in their path must be removed. I had this morning referred to the record of

our talks of the past two years. He might say that this record does not give any indication that the U.S. is making efforts to remove such obstacles in our relations. From this record of our talks it can be clearly seen that their complaints against us have been based on facts. They consider that relations between two countries must be based on equality, mutual benefits and reciprocity. The U.S., however, has consistently denied this basis. The principle of equality and reciprocity has been generally accepted as one of the bases of international relations. He did not see any reason why our side should continue to object to it.

3. Wang continued. Let us take the question of returning civilians. His side has faithfully carried out the agreement of September 10, 1955 while my side has not, thus violating the principle of reciprocity. Now all those ordinary American nationals in China who desire to return have left. Even among the American prisoners, 34 have been released in advance or at the expiration of their terms. Yet Chinese in the U.S. who desire to return continue to encounter obstacles and persecution so that many cannot return. Nor do those Chinese prisoners in the U.S. enjoy similar lenient treatment as do those U.S. prisoners in China.

4. Wang continued. Next he wanted to take up the visits of newspaper correspondents. Last year his government took the initiative in admitting American correspondents. All those who wanted to do so did not succeed in coming due to obstructions

placed by the U.S. Government. Three went and they succeeded in completing their coverage. On this score the U.S. has again failed to observe the principle of reciprocity. On August 22 my government had announced permission for American correspondents to enter China but flagrantly refused to announce permission for Chinese correspondents. The draft agreement introduced by his side at the last meeting called for reciprocity for newsmen to come and visit on a reciprocal basis. This was rejected by my side.

5. Wang continued by saying that on relations between China and the U.S. and on such concrete matters as cultural exchanges, human contacts, and visits of newspapermen, our side has violated the principles of equality and reciprocity, thus showing contempt of the principles in international relations. They consider that in Sino-American relations no question can be settled if one departs from this principle. In this respect they have consistently insisted on equality and reciprocity, and they resolutely demand that our side subscribe to this principle. Otherwise their side cannot unilaterally undertake commitments.

6. Wang continued. With regard to the renunciation of force, his position has always been that the relaxations of tension in the Taiwan area constitutes one of the vital aspects in the improvement of relations between China and America. Previously they had dealt at great length on the importance of this issue. The fact before us is that the Chinese territory of Taiwan is under the direction of the U.S. and peace in the Far East is

disturbed by the attitude of the U.S. Government. His side has repeatedly put forward their views with regard to how this situation can effectively be resolved. It is now up to the U.S. to put forward concrete opinions if the U.S. is genuinely willing to respect the sovereignty of China and genuinely desires to contribute to peace in the Far East.

7. I replied. He had again this morning as in the past spoken much of the terms equality and mutual benefit and reciprocity. I told him when we came here more than two years ago my interest and the interest of my government is in substance rather than words. At your his suggestion we entered into an agreement more than two years ago which was supposed to embody the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and reciprocity. I can (could) not see that that agreement has in any way insofar as implementation by his country is concerned demonstrated either equality, mutual benefit, or reciprocity. The evidence of this is not the unsupported statements of myself and of my government; the evidence is the impartial observations of the third parties named in that agreement to determine whether it was being carried out in good faith. With respect to your (his) country the UK is witness to the fact that it has not even been able to carry out the subsidiary provision of that agreement. The UK is witness to the fact that/for more than two years there has not been even any pretence of releasing the imprisoned persons who were subject to that agreement. Prisoners are now being held up to the very last day

of completion of their sentences. I can could not see the slightest evidence of what you he termed lenient treatment, much less any evidence of carrying out the terms of the agreement permitting these people to return to the U.S.

8. I continued. On the other hand the Government of India which was named by him in the Agreement with respect to its operations in the U.S. has not yet called to our attention a single case of obstruction to the return of any Chinese who desires to return to your his country. The question, you he full well knew, is not whether a majority of Chinese residing in the U.S. have returned to your his country or whether a minority have returned. The question is whether those who desire to return have been and continue to be free to do so. The Government of India and the Indian Embassy in the U.S. are witness to the fact that they are able to do so.

9. I continued. Thus it is clear, not on the basis of my words but on the basis of imparting impartial ~~important~~ evidence to whose benefit that agreement has operated. However, apart from all this, his your government full well knew even before we came here that the question of Americans imprisoned in your his country and prevented from returning to the U.S. was one of the major obstacles to the improvement in our relations. The very terms of ~~f~~ reference agreed upon by our two governments for these talks are witness to that fact. I have not and do not ask him to agree as to whether this position is right or wrong, but what I have asked

him to recognize is that it is a fact. It is a fact of fundamental importance and a fact which is readily within the control of his government. I agreed to the proposal which he you made for our agreed announcement on the subject on the understanding that his authorities would be willing and able to remove this block to the improvement of our relations. In spite of all this his authorities deliberately are maintaining this block to our relations. It is entirely impossible for me to understand why they continue to do so. It is entirely impossible for me to reconcile this undisputed fact with progress for improvement in relations and improvement in these talks. I had have most earnestly in every way I could can think of attempted to make this clear to him you.

10. I continued. With respect to correspondents it is a similar situation, that is, is his your interest in words or is his interest in substance? I failed to see the ground for his your complaint. As far as I knew no newspaper correspondents from his country had ever applied for entry into the U.S. In fact until a few weeks ago he never indicated any interest in the subject. As I told him at the last meeting, if it is the desire of any newspaperman to enter the U.S. his application will be accepted at any foreign service post throughout the world. His application will be considered on an individual case basis in accordance with our laws and regulations. If his your authorities desired to approve or deny the applications for visas which have been made to him by U.S. correspondents whose passports

Page of
Desp. No. unnumbered
From UAJohnson

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Page of
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From

have been validated for travel to [his] your country, that is entirely a matter of their choice. If they wanted to deny all of them on a blanket basis or deny or approve them on an individual basis, that was entirely a matter of their choice. As far as the U.S. was concerned, under our laws, applications must be considered individually. I could not see the basis for [his] your complaint about this position or why it should prevent exchanges of newsmen.

11. (I continued.) As far as the question of renunciation of force was concerned, the situation still is that [his] your authorities refuse to agree to an unconditional renunciation of force such as I had proposed. Their position still appears to be that they are asking the U.S. to surrender to their point of view with respect to the Taiwan area even while they continue[d] to use the threat of force. I could not see in that position the slightest element of any willingness to settle disputes by peaceful negotiation or the slightest element of equality, mutual benefit, or reciprocity.

12. Wang replied. I had spoken a lot of words concerning mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity. All these words sounded quite all right to him whereas in substance the record of our talks shows that in the course of these talks I had always been telling the Chinese government to do/this and to do that ~~suchxthingx~~ whereas the U.S. Government has never indicated its willingness to make any effort. Insofar as the agreement on civilians is concerned, the record shows that the U.S. side has always been telling the

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Chinese Government to take actions whereas the U.S. itself has not been taking actions to implement that agreement. Insofar as the release of prisoners is concerned according to my way of stating the matter it would seem that only the question of American prisoners is concerned while there is no question of Chinese prisoners. Such allegations do not conform with the actual situation.

13. Wang continued. With respect to the visit of newspaper correspondents, the official statement of my government indicated that it was going to allow a certain number of American newsmen to go to China while it does not even try to conceal its refusal to give reciprocal treatment to Chinese newspapermen going to the U.S. All this shows that lip service to reciprocity does not mean reciprocity actually. With regard to the question of Chinese going to the U.S., this is entirely a matter for the Chinese correspondents to decide on because his government has never tried to prohibit or prevent the visits of correspondents as my government has done. Thus the Chinese correspondents can make their own decision on this matter. The question does not depend on the Chinese Government or on the Chinese correspondents but it is up to whether the U.S. is willing to observe the principle of reciprocity and equality.

14. I replied Then apparently there was no problem. Apparently no Chinese correspondent desired to go to the United States as no one has made application to do so.

15. Wang continued. He had made it clear that it was not a question of this or that correspondent but was a question of whether the U.S. is going to observe the principles of equality and reciprocity in international affairs. They could not in any way accept the position of the U.S. which unilaterally refused to accord equality and reciprocity to Chinese correspondents. This position violated all standards of international behaviour.

16. I replied. We simply made it clear in view of the history of this question and in view of the legal framework in which we must operate that we could not be bound as a matter of right to permit, or to give advance approval, to a number of Chinese correspondents corresponding to a number of American correspondents which they might decide to admit to their country. If and when any Chinese correspondent makes application to go to the U.S. we are entirely willing to consider his application. He himself had said that application for visas to his country would also be considered individually.

17. I continued. United States correspondents travel to most of the countries of the world including those which have social and economic systems similar to his own, and correspondents from those countries travel to the U.S. In no case did I know of any agreement on reciprocity or equality nor has the U.S., for those countries, insisted on any such agreement. If they were to do so, we would have to give them the same answer I gave him here.

18. He then indicated he had no more to say.

19. I did likewise and suggested we meet again on November 7. Wang said he would prefer November 14. I agreed.

U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

UAJohnson:sg

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UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

...OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Oct 17 1957
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October 9, 1957

Letter No. 60

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Ralph:

As stated in my summary telegram, there was nothing new at this morning's meeting. He obviously had no new instructions, his performance was almost listless, and his replies entirely perfunctory. As you will also note he cut the meeting off short. I feel that given the situation I made out very well today and that his position on the correspondents was very weak. I think that they full well realized this and that they do not have much of a public issue unless and until Chinese correspondents apply for visas and are refused. I am surprised that this has not been done up until now but perhaps they did not have their "ducks lined up" and think that it is very likely that they will do so before the next meeting. It of course depends on what their principal objective is. They can hardly expect to be successful in making us formally and publicly retract the "reciprocity" issue. They have not been successful in rousing our own press to the fray. The press elsewhere seems to have a marked lack of interest in the whole subject now. However, if we were to turn down an application from one of their correspondents they would probably be successful in again arousing interest in the subject both in our own press and abroad. One can only speculate as to whether they really desire to have any American correspondents enter their country. If they do not, the present impasse may not be unwelcome to them and they might let it continue rather than take the risk of it being broken by our issuing visas to one or more of their correspondents.

Nevertheless, in connection with the possibility of some Chinese correspondents entering the United States I think ~~I think~~ that we should be prepared for the possibility

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

of their attempting to contact some of the Chinese students, particularly those for whom they have names and addresses, and for the difficulties that may well ensue. Given past attitudes of the students I think that we can depend on most of them being unwilling to see correspondents, particularly one from Communist China, and of their attempting to use this as proof that we are "terrorizing" the students. If they do see any, I think that we can depend on the students taking at the best an ambivalent attitude on their reasons for not returning. I do not have any suggestions at the moment for meeting this problem but merely mention it as something we should think about.

I was, of course, disappointed that the Department did not accept my suggestion from Prague for taking a little initiative in this field at today's meeting. Although the meeting went off well without it, I do not think it safe to assume that this will always be the case or that they will not take another initiative in this field. Frankly, as you know, I am not happy with consistently being in the position of responding to his initiatives and never having an initiative of my own to which he is required to respond. I have felt that this correspondents issue gave an opportunity for somewhat turning the tables on him.

As far as the next meeting is concerned I think we simply have to wait and see what they do or do not do between now and that time. I fully expected him to turn down the suggestion for November 7 for the next meeting as that is the 40th Soviet anniversary and will be given a big play throughout the bloc. However, I wanted to leave it to him to suggest a later date. I should mention a point Ed Martin called to my attention with regard to the memo enclosed with your letter to me at Prague. Neither of us have a copy here as we do not like to carry classified communications but it is the recollection of both of us that in the last paragraph there was a phrase which in effect credited Chinese Communists with forcing us to change our policy on the travel of newsmen. While it is true that Peking's issuance of invitations to American correspondents started the whole issue, it was not pressure from Peking that brought about a change in our policy but rather the pressure from our own press.

Incidentally, the amendment of Ekvall's travel authorization mentioned in the last paragraph of my letter of September 12 has not yet been made and his new orders came out in the same form so he has not yet been able to collect for his previous travel.

Kindest regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson

P.S. For your information there has been a change in the courier arrival here so that your letters arrive here Wednesday afternoons. Thus, if there is anything of special importance in your letter it would be good to make some mention of it in our guidance so that if the courier is late for any reason we can ask you to telegraph the substance.

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November 8, 1957

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Official - Informal

Letter No. 76

Dear Alex:

We have just emerged successful from a spirited encounter with the Chinese Communists supported by the rest of the Soviet bloc at the Red Cross Conference in New Delhi where the Communists endeavored to exclude the Republic of China. Since Ed was present there is no need for me to describe the affair in detail. It is possible that Wang may attack us at the next meeting for our activities there and we will cover this point in your instructions. We sent an official delegation to the Conference only after considerable debate within the Department and with strong misgivings on the part of FE. We felt it would establish an unfortunate precedent for the U. S. Delegation to be present officially with the Chinese Communists. However we did go on the basis that this was to be a unique, humanitarian, non-political meeting at which all those having a reasonable claim to be present would be admitted. We of course could not assent to seeing the Republic of China excluded and the final result of our efforts was the admission of the GRC at which the Chinese Communists and the other Communist regimes walked out.

Judge Goodman in the Powell-Schumann sedition case handed down an order on November 1 giving the U. S. 30 days in which to issue defense attorney Wirin a passport valid for travel to Communist China, failing which he would dismiss the case. I will enclose a copy of the order if we can secure a legible one. In the meeting today with L we decided that the overall interests of the U. S. Government would probably be best served by validating Wirin's passport. Not to do so would place the responsibility on the State Department for dismissal of the case. Now that we have validated passports of American newsmen, we feel that validating Wirin's passport would not appreciably decrease the pressure from others who desire to go to Communist China. He has reasons for going which are unique. I don't believe that validating Wirin's passport will necessarily lead to his admission to Communist China or the procurement of the evidence which he is seeking. The Chinese Communists in a letter dated October 30 rejected the court's request for judicial assistance from Chinese Communist courts on the "ground that there is no agreement for judicial assistance between the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China". My guess is that Peiping will continue

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador now at Geneva,
American Consulate General,
Geneva.

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Lot 72 D 415

to play this case in such a way as to endeavor to force the U. S. in the direction of Government to Government arrangements or agreements. Final decision has not been made yet as to whether Wirin's passport will be validated but I believe it will be approved.

Another month has gone by and no Chinese Communist correspondent has applied for a visa. Their inaction supports the speculation in your letter of October 9 that they may not really desire to admit American correspondents to mainland China at this time. If this is the case we can expect Wang at the next meeting simply to repeat his old accusations that we refuse to grant equality and reciprocity and that no exchange can take place until this obstacle has been removed. I have a feeling that they take this insistence on reciprocity rather seriously and to the extent they feel their overall international position is growing stronger they will be less inclined to act with flexibility to bring about actions toward breaking down U. S. restrictions on relations with them unless such actions could be taken on a plane of equality and reciprocity. The aftermath of the "sputnik" may make them more adamant in this respect. The manner in which they handle future developments in the Powell passport case may afford some clues to their thinking.

I am enclosing another copy of our memo of September 30 on Chinese Communist motivations and intentions with respect to travel of Americans so that you will have one in Geneva. Of course it is true that it was pressure from the American press which brought about our change in policy on passports for correspondents and not Chinese Communist pressure. The intent of the last paragraph of the memo was to say that looking at it from Peiping's point of view since their rather clever and dramatic act of approving visas for a large number of American correspondents set in motion the whole train of events leading to our change in policy, they must give themselves a considerable share of credit for that result.

I sent you and Ed copies of a memorandum to Mr. Robertson regarding our position with respect to Chinese aliens sentenced to prison subsequent to May 31, 1956. In brief it seems to me we have to have a cut-off date beyond which we cannot go in offering Chinese aliens the choice of deportation to Communist China. If we were to make a continuing operation of extending the terms of the Agreed Announcement to Chinese aliens regardless of his date of sentence, we might get into a situation where any Chinese would have carte blanche to commit any crime in the book. Or so it might seem to Justice and to the various State authorities. At the same time, I feel we should not be deprived of our flexibility in this regard, and for that reason I recommended that we not state our position to Immigration and Naturalization Service at this time. So far as we know there is only one case (Lee Poy) of a Chinese sentenced after May 1956 desiring to return to Communist China under the terms of the Agreed Announcement. He does not appear to have brought his case to the attention of the Indians.

John Dexter, who is going to take Bob Ekvall's place as interpreter, is now in the Department on consultation. He intends to do some work with Language Service Branch here in the general techniques of conference interpreting, following which he will take a little leave before proceeding to Geneva. We hope he will be able to arrive in Geneva in time for the December meeting. It would be desirable, if you can work it out, to have Dexter sit in on the December and January meetings. It is up to you, of course, whether you wish to introduce Dexter at the December meeting as Ekvall's replacement, or to have him take La Claire's place for the December and January meetings. Although it is somewhat irregular, I should think it might serve as a demonstration of our continuing interest in the talks if you introduced Dexter frankly as Bob's replacement. It would also be more useful to Dexter if he could concentrate on following the interpreting rather than be required to take notes. We are having some trouble fitting Dexter in at a post convenient to Geneva. The only job which has been given serious consideration as a possible slot for Dexter at Geneva is the conference administration position formerly occupied by Bill sabbagh, but this job is felt to be not entirely appropriate. The difficulty with assigning him to Bern or Zurich is the matter of his language training between meetings. As you know we are asking Ed to look into language training possibilities, but we are not too sanguine about those places.

As you will have noticed from the verbatim record of the 79th MAC meeting, the UNC opening presentation on the missing servicemen was based almost entirely on the draft statement which you saw here last May. There were a couple of unfortunate interpolations, however, which have given rise to some false impressions. In the latter part of the opening statement, it is noted that the Communist falsification of their "accounting" only strengthens the conviction widely held in the United States that American citizens are still being held. The USIA ticker on the MAC meeting misquoted this passage so that it appeared the U. S. Government shared this conviction. The other unfortunate statement in the UNC presentation was the reference to the 1,084 persons on the UNC list against whose names the Communists noted in their last "accounting" that they had no data. This gave rise to the mistaken inference in the USIA ticker and in some news stories that the figure 1,084 is the total number of missing servicemen for whom we are seeking an accounting. As you know, we regard the Communist accounting as unsatisfactory throughout, and not just with regard to the persons on whom they say they have no data.

On the whole, despite these unfortunate passages, I believe the meeting went pretty well. I do not see that the Communists offered us any particular openings for exploitation at Geneva, but they did in their rebuttal concentrate somewhat more than formerly on the proper issue of an accounting.

Their stress upon the fact that the UNC has not yet submitted an accounting for their list of 98,000, if Wang takes the same line at Geneva, should give you the opportunity for the citation of additional individual cases by way of proving our contention that their accounting is completely unsatisfactory and hence does not meet the condition that we have set for rendering an accounting of their missing personnel.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure:

1. Memo re "Chinese Communist Motives and Intentions with Respect to Travel of Americans".

copy to Edwin W. Martin, First Secretary
American Embassy
London.

838

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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FOR JOHNSON

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Guidance for November 14 meeting:

1. Reiterate continuing concern at failure Chinese Communists release imprisoned Americans despite commitment to do so over two years ago.

2. Express to Wang our deep regret Communist side in MAC at 79th meeting October 22 again refused account for UNC missing personnel. This refusal perform what even Communist side admits is obligation under Armistice Agreement demonstrates anew Chinese Communist contempt for sanctity agreements, as well as disregard humanitarian considerations. State that failure Communist side respond in MAC compels US raise again in Geneva forum. Cite individual cases from list to demonstrate falsification in previous Communist "accounting".

3. If Wang refers to Red Cross Conference, New Delhi, you should point out US concern with maintaining universal humanitarian character Red Cross as demonstrated by our attendance despite presence official delegations of various regimes we do not recognize. Communist walk-out demonstrated their

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Drafted by:
FE:CA:RNClough/DIOsborn/ikb 11/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
Ralph N. Clough

Clearances:
FE - Mr. Robertson (cleared in draft)
S - The Secretary (cleared in draft)
NA - Mr. Henderson (cleared in substance)

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fundamental disregard for basic humanitarian non-political character Red Cross. You may wish remark that scorn for basic principles Red Cross shown New Delhi consistent with Chinese Communist refusal admit XX ICRC representatives to their prison camps during Korean war.

4. Maintain position on newsmen if Wang raises issue. Decision solely in hands Chinese Communists whether they admit US newsmen or permit their newsmen apply US visas.

5. Maintain established position other issues.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

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UNEVENTFUL ONE HOUR MEETING THIS MORNING. WANG OPENED WITH STATEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION WHICH, TOGETHER WITH HIS REPLIES DURING GIVE AND TAKE, WAS MILDEST YET MADE. EMPHASIS WAS ON 50 OF 56 NAMES GIVEN ME AND 21 OF 103 NAMES I HAD GIVEN HIM NOT HAVING RETURNED AS WELL AS ONLY ONE PRISONER HAVING RETURNED. ALLEGATIONS OF OBSTRUCTION BASED ON EXPERIENCES OF THOSE HAVING RETURNED. DURING COURSE GIVE AND TAKE FOR FIRST TIME MADE STATEMENT "TO SAY THAT THERE IS THIS NUMBER OF CHINESE IN US IS NOT SAME AS SAYING THEY ALL DESIRE RETURN OR WE WANT THEM ALL RETURN."

IN REPLY MY STATEMENT ON MISSING MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCORDANCE PARA 2 DEPTEL 497, HE REFUSED ENTER INTO DISCUSSION STATING I WELL KNEW THEIR ATTITUDE THAT IT WAU NOT IN TERMS OF REFERENCE TALKS. I, OF COURSE, STRESSED WAS "PRACTICAL MATTER" BETWEEN US AND REFUSAL DISCUSS OR ATTEMPT IGNORE PROBLEM COULD NOT SOLVE IT.

NEXT MEETING DECEMBER 12.

GOWEN

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador to Prague
now at Geneva

unnumbered
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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 14, 1957
DATE

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SUBJECT: China Talks - 72nd Meeting

1. Wang Opened.

It had been more than two years since the two of us reached agreement on return of civilians but a majority of Chinese nationals are still prevented from returning to China. This raises a question of good faith. There are tens of thousands of Chinese nationals still in the U.S. Among these, students alone number more than 5000. These students left China many years ago and are now anxious to return to their homeland. Before we reached agreement our authorities were apparently detaining them. After we reached agreement our authorities are still trying to delay them by all sorts of obstructive tactics. At our meetings here he had given us 56 names. 50 of these have not yet returned. The U.S. has submitted 103 names of which 21 are yet to return. With regard to these 21 specific persons who have not returned the American side has failed to give an accounting. They have been continuously receiving letters from relatives of these unfortunate persons appealing for assistance to bring their sons home. He also takes ~~takes~~ note

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~~NOTE~~

note of the fact that of the 34 persons listed by the U.S. authorities, except in the case of one person, all the rest have not been returned. A sharp contrast arises between the failure of my authorities to carry out the Agreement and its implementation by his side. As the result of his side's ~~faithful~~ faithful implementation of the Agreement, all those Americans who wanted to return have done so including among those, a majority of the criminal offenders who have been returned at the expiration or prior to the expiration of their sentences. ~~It felt it incumbent~~ He felt it incumbent upon himself to stress once again that since the Agreement was concluded between the two sides, both sides should honor the Agreement. It is hoped that the American Ambassador will impress upon his government that the Agreement must be carried out so that Chinese nationals can return to their country without further obstructions.

2. I replied. We agreed at the outset of our talks here insofar as the return of nationals of either side were concerned that what we were discussing was those who desired to return. In fact, that language is incorporated in ~~[illegible]~~ our Agreed Announcement on that subject. As he himself pointed out here this morning, there are tens of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the U.S.A. / They had been residing there even before his authorities took control of the mainland of

China. Most of them have been residing there for many years. With respect to the students, it is entirely understandable that many of them do not desire to return. He seemed to take the position that because they have not returned or because some of their relatives desire to have them return, they are prevented from returning by some mysterious obstructions imposed by my authorities. The fact of the matter is very clear on the face of it that those who have not returned have not done so because they do not desire to return. As I had pointed out to him many times, we have no desire nor reason to detain people in the U.S. against their will. He and his authorities continued to make vague unsupported statements that ~~that people~~ these people are being obstructed in returning. It is incredible to me that he finds it possible to make such statements in the face of the facts. The facts are that the very agency which he himself suggested has not called to our attention a single case of obstruction. The Chinese in the U.S. have continued to be entirely free to depart for his country if they desired to do so. The ~~whole~~ sole question -- let me say the sole determing factor -- is their own desire. He had again this morning presented various figures. With regard to the 56 names he had submitted to me, I had told him in the past and I told him again categorically this morning, they and every other Chinese are entirely free to leave the U.S. if they desire to do so.

3. I continued. He had talked about the figure of 103 and again misrepresented that figure. As I had told him at the time I gave him those names, they were not names of persons who necessarily desired to return to his country. They were names of persons, and I repeated this, they were names of persons to whom orders were issued preventing their leaving the U.S. during the Korean war for reasons of national security. The fact that such orders were issued or that I gave him their names here was not the slightest evidence that they desired to return. It had no relation whatever to their desires. It was a purely preventative measure and, as I told him at the outset of our talks here, those orders have been entirely withdrawn. The fact that the orders were withdrawn and the group was free to return any time it wanted to do so is established by his own statement that eighty-two in fact have returned. With regard to those in prison I outlined to him the measures which we had taken to determine their desires after he rejected the first proposal that I had made in this regard, and those who desired to return have done so regardless of the length of their sentences.

4. I continued. These are the facts with regard to the return of Chinese from my country to his country. They are not vague, unsupported allegations; neither are they unilateral statements on my part. They are facts known to all the world; they are facts established by

impartial evidence. If he continues to refuse to accept these facts, I can only draw my own conclusions as to the reasons.

5. I continued. The facts with regard to Americans in his country are equally clear. It is entirely clear and indisputable that of the 19 Americans in his prisons at the time of our Agreed Announcement and concerning which that Agreed Announcement said his authorities would adopt measures for expediting their return, after over two years six still remain in his prisons. It is a fact that since December 1955 not one American has been returned prior to serving the full sentence imposed upon him. It is the normal practice for every country of which I have knowledge to remit substantial portions of sentences for normally good behaviour of prisoners. Since having entered into the Agreement, these Americans seem to have been deprived even of this privilege. Thus, apart from the very serious and solemn question of obligation of his authorities under the Agreed Announcement, the position of these prisoners seems markedly to have worsened since the announcement of the Agreement. Apart from their obligations under the Agreement, the action of his authorities to continue to keep these persons in prisons is utterly in contradiction to professions of desire for settling of questions and improvement of relations between us. I and my government can only conclude this is a deliberate

policy.

6. Wang replied. He made a statement this morning with regard to the tens of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the U.S. including 5000 students, but this was not the same as saying that they wanted all these to return or that all wanted to return. What he had specifically made clear was that among these people, regardless of whether they were ordinary residents or students who were in the U.S. to acquire knowledge, many do desire to return to their homeland. That he had given me a limited list of specified persons explained the fact that these persons desired to return to their country. All these persons desired/to return to their country. All these persons have expressed a desire to return, but have encountered difficulties in doing so. From the experiences of those Chinese who succeeded in returning recently is explained the fact that there exist various barriers and difficulties preventing their return. Some of those who have returned complain that once they made known their desire, they got in trouble with our authorities, who had them interrogated. There are cases in which my authorities tried to press persons who made made known their desire to go to his country to go to Taiwan instead. There are cases in which persons whose desire to return to his country/ ~~so~~ were given such short notice/ ~~they~~ they got into trouble in making preparations to leave. There are cases of persons departing who have had their property sequestered.

These circumstances and the possibility that they might encounter in departing some form of difficulty inhibited their nationals from making up their minds to return to his country.

7. Wang continued. With regard to the 103 whose names I submitted, the statement I gave this morning admitted the fact that those persons were prohibited from returning to his country. The fact that my authorities issued the order clearly explained the fact that there were persons prevented from returning. It was still a fact that 21 still were not able to return. Considering the points he had made this morning, he therefore again requested me to impress on my government to take measures necessary to remove all these obstacles so their nationals can in fact exercise their right to return to their country without obstruction.

8. I replied. It seemed to me that on the one hand he was complaining that we made persons go too quickly and on the other hand we prevented them from going. All I was asking of Wang -- all I ever asked of Wang -- is that Americans in prison who unquestionably desire~~d~~ to be released and return be permitted to do so.

9. Wang indicated he had nothing more to say.

10. I said I had something more to discuss this morning. I then read the following prepared statement:

"Mr. Ambassador, you will recall that at our 23rd and

24th meetings I discussed with you the question of American military personnel still missing from the Korean hostilities and concerning ~~xxxxxxx~~ whom we had solid grounds for believing that your side must have information. You will recall that it was your position at the time that this matter should be taken up in the Military Armistice Commission in Korea. I pointed out that we were not concerned as to where the information was furnished but only in obtaining theinformation.

"I was pleased and encouraged that when, in accordance with your suggestion, the matter was again taken up by the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission, your side accepted the lists of personnel which they had so long refused and promised to investigate the matter. I and my Government hoped that at long last your authorities had decided to liquidate this question by furnishing the requested information. However, this hope was sorely disappointed when at the 69th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission in February of last year the lists were retunned ~~xxx~~ with simply the notation, in the overwhelming majority of cases, of "no data". In a lesser number of cases your side finally admitted that the men had been prisoners of your side but attempted to account for them by stating that they had escaped.

"Mr. Ambassador, as pointed out by the United Nations Command representatives at the 79th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission last month this information is simply not creditable. Not a single oneof these men has ever returned to our side and if they had in fact at one time escaped they must therefor have been recaptured or killed by forces of your side. If such was the case, forces of your side must have some record thereof and I cannot understand why they continue to refuse to furnish it to us. I also find it astonishing that your side would list as having escaped a man such as Capt. Harry Moreland who, as I pointed out in our 64th meeting last January, had both legs amputated. I find it incredible that your side would be able to say that it had no data concerning a man such as Capt. Joseph S. Long, Jr. of the United States Air Force, who, a broadcast from your side in April 1952 said, was alive and a prisoner.

"However, when such facts were pointed out at the 79th Military Armistice Commission meeting last month, representatives of your side resorted to entirely irrelevant polemics rather than making any serious effort honestly to discuss the problem or to furnish the requested information which they have recognized is their obligation under the Korean Armistice Agreement.

"Mr. Ambassador, my purpose in again raising the question with you here this morning is not to make accusations or to engage in polemics, but rather to seek the cooperation of you and your authorities in liquidating this problem."

11. Wang replied. With regard to the question of missing personnel in the Korean War that I had again brought up this morning, he had made their attitude very clear in previous meetings. He did not consider this subject within the terms of reference of our talks. He therefore did not feel it was necessary to give a reply to me this morning.

12. I replied whether he considered it within the terms of [illegible] reference or not, it is a practical matter at issue between us. It is not a problem that can be solved by sweeping it under the rug or doing nothing about it.

13. Wang said he had nothing more.

14. We agreed that our next meeting would be held on December 12.

U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

847

103

UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
11/18/57
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy to WSP

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☐ Reviewer ________ Date 8/6/87

SECRET
OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
VIA AIR POUCH

November 14, 1957

Letter No. 61

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Ralph:

As you have seen Wang was today very mild and obviously just marking time. There was no slightest mention of New Delhi or anything else. You will note that I made the tone of my statement on missing military personnel somewhat milder than implied in the guidance telegram. If our purpose is really to get information on these men I still feel it is better with them and for the record to handle it, particularly in a closed meeting such as this, in that manner rather than simply as a propaganda blast. In any event the people in MAC seem fully capable of exploiting the propaganda blast approach.

I cited the case of Long as the best additional case I could find. I am somewhat confused on the now voluminous files on this subject here which Dave had well in hand. If he has the time, I would appreciate Dave dropping us a little note on any suggestions he may have based on his memory of what we have on hand here.

I think you are right in issuing a passport to Wirin.

The correspondents issue seems to be completely dead on all sides. I am sure that you are not, and I know that I am not, regretful that this is the case.

It

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

It certainly confirms that Peiping has no interest in letting in American correspondents at this time. Incidentally, what has happened with respect to the returning American students? I have seen nothing whatever on it in recent weeks. You will have seen that I had the Tyler couple in Prague.

I think your memo on Chinese in prisons is good.

Ed is working on the question of an instructor for Dexter and I will let him tell you about that. I would be very glad if Dexter could arrive here by the December meeting. I entirely agree that the best thing to do is frankly to introduce him as Bob's successor and will do so.

With respect to Bob I did not receive your letter of October 8 regarding his travel orders until I arrived here this trip. I think that there may be a little misunderstanding as to the problem. It is not one of giving him State orders for travel within France, but rather of just having his State orders read so that they cover travel from any place in France that he may be to Geneva rather than just from Paris. As it now stands he is just not able to collect anything for his August trip. He was at Roquebrune on leave and instead of returning to Paris and originating his trip there, he went directly from Roquebrune to Geneva which was also cheaper for the Government. While the amount is not large he should be paid.

I was interested in talking to Ed and Dave Popper about the New Delhi show. I had no idea that they had gone down there.

Thanks very much for Ken Young's memo on his talk with the Pole. I found it most interesting for its other points as well as the one on China.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador.

842

(110)

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
NOV 21
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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American Embassy,
London W.1, England.
November 19, 1957

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

Official-Informal
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dear Ralph:

I am writing in response to the Department's telegram 3375 instructing me to investigate instruction in Chinese available at l'Ecole d'Interpretes at Geneva and Chinese tutors at Bern and Zurich, if any. On Thursday afternoon, November 14, Bob Ekvall and I interviewed Mrs. Paul Chu, Chinese teacher at l'Ecole d'Interpretes, and on Friday morning I talked to Madame Piguet at the school itself, which is part of the University of Geneva. Late Friday afternoon I flew to Zurich hoping to talk to Dr. Peng, the Chinese language teacher there. Though I was disappointed to find that he had left town with his entire family for a few days, I was able to discuss the problem with our Consul General, who had been totally ignorant of what it was all about, and to suggest certain questions be put to Dr. Peng by the Consulate General immediately upon his return to Zurich.

Both Ekvall and I were impressed with Mrs. Chu, the professor at l'Ecole d'Interpretes. Her kuo yu is spoken with a genuine Peiping accent and her English is fluent. Moreover, she claims to have had five years' experience in teaching Chinese, two at Geneva and three at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where she received her M.A. Mrs. Chu is very much interested in the problem of interpreting and has a good opinion of her own abilities to teach it, which, I should say on a first impression, is well-founded. She teaches two classes on Saturday morning at l'Ecole d'Interpretes, one in interpreting and one in advanced conversation. These

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of CA Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

are the only advanced Chinese courses taught at the school. They cost only 12 francs per term.

Mrs. Chu would not commit herself to give private tutoring, although Ekvall and I judged that she probably would if presented with the actual opportunity. She felt that her two hours of instruction per week at the University would be sufficient for a good student to maintain his proficiency. While this may be somewhat optimistic, I personally doubt that one hour a day would be necessary in addition to the two hours on Saturday. If Dexter were to enroll in the two classes at the University, two or three hours per week of supplementary tutoring from Mrs. Chu would be more than adequate to meet his needs. Mrs. Chu indicated that she would charge 10 francs per hour for private tutoring. If Mrs. Chu is unwilling to give private tutoring, there are one or two other Chinese in Geneva who could do so.

While I do not have the final answers on the situation in Zurich, my feeling is that probably Dr. Peng would be able to give Dexter the necessary practice, although I doubt very much that his professional qualifications and capabilities in teaching interpreting approach those of Mrs. Chu in Geneva. I hope that during this week you will receive a telegraphic report from Zurich as to Dr. Peng's capabilities and interest in doing the job. As it looks now, from the standpoint of maintaining and increasing his language and interpreting profficiency, Dexter should be assigned to Geneva. As you are aware, Bern has not turned up any potential instructors.

I feel that it is a mistake to assign Dexter to an already existing slot either at Geneva or Zurich, and the officers in charge of these posts are of like mind. The reasoning of the Consuls General is quite simple and, to my mind, understandable. Their offices do not suffer from an excess of slots to cover the work that has to be done. Thus they are not eager to accept an officer for one of these slots who is from the outset going to devote at best only 3/4 of his time to the job. In my own case, I can tell you frankly, that the Minister and others here are not at all happy about the amount of time I am away from my job at the Embassy. In effect, the Geneva assignment takes about 1/4 of my time, and of course recently the Delhi conference has taken me away for a much longer period. In my case the Geneva assignment is at least related to the work I do here, although, as I am sure CA is aware, I am supposed to be covering the work here of 5 or 6 other geographic offices in the Department as well as that of CA. In the case of Dexter, if he were to be assigned to Zurich, for example, which is purely a Consular post, his work would be entirely unconnected with the Geneva meetings and the time spent on them and on language training would be a dead loss to the Consulate. An assignment like this would not be fair to the Consulate or to Dexter himself.

As for the Geneva assignment, I think it would be very unfortunate to put Dexter in a general service officer's slot. The only reason for Dexter's assignment and for his continued language training is that at Geneva we are maintaining some sort of tenuous diplomatic contact with the Chinese Communists. The history of the past 4-5 years has demonstrated that the Peiping regime has to be dealt with, at least at this minimum level, and I see no reason to believe that developments in the future will make it any more possible to refrain from having some dealings with the authorities who control some 1/2 billion of the world's population. Certainly our operation in Geneva is important enough to stand/on its own feet, at least to the extent of providing the salary and perquisites of one full-time officer. I feel that [redacted] developing Dexter and, I hope, several other language officers as first-class interpreters - cum - negotiators [redacted] will pay off in the long run regardless of who controls China. We are certainly never going to get back to the "Taipan" and "Legation quarter" days.

Thus I sincerely hope that another look can be taken at Dexter's assignment, as I do not think we should try to fit him into some pre-existing slot entirely unrelated to the real purpose of his assignment to Switzerland, which would not allow him to contribute his best either to the work of the local office or to our own operation. Why not frankly assign him to Geneva for the purpose of our operation and let his spare time be utilized for economic and political reporting, for cultivating contacts with Asian delegations assigned to Geneva and in other ways useful both to his own development and to the work of the Consulate General. Both Gowen and Popper have told me they could find plenty of useful work of this kind for him to do.

Sincerely,

Ed

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

cc: The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Embassy,
Prague

843

8 30

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SENT TO: Amembassy, PRAGUE PRIORITY 182

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION [FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY] ~~[illegible]~~

Your tel 297.

We agree you should go ahead with December 12 meeting.

Would like your comment on following alternative methods continuing talks under consideration here: 1) Beam meet with Wang in Warsaw, 2) Rankin commute Geneva from Belgrade following assignment there, 3) talks be continued at lower level and conducted by Martin commuting to Geneva.

DULLES

Dulles
WSR

611.93/11-2157

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

RM/R
Anal
Rev
Cat

Drafted by:
FE:CA:RNClough:as:11/20/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ~~[illegible]~~ FE - Mr. Robertson

Clearances:
~~U - The Under Secretary~~
S/S- Mr. Howe
O - Mr. Henderson

~~FE - Mr. Robertson~~
EUR - Mr. Elbrick
CBE
by JGF

Cleared in substance with Secy WSR

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Department of State

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ACTION C

891

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81

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32
Action

O
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Control: 12847
Rec'd: November 22, 1957
11:13 a.m.

FROM: Prague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 316, November 22, 1 p.m.

NC

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611.93/11-2257

PRIORITY

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DEPTEL 182.

From substantive standpoint favor alternative which would designate another officer of ambassador rank for continuation talks at Geneva. However, suggest CHICOMS may identify Rankin with GRC to degree that would tend to prejudice his negotiations if and when CHICOMS may shift from present attitude. Therefore, suggest possibility Bonbright commuting Geneva from Lisbon. If this not feasible favor Beam meeting Wang in Warsaw. This would, of course, require Martin commute London-Warsaw (this appears practicable from airline schedules available here) and preferably assignment Dexter to Warsaw. If this done, believe we should also suggest to CHICOMS alternative of Martin meeting at Geneva with CHICOM representative on understanding consideration would be given again designating an ambassador if and when it appeared desirable.

Must anticipate Wang will require instructions before replying to me on any alternative that lowers level talks or moves them from Geneva. In this event Martin could remain at or return to Geneva to receive their reply and make agreement, including public announcement, for next meeting. In such case we could simply state following December 12 meeting that date next meeting will subsequently be announced. In event I must inform Wang of designation new ambassador for subsequent meetings, this could be included in announcement following meeting without making reference to my transfer from Prague unless that is otherwise publicly known at time. (I would prefer to postpone announcement my transfer from Prague until very shortly before my departure.)

In any

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In any event would appreciate December 12 meeting instructions also covering publicity aspects.

JOHNSON

LMS:CV/1

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2 [illegible]

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☑ Reviewer AJ Date 7/2/92

6

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

SECRET

Official Informal

Letter No. 77

November 26, 1957

Route CA
KS

Dear Alex:

I am enclosing an exchange of correspondence between Mrs. Downey and Mr. Robertson. Mrs. Downey's renewed request for permission to visit her son caused us to reconsider our policy of denying passports to relatives of prisoners for visits to Communist China. After weighing the various considerations we have decided to recommend to the Secretary that we authorize travel by those relatives of the six remaining prisoners who may wish to make the trip.

We recognize, of course, that this action will attract a good deal of publicity and will constitute another breach in our policy opposing travel by Americans to Communist China, particularly coming so soon after our approval of Wirin's travel. However, we felt that these relatives have a far stronger claim than could be put forward by any others who may wish to visit Communist China and we feel we could defend our policy against further encroachment. On the plus side there is the possibility that one or more of the prisoners might be released on the occasion of his relative's visit. I am not optimistic that this will happen, but at least we will have taken every possible step to bring about the release of these unfortunate people.

It is possible that the Communists may not desire such visits at this time or may seize upon our action to demand reciprocal rights for visits by relatives of Chinese prisoners in this country. I think we would have to oppose any such maneuver on their part and it would give us an opportunity to retell the story of our offer to release Chinese prisoners which leaves the Chinese Communists in a rather weak propaganda position.

In order to minimize the possibility of giving the Communists any pretext for accusing us of "inequality", "one-sidedness","espionage", etc., we thought it would be best for the relatives to apply individually to the Chinese Communist Red Cross rather than for us to take it up at the Geneva talks.

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Prague.

In view of Hammarskjold's interest in this subject we would notify him before our action was made public.

I would appreciate receiving by telegram any comments you may have on this proposed course of action.

Judging from Wang's behavior at the last meeting, the Chinese Communists have run out of ideas for the time being. I am enclosing a very interesting report from the British Embassy concerning a remarkable lecture given by Chou En-lai to the assembled chiefs of mission in Peiping. His statement that they are willing to go on talking at Geneva for 10 or 20 years if necessary indicates we need have no fear of an early break-off on their part.

We expect to have a decision from the Secretary soon on the method of carrying on the talks after your transfer. I expect to write you further on that before the next meeting.

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Mr. Robertson from Mrs. Downey, Nov. 6, 1957
2. Letter to Mrs. Downey from Mr. Robertson, November 14, 1957
3. Telegram from Peking to Foreign Office dated Nov. 16, 1957

cc to Ed Martin, London
Amconsul Geneva for Johnson

846

1957 DEC 4 PM 4 06
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DC/1

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1 Alexis

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

SENT TO: Amembassy Prague for Ambassador 199
Amconsul GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON 546
RPT INFO: Amembassy LONDON FOR MARTIN 4085

Origin

Info

Notes (not made)
12 Johnson, U. Alexis
123 Martin, Edwin W.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Partial guidance for December 12 meeting:

1. Inform Wang you being transferred. State US desires continue talks Geneva and will designate Martin represent US. FYI You would not ask Wang designate another representative but we assume he would not wish continue himself under these circumstances and representative ~~XX~~ of appropriate rank would be appointed. END FYI

2. If Wang accepts you should propose limiting press announcement following meeting to usual statement of date next meeting. If Wang insists, announcement may also state "for administrative reasons" next meeting to be held between Martin and Chinese Communist representative. You may tell Wang you desire delay public announcement impending transfer until new appointment officially confirmed.

3. If Wang states requires instructions before replying you should inform him reply should be addressed Martin at Geneva who will-be empowered agree on date and public announcement regarding next meeting.

611.93/12-457

Distr. Desired (Offices Only)

Drafted by:
FE:CA:DLOsborn/RNClough:ikb-mfh
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
The Secretary
~~FE - Walter S. Robertson~~

FE - Mr. Jones HPJ

S/S CR
DEC 4 1957 P.M.

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4. If Wang refuses continue talks on proposed basis, insisting on ambassadorial level, inform him we remain ready continue talks but cannot designate ambassador for this purpose this time. You should maintain this position even in ~~xxxx~~ unlikely event Wang threatens break. If Wang suggests alternative basis for continuing talks, you may inform him suggestion will be reported Department but that for number compelling reasons only feasible basis at this time is one proposed by you. FYI Department believes it unlikely Chinese Communists will break off talks, especially in view Chou's recent statement to foreign chiefs mission Peiping they ready continue talking ten or twenty years if necessary. In give and take you should be careful retain freedom action for US to propose restoring talks to ambassadorial level at some future time when this might be desirable END FYI.

5. Your announcement of change in US representation in talks should follow strong statement of US disappointment at Chinese Communist failure to live up to public commitment release all jailed Americans and their failure renounce force so that Wang will perceive connection between our disappointment at meager results of talks and our unwillingness to continue at ambassadorial level.

Dulles DULLES
WSR

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833

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31

Action

FE

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Control: 3663

Rec'd: December 6, 1957
9:18 a.m.

Action Assigned to
Action Taken

FROM: Prague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: ~~323~~ 332, December 6, 10 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 323, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 17.

LONDON FOR E.W. MARTIN ONLY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re paragraph 2 DEPTEL 199.

Announcements of next meeting customarily are to effect "two ambassadors will meet again...". As such statement would clearly be inaccurate believe it may be preferable for me take initiative in proposing announcement state "for administrative reasons" Martin will be US representative next meeting handling question CHICOM representative according to developments at meeting. In view of NEW YORK TIMES December 1 Washington story Department "contemplating" my transfer to Bangkok have received inquiries on future meetings with Wang from press representatives at Geneva and must expect flat inquires after December 12 meeting even if question hedged or avoided informal announcement of next meeting. Therefore, while I would have preferred further postpone news my departure from Prague, under circumstances believe it preferable for news Martin designation frankly be announced following December 12 meeting and matter be interpreted in context and manner our choosing by statement subsequently to be made by Department rather than permitting it leak out in piecemeal and probably distorted form. In reply to press inquiries following meeting would informally confirm I expected transfer from Prague but had no firm information on new assignment. Any additional information would have to come from Washington. If Wang does not accept Martin designation, asks time to receive instruction or otherwise no agreement is reached between us I will attempt obtain his agreement to simple statement that announcement concerning next meeting will subsequently be made or unilaterally

611.93/12-657

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or unilaterally make such announcement myself giving no information to press on expectation my transfer from here or our proposal for Martin's designation. However, in this event must anticipate considerable press speculation.

JOHNSON

BB:CV/1

848

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☐ Reviewer ______ Date 9/19

12/11/57

Lot 72 D 415

American Embassy,
No. 1 Grosvenor Square,
London W.1, England.
December 6, 1957

Official-Informal
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ralph:

It was with mild surprise that I received Deptel 4068 yesterday. While I was aware that Alex was being transferred, I had assumed that the Department would be arranging for some other Mission Chief in the area to carry on with the Geneva talks. I am, of course, flattered that the Department should repose enough confidence in me to designate me to continue them after Alex's departure. However, I am somewhat dubious about the Chinese Communist willingness to carry on negotiations at my level at least for some time to come. While I claim no special competence in reading Chinese tea leaves, I thought I should communicate my preliminary reaction to your telegram as soon as possible.

I think it virtually inconceivable that Wang will agree to negotiate personally with me and unlikely that he will agree at the meeting to designate another representative. While I concur in your judgment that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to break off the talks, I think they may be willing to see them suspended indefinitely on the issue of the level at which they are to be conducted. They may argue that just because the talks have bogged down is no reason to put them on a lower level. Progress is less likely at a lower level (their line may run) than at the Ambassadorial level, while if we are really sincere in our desire to settle differences, we should agree to talks on the Foreign Minister level. Thus the Chinese Communists may well take the occasion of Alex's departure to renew their propaganda for Foreign Minister level meeting, though indicating willingness to continue at the Ambassadorial level. My guess is that they may hold to this position for some time, making clear that they are not breaking off the talks but simply waiting until we have seen fit to appoint another Ambassador to carry them on.

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

My feeling that the Chinese Communists are likely to hold out for Ambassadorial talks is based on the fact that I can see no great pressure on Peiping to agree to talks at a lower level, which would be a move in precisely the opposite direction to that advocated by them. While Chou En-lai told the Mission Chiefs in Peiping recently that his regime would be willing to carry on the talks for ten or twenty years, he did this, I think, in the context of his discussion of the so-called two-China policy. He was indicating on the one hand, that the Chinese Communists would not agree to such a policy even though negotiations at Geneva were to go on for ten or twenty years, and, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists were very patient and would not be the ones to break off negotiations. I recall, too, that he referred specifically to the "Ambassadorial" talks and I can't see that there was anything in his remarks which indicated eagerness to carry these talks on at a lower level.

To say that I doubt that the Chinese Communists will accept lower level talks (at least for some time to come) is not to say that we should not make the pitch outlined in the telegram under reference. Looking back over the talks, I think it fair to say that they were quite productive for the first five months but not since then. While certainly some purpose has been served even during the period since December, 1955 (e.g. in connection with the stabilization of the situation in the Formosa Straits), its importance has probably diminished with time. In any event, after two years without appreciable progress it would seem appropriate to indicate our dissatisfaction in terms stronger than the usual protests at the negotiating table. Alex's transfer provides us with such an opportunity.

I think we should anticipate the possibility that the Chinese Communists, having read the New York Times article of December 1, will have foreseen that Alex will say his farewells at the Thursday meeting and will have prepared their positions in advance to meet various contingencies. Thus they may have already decided that they will not consent to continue discussions at a lower level and will be prepared to explain their position to the press immediately after the meeting. While it is possible that they might even

/take this

take this pretext to end the talks entirely, my feeling is (as indicated above) that they are more likely to stress their willingness to continue the talks but only at the Ambassadorial level. I think we should be prepared for such a contingency as this and have our reasons for designating me rather than an Ambassador ready to give the press.

Another contingency for which to prepare a press explanation is the one mentioned in paragraph three of the reference telegram. Under these circumstances we would have to explain to the press why no date was set for the next meeting, since absence of this information would inevitably lead to speculation that the talks had been broken off.

In case the talks do continue without interruption, I wonder whether I can carry them on effectively without assistance. Since I have seen no indication that the Department is contemplating providing me with an "advisor", I take it that you do not feel that at the present pace of the talks there is need for one. Certainly at the tempo of last month's meeting I think I could manage on my own but there would be no assurance that the meetings would continue at such a low key. Alex has apparently felt on the basis of his long experience that it was essential to have an advisor.

One final item: Am I correct in assuming that paragraph three of the reference telegram simply means that the Consulate General in Geneva will act as a postbox for me and that it is not contemplated that I will be staying on at Geneva?

I am sending a copy of this letter to Geneva so that I can discuss it with Alex and get his reactions, and in case you wish to cable your reactions to it there.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

cc: The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
American Consulate General,
Geneva, Switzerland.

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1957 DEC 10 PM 4 43

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA ~~Amembassy PRAGUE~~
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~~FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY~~
~~PRIORITY Amembassy LONDON FOR MR. MARTIN ONLY~~
~~AGREEMENT DISTRIBUTION~~
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

033.1100-PO/10-358

611.93/12-1057

Your 323.

1. Concur your suggestion that you seek Wang's agreement to announcement Edwin W. Martin's designation following meeting. You may inform press informally you expect transfer from Prague but final decision ~~on~~ next post not yet made. In response queries ~~as to~~ reasons for change in level representation at talks you should state any comment would have to come from Department.

2. In event Wang unwilling agree Martin designation at meeting, seek his agreement on announcement of date next meeting or, if he refuses, propose statement that announcement as to date ~~of~~ next meeting will be made later. Concur your recommendation that in these circumstances no repeat no comment be made to press concerning Martin designation or your transfer.

3. Mark any messages which contain references ~~concerning~~ your transfer ~~AGREEMENT DISTRIBUTION~~ Limit Distribution for Henderson only.

Martin, Edwin W.

Dulles

Drafted by: FE:CA:RMClough:mh 12/9/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Walter S. Robertson

Clearances: FE - Mr. Jones HPJ

O - Mr. Henderson

611.93/12-1057

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Classification

S/S CR
DEC 10 1957 P.M.

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(850)

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1957 DEC 10 PM 4 44

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA 557

FOR JOHNSON

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Origin

Info:

Guidance for December 12 meeting:

1. Express dissatisfaction Chinese Communist continued failure permit return civilians desiring to do so. This question could have been settled in first week or even first day of talks by simple word and act their part. Should have been settled finally on September 10, 1955 when they agreed take measures permit Americans expeditiously exercise right to return. Yet six Americans remain in jail Communist China, 824 days later.

2. With regard question accounting for US military personnel missing unaccounted for from Korean hostilities, remind Wang he said at last meeting did not feel it necessary reply that question that morning. There been 50 meetings since question raised in talks. Surely on one those mornings he could have offered request his authorities investigate matter and furnish information.

3. On renunciation force, most fundamental practical matter at issue, Chinese Communist attitude past year and half been one of unwillingness even discuss seriously.

611.93/12-1057

Dist. Desired (Offices Only)

DC/A
Anal. C3
Rev.
Cat.

Drafted by: DLO
FE:CA:RNClough:mfh 12/9.57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: David L. Osborn WSR
~~CA - Ralph N. Clough~~

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Robertson WR
L - Mr. Becker (substance of paragraph 5) DLO

The Secretary (in draft) WSR

S/S CR
DEC 10 1957 P.M.
MC file

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4. If Wang raises matter visits by relatives, state United States decided issue passports for such visits in view prolonged tragic separation six men from families and messages received by family members from Chinese Communist Red Cross inviting them to make trip. Decision whether or not apply for passports for such purpose up to individuals concerned. Number if any of persons who will apply not known. Any applying will be advised contact Chinese Communist Red Cross. If Wang seeks reciprocity agreement, reject and point out US not preventing any Chinese from departing US. If Wang refers to Chinese in jail in US remind him our earlier offer permit all return who desired and allow Indian Embassy confirm their wishes. Inform Wang that if Chinese Communists truly interested in reciprocity they should show reciprocity by removing all obstacles to departure remaining detained Americans as US did prior to August 1, 1955 regarding Chinese in US.

5. If Wang proposes agreement on mutual judicial assistance in connection projected visit Communist China by defense counsel in Powell-Schumann case, advise him such agreement impossible and unnecessary. If Chinese Communists choose withhold cooperation with defense counsel in collection evidence for defense Powell-Schumann, this their own responsibility. US Government has no responsibility this regard.

6. With reference arrangements for succeeding meetings, follow previous
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
guidance (Department's 199 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXto Prague and also
556 to Geneva).

556

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(idlo)
DULLES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** ACTION COPY

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31 H
Action

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Action Assigned to
Action Taken
Control: 6340
Rec'd: DECEMBER 11, 1957
9:09 AM
Date of Action
Action Office Symbol
Name of Officer
Direction to DC/R

100
001
6

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 506, DECEMBER 11, 11 AM

NIACT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - FROM JOHNSON

RE DEPTEL 557, DEC 10.

IN ABSENCE OF GUIDANCE TO CONTRARY I PROPOSE TO HANDLE PRESS MATTERS AS FOLLOWS:

IN MOST LIKELY EVENT NO AGREEMENT REACHED ON NEXT MEETING, I WILL, PREFERABLY IN AGREEMENT WITH WANG, INFORM PRESS THAT ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING NEXT MEETING WILL SUBSEQUENTLY BE MADE, THAT AS I EXPECT TRANSFER FROM PRAGUE I WILL NOT FURTHER PARTICIPATE IN TALKS, AND US HAS ACCORDINGLY MADE PROPOSAL TO WANG FOR CONDUCT OF FUTURE TALKS ON WHICH WE AWAITING PRC REPLY. WOULD POINT OUT THAT ACCORDANCE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIAL NATURE TALKS CANNOT GIVE SUBSTANCE OUR PROPOSAL. IN EVENT AGREEMENT REACHED ON NEXT MEETING WITH MARTIN AS POINTED OUT MY REPLY FROM PRAGUE TO DEPTEL 546 IT NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME PROPOSE TO WANG "USUAL STATEMENT" TO EFFECT THAT TWO OF US WILL AGAIN MEET AS THIS CLEARLY NOT TRUE. THEREFORE WOULD PROPOSE ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG LINES SECOND SENTENCE PARA TWO DEPTEL 546 INFORMALLY CONFIRMING TO PRESS AFTER MEETING THAT I WILL NOT AGAIN BE MEETING HERE BECAUSE I EXPECT TRANSFER FROM PRAGUE.

IN EVENT WANG ISSUES PUBLIC STATE ACCUSING US OF ATTEMPTING BREAK OFF MEETINGS OR OTHER SUCH CHARGES WILL PROMPTLY REPLY WITH STATEMENT OF FACTS CONSULTING DEPT AS SEEMS DESIRABLE AND LEAVING TO DEPT ISSUANCE OF ANY EXTENDED REPLY.

IN ANY ABOVE CONTINGENCIES I WILL, OF COURSE, CONFINE MYSELF TO STATEMENT I EXPECT BE LEAVING PRAGUE WITHOUT MAKING ANY REFERENCE TO POSSIBILITY BANGKOK APPOINTMENT.

GOWEN

DT

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611.93/12-1157

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MAR 2 1959

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1957 DEC 11 PM 8
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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA NIACT 563

FOR JOHNSON

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Your 506.

1. Presume you now have Deptel 556. 611.93

2. Concur your proposed tactics in event Wang issues accusatory public statement following meeting.

3. In event no agreement on next meeting, Department believes preferable announcement follow lines paragraph 2 Department's 556. Appreciate would cause speculation, but believe such speculation more easily dealt with than that which would be stimulated by mention of US "proposal," and fact we awaiting reply.

4. Concur your proposed tactic in event agreement reached: i.e., propose announcement along lines second sentence paragraph 2 Department's 546, informally commenting to press as per last sentence first substantive paragraph your 506.

5. Unless you deem necessary because of unforeseen circumstances, ~~such as contingencies referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above,~~ see no need Martin remaining Geneva after meeting. Consulate General should transmit him any communication from Chinese Communists.

Dulles

611.93/12-1157

Drafted by: DLO
FE:CA:DLOsborn:mfh 12/11/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Ralph N. Clough

Clearances:
~~[illegible]~~

FE - Mr. Robertson (in draft)

S/S-CR
DEC 11 1957 P.M.
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35-H
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Control: 7164
Rec'd: DECEMBER 12, 1957
9:20 AM

Assigned to
091/6

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 510, DECEMBER 12, 2 PM

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NIACT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION FROM JOHNSON.

ONE HOUR FIFTY MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING.

I OPENED WITH STRONG STATEMENT ALONG LINES PARAS 1, 2 AND 3 DEPTEL 57, CLOSING WITH STATEMENT ON MY TRANSFER AND DESIGNATION OF MARTIN.

WANG CLOSELY QUESTIONED ME ON DESIGNATION MARTIN "AS TO WHETHER U.S. WAS PURPOSELY CHANGING LEVEL OF AMBASSADORIAL TALKS" AND THEREFORE "NATURE" OF TALKS. I REPLIED ALONG LINES PARA 4 DEPTEL 546 AND WANG SAID WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT GOVERNMENT. WHEN, IN REPLY MY STATEMENT ANSWER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED MARTIN, HE INSISTED REPLY ONLY TO ME, I EMPHASIZED THAT AS OF CLOSE MEETING TODAY MARTIN WAS U.S. REPRESENTATIVE. HE REJECTED MY SUGGESTION ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE CONCERNING DATE NEXT MEETING AND WE FINALLY AGREED ON ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT WE HAD HELD 73RD MEETING TODAY AND AMBASSADORS "STATED AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE MADE CONCERNING THE NEXT MEETING".

HE MADE PROPOSAL FOR AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT ON JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE ON BASIS "EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY" AND THEREFORE "GOVERNMENTS OF TWO COUNTRIES DECIDED TO APPOINT EXPERTS TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANCE AND CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT ON JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES". IN ORIGINAL PRESENTATION AND GIVE AND TAKE LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON FACT U.S. DISTRICT COURT AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD MADE REQUEST TO PRC MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.

611.93/12-1257

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MAR-2 195

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 7164
CORRECTION ISSUED: 12/12/57 10:30

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-2- 510, December 12, 2 p.m., from Geneva-CORRECTED PAGE 2

I, of course, rejected along lines paragraph 5 DEPTEL 557. He indicated they will issue public statement on this.

Full text draft agreed announcement on judicial assistance by separate telegram.

Full report of meeting being pouched Friday.

GOWEN

JNA:LOS-2

Action Assigned to OAD
Action Taken Corrected

Date of Action 12/18
Action Office Symbol CA
Name of Officer R. N. Clough
Direction to DC/R File

Confidential File

MAR - 2 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

854

Priority
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
611.93/12-1257
839

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador now at Geneva

DESP. NO. unnumbered

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE December 12, 1957

REF :

Action Assigned to CA
Action Taken

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35	FE-5		RM/R-2 S/S-2 S/P-1 C-1 G-1 L-1
	REC'D 12-19		OTHER

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SUBJECT: China Talks - 73rd Meeting

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file

1. I opened 73rd meeting with prepared statement:

(a) Mr. Ambassador, when we first met here in August, 1955 again to discuss, among other things, the question of Americans in your country desiring to return to the United States but prevented from doing so, I pointed out to you the fundamental importance of this question to the future relations between our two peoples. I also pointed out to you that the question could have been settled even on the first day of our talks if your authorities had taken the simple and straightforward step of doing no more than matching the action that had been taken by my government with respect to the Chinese in the United States -- that is, withdrawing all measures preventing their departure and permitting them to return. This would have permitted us promptly to proceed to the discussion of other questions in an atmosphere that would give greater hope of constructive results. However, your authorities refused to take this straightforward and reciprocal step and you insisted that I enter into public agreement with you on the subject. Although I saw no necessity for such an agreement, I concurred in your proposal, even including your proposal on third party representation in the U.S. I did this on the clear understanding, which was embodied in the specific words of the agreement, that this would promptly resolve the problem of Americans detained in your country. The agreement into which we entered on September 10, 1955 in fact specifically said that your authorities agreed to take measures to permit Americans (not just some Americans, but all Americans) expeditiously to exercise their right to return. Yet eight hundred and twentyfour days after we entered into that agreement, Mr. Ambassador, six Americans still remain in your prisons. I have, in the past, and must again today express to you as solemnly as I can, the dissatisfaction of myself, my government and the American people with this absurdly long delay of your authorities in resolving this problem and in carrying out their pledged word in the first agreement ever reached between us.

(b) At our

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(b) At our twenty-third meeting on October 27, 1955, I raised with you the question of the failure of your side to account for many U.S. military personnel still missing from the Korean hostilities. I pointed out to you that each of these men were last seen or heard from under circumstances indicating that he was either captured or killed by forces of your side and that your authorities should have information concerning them. I also pointed out many specific cases in which your official radio, as well as press, had specifically identified persons on the list as being prisoners of your side. Yet they were never returned nor was any report even received of their death. In the time that has elapsed during the fifty meetings that have taken place since that period, no satisfactory accounting of these men has been made in the Military Armistice Commission in Korea or here. Surely at one of these meetings it would have been very simple and straightforward for you to have offered to request your authorities to investigate the matter and furnish us information to which we are entitled not only on humanitarian grounds but also by the specific terms of the Korean armistice agreement. Yet you have not done so.

(c) Mr. Ambassador, at our 20th meeting on October 8, 1955 I made to you a proposal suggesting that we renounce in reciprocal terms the use of force in the settlement of issues between us, that is, either we were going to permit our disputes to lead to hostilities between us, or we are going to express our joint determination to seek their settlement by peaceful means only. I pointed out the importance of any such declaration, especially with regard to the Taiwan area, and that such an agreemant need not in any way prejudice the position of either side or the pursuit of its policies by peaceful means. Yet you have persisted in misinterpreting and misrepresenting this simple proposal which is in full accord with accepted standards of international conduct and for the past year and a half have not even been willing seriously to discuss it. Mr. Ambassador, this has also been a source of deep disappointment to me and to my country.

(d) Mr. Ambassador, as this is my last meeting with you it is a source of particularly keen disappointment to me this morning to have to recount this record of the failure of your authorities to live up to the first and only agreement reached between us as well as their failure to take any steps to resolve these other outstanding issues. When I came here almost two and one half years ago I had high hopes that your government would be promptly responsive to these few fundamental and mutually advantageous suggestions for the removal of obstacles to the improvement of our relations and thus establish an atmosphere in which other problems could profitably be discussed. I desire to inform you that I am being transferred from Prague to a new post and it will therefore not be possible for me further to carry on these talks with you. However, my government persists in its determination and willingness patiently to seek a settlement of our differences and accordingly desires to continue these talks here. To this end Mr. Edwin Martin will be designated as the United States representative."

2. Wang replied. The record of our talks of more than two years shows we have not done the duty given to us to settle the issues pending between our two countries. He came to these talks with me with great hopes. It is a fact that there existed a number of practical issues between our two countries. The existence of such issues between our two countries not only exerts an influence on the relations between our two countries, but also leads to the tense situation in the Far East. It was with the desire of resolving the issues between our two countries as well as to improve our relations that he had in the course of the entire talks made various concrete proposals to bring about this end. Yet he must point out that the Ambassador and the United States Government have not given sufficient attention to proposals that he has made.

3. Wang continued. The progress of our talks has suffered due to the policy of my government during the entire course of these talks to obstruct and drag on deliberately what we have started here. For this his side is extremely dissatisfied with the situation of these talks. And the responsibility for this state of affairs is not on his side at all.

4. Wang continued. At this morning's meeting he still would like to bring up and discuss with me another matter that is

relative to the relations between our two countries. In view of the fact that an American court has requested the Chinese Ministry of Justice for judicial assistance in connection with the Powell case, he now proposed on behalf of his government that our two countries conclude an agreement to render each other judicial assistance. On September 3, 1957 the United States District Court of Northern California corresponded directly with the Ministry of Justice of his country and put forth a request for judicial assistance for Mr. and Mrs. Powell and Mr. Schuman, all American citizens and editors of the "China Monthly Review". The Chinese authorities are willing to meet the request of the U.S. Court. However, in accordance with international practice, only after the two countries have reached agreement on judicial assistance, can assistance be rendered in specific cases in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. As a matter of fact the U.S. Government has concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements on judicial assistance with other countries. It can readily be seen that the procedure referred to above by the U.S. District Court is not in keeping with proper procedure. For this reason the Chinese Ministry of Justice was obliged to return the original request on October 30 of this year. Nevertheless, in its message of reply the Ministry of Justice specifically stated that if the Chinese and American governments reached agreement for judicial assistance the request in the Powell case would be eligible for consideration.

Since the Chinese Ministry of Justice stated the aforesaid position, no step has so far been taken by the American authorities to promote a judicial agreement between our two countries. Yet on November 2 of this year the American State Department issued a passport valid for travel to China to Mr. Wirin, Powells' defense attorney, for the purpose of taking testimony. It is evident that in the absence of a judicial agreement, it would be impossible for Mr. Wirin to accomplish the purpose of taking testimony.

5. Wang continued. In order to resolve the question of judicial assistance in the case of the Powells as well as other cases which may be raised in either country in the future, he proposed that both sides make the following agreed announcement ~~ax~~ so that ~~both sides make the following agreed announcement so that~~ cases can be taken up speedily. It is hoped that I and my government would give careful consideration to this proposal.

6. Wang then handed me the following text:

"Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America Concerning Negotiations on Judicial Assistance. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

In order to give each other judicial assistance on the basis of equality and reciprocity, the Government of the People's

Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America deem it necessary to reach an agreement on judicial assistance between the two countries. The Governments of the two countries decide to appoint experts to start negotiations on the substance and concrete arrangements of an agreement on judicial assistance between the two countries." End text.

7. I replied. As communications from his country to Mr. Wirin had indicated their intention of making a proposal of this kind, this matter has already been given careful consideration ~~of~~ my government. First let me point out that it is Mr. Wirin as the defense attorney for the defendents Powell who is seeking to obtain testimony in his country and not the U.S. Government and that the court was simply acting on Wirin's behalf. A passport has now been issued to Mr. Wirin for the purpose of taking the testimony he seeks on behalf of his clients. It is entirely up to the authorities of his country whether or not they desire to cooperate with Mr. Wirin in the collection of the evidence which he seeks. There is no responsibility of the U.S. Government in this regard. It is clearly not necessary to have a judicial assistance agreement such as he proposed to permit Wirin to take the testimony that he seeks. Countries commonly permit the taking of such testimony without intergovernmental agreements. I myself have often had experience in this regard. I was therefore authorized to inform him that the U.S. Government does not consider it possible to enter into such

agreement and does not consider such an agreement necessary for the taking of such testimony.

8. Wang replied. He considered the response made by me to this question as not satisfactory. No matter who is going there to take testimony, the case is not one of an individual applying to the Chinese Ministry of Justice, but it is the District Court of Northern California that has made the request to the Ministry of Justice. Clearly this court is an institution of the United States and cannot be anything else. The statement has been made by to the effect that an ~~ax~~ individual person may proceed to obtain testimony in a foreign country without the agreement of the government concerned. Such a statement cannot be regarded as correct. That statement does not conform even with the accords signed by the United States itself with foreign countries.

9. Wang continued. ~~Ix~~ He just would cite one case. At the 6th Inter-American Conference held in Havana in 1928 a Bustamante code was adopted at that conference at which the U.S. was represented. Article 388 of this code states that every judicial step which a country has to take in another country will be carried out by letters consular or letters rogatory submitted through diplomatic channels. If, as I said, the possibility of judicial assistance existed without the necessity of agreement between the governments concerned, then this article in the Bustamante code in which U.S. has associated itself

would appear to be irrelevant. Now the fundamental fact is that an institution of the U.S. has put forward such a request to his authorities and his authorities have expressed willingness to meet this request so that it can be handled by proper channels and procedures. Since I had made a remark that it was not necessary for governments to reach agreement on the handling of judicial assistance and if this is the considered opinion of the U.S. does this mean that the U.S. no longer seeks such judicial assistance. If so, the U.S. has reversed its position.

10. I replied. I happened to have had personally considerable experience in this field while serving as consular officer at various posts. It is up to each country to determine for itself whether it will permit the taking of testimony within its territory and under what circumstances it will permit the taking of such testimony. Letters rogatory are merely one form for taking of such testimony. There are many other forms. It is up to the country in which the testimony is to be taken to determine in what form it may be taken and the courts in the country where the testimony is to be used to determine the acceptability of that form. The 1928 Havana Convention which he cited certainly has not supported the statement that testimony cannot be taken in the absence of such agreement. It merely agrees that letters rogatory will be the form. In the absence of agreements, it is up to each country to decide for itself.

Mr. Wirin has been issued a passport at his request for the purpose of taking testimony in Wang's country. Whether Wang's government permits Wirin to do so and in what form it permits him to do so is entirely up to the decision of his authorities. It is not a matter in which the U.S. Government has responsibility.

11. Wang replied. There exist two forms of judicial assistance between two countries. One of the forms is to proceed in accordance with international practice. The other is to proceed not in accordance with international practice; one of the forms shows respect for the other country whereas the other form does not show such respect. One of the sides has requested judicial assistance from the other while at the same time it is not going to follow international practice in this regard. This cannot be considered as showing respect for another country. Suppose an official institution in China approaches a court of the U.S. Government. ~~xx~~ He would presume the U.S. Government would not agree to this procedure. His side has already made clear that they are ready and willing to consider the request made by the American court. But this matter must be handled and settled in accordance with proper procedures in this respect. Since I had made it clear that the U.S. will not consider entering into an agreement to cooperate on this matter, it appears that on the one hand the U.S. has made the request while on the other it refuses the acceptance of this request and its satisfaction. He much regretted the failure to reach an agreement on a matter

on which his authorities were first approached by an American institution. It would appear that the U.S. Government has made up its mind not to ~~xxxxxxx~~ resolve any issues between our two countries. He cannot but express regret and dissatisfaction. He wants to make clear that they will take steps to make known their position in this matter.

12. Wang continued. I had just informed him of my transfer to a new post. He recalled that the present series of talks between us was started by the two of us and at one time was carried on by the Consuls General of our two governments in Geneva. Then, on the initiative of the U.S., the consular contacts were elevated to the present level of Ambassadors. He regretted that he had not been able to accomplish the tasks and hopes entrusted to us by our peoples and governments. One thing on which he wanted to be clear following my transfer was whether my government is going to change nature talks at Ambassadorial rank.

13. I replied. There is no intent to change the nature of these talks. As I told him it is the desire of my government that they continue. However, compelling reasons do not make it possible for us to designate a person of Ambassadorial rank at this time for this purpose. As he knows, Mr. Martin is a senior and experienced officer of our foreign service who as he knew, except for a brief interval, has been connected with these talks from the beginning. He has the full confidence of

the U.S. Government and it is the opinion of the U.S. Government that he is best able to carry them on at this time.

14. Wang replied. The purpose of his asking the question was to clarify the nature of the talks and not an expression of opinion on any individual person. With regard to my information he was not in a position to make a reply but he had to report back to his government. He will consult with his government and when any reply was received he would let me know.

15. I suggested that Mr. Lai or Mr. Chiu could address a letter to Mr. Martin at the Consulate General here. I added that Mr. Martin is authorized to agree to a time and place for the next meeting.

16. Wang replied that in any event he will communicate to me the opinion of his government about arrangements for the next step.

17. I commented that it might delay this as I might be leaving shortly.

18. Wang replied that they could communicate with me via Mr. Martin.

19. I stated that at the close of the meeting I was no longer the U.S. representative but that it was all right to address the letter to me IF HE DESIRED as long as Mr. Martin gets it.

20. Wang replied that the important thing is that arrangements for these talks to continue is a matter to be decided by two not one party.

21. I stated that I WAS NOT ARGUING THAT POINT [there was no argument] but that Martin is

our channel.

22. Wang replied. He wanted to make it clear that he was not expressing an opinion on a person but that these talks at Ambassadorial rank had been raised from consular rank and were known as Ambassadorial talks. Of course he welcomed Mr. Martin's designation, but as he understood it, Mr. Martin had not been given the rank of Ambassador. In this respect it involves a change in their nature and thus the talks cannot be considered as Ambassadorial talks. Again he wanted to state it does not involve any personal opinion against Mr. Martin. He personally appreciates Mr. Martin's ability and Mr. Martin certainly enjoys the U.S. Government's confidence. ~~23x~~ Mr. Martin is well informed on our problems.

23. Wang continued that he wanted further clarification. We began with Ambassadors who had their advisers. Each team was headed by an Ambassador. Now that I was being transferred and Mr. Martin designated, the talks cannot be considered as Ambassadorial but between advisers.

24. I asked whether we needed to raise the problem. The talks were being continued between the representatives of the two governments. As I told him previously, it was not possible to designate an Ambassador at this time.

25. Wang replied. He recalled that our association began in 1954. I would recall that after the talks between us were instituted I was unable to continue. I agreed to designate an administrative

officer to continue the contact. As I was aware the talks were on the same level. If there is any change in the level, it involves a change in the nature of talks and the nature of the problems to be settled will be influenced. The nature or rank of diplomatic negotiations has a bearing on their ability to resolve problems in negotiations. For instance, matters handled at the supreme level between heads of government cannot be handled by foreign ministers.

26. I stated that I thought it was up to each government as to the authority and competence it gives to each representative. Mr. Martin will be diplomatic representative.

27. ~~He~~ Wang replied that he had to consult his government on this matter and would give a reply when he had been informed.

28. I stated that the reply, however, should be addressed to Mr. Martin at the Consulate. I added that there was the matter of a press announcement. If we could give a date, there would be less press speculation. We could give a date without discussing the level. I would suggest "Representatives of the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China will meet on January 9th". That is four weeks from today. If for any reason there is a change, that could subsequently be announced.

29. Wang replied, should we make announcement along this line, "Ambassador Johnson has been given a new appointment. For this reason the present talks between the two countries are suspended. The procedure for the future talks will subsequently be agreed

be agreed between the two sides".

30. I stated that that presented a personal difficulty for me. He was the first to be told of my transfer. I had not yet informed the Czechoslovak Government. I would prefer that a statement on the future of the talks ~~wxxx~~ be made. What I had in mind was: "Ambassadors U. Alexis Johnson and Wang Ping-nan held their 73rd meeting today. They stated an announcement would subsequently be made as to the date of the next meeting."

~~32x~~ 31. When Wang appeared to demur at ~~xjxx~~ this, I suggested the substitution of ~~xx~~ "concerning" for "as to the date of".

32. Wang agreed.

U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

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UNITED STATES RESIDENT DELEGATION
AND CONSULATE GENERAL
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
12/19/57
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

December 12, 1957

Letter No. 62

Lot 72 D 415

Dear Ralph:

This is my final letter from the Geneva Ambassadorial talks. I cannot say that from a personal standpoint I am sad as the last year, in particular, has been very sterile. However, I am sad that more has not been accomplished.

As far as the future is concerned I feel that we may well be in for a long hiatus with their reply being that they stand ready to resume the talks at any time we appoint an Ambassador, but that they see no purpose in meetings at a lower level. Frankly, I do not feel that they will feel any pressure to take action along the lines of releasing additional prisoners to persuade us to resume at the Ambassadorial level. I think that their line will be that the sterility of our talks is an argument for the Foreign Minister level meeting rather than for reducing the level below Ambassadors.

You, of course, know that they are extremely sensitive on the subject of corresponding levels and we can be sure that even if they do agree to resume with Martin they will be very careful also to appoint a First Secretary, to correspond with Ed's rank in London. This will, in fact, mean that their man will be considerably below Ed in competence and authority as Ed would normally be a Counselor in any post but one such as London. Thus any meetings Ed may have will be on an even more routine level than those I have been having. I think, for example, that they will refuse even to enter into any discussion whatever of matters such as renunciation of force. This

was

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

was foreshadowed by Wang's remarks today.

In any event it was clear that at today's meeting Martin's appointment was an eventuality for which they were in no way prepared. My main satisfaction from the meeting was that for the first time in two years I had the initiative with him.

I am sorry about the mix-up on the press guidance telegrams. When I received 557 I thought that was all there was and that I had better get our lines clear on press matters. Late that evening we received 556, long after I had sent out my message to you. It turned out 556 had been badly garbled in transmission and that they had been working all day to clear it. The press here are very unhappy with me but I am sticking to the line of no comment. Of course, with the upcoming NATO meeting in Paris and all the other news I don't think that the matter is going to make a very big splash any place.

I felt a little bit at a loss to expand on the theme of why a judicial assistance agreement was "impossible and unnecessary" and hope that I did not say any of the wrong things. I was also somewhat at a loss to handle his emphasis on a U.S. Court having communicated with the PRC and tried to shift it back to the subject of Wirin.

As a final note, my thanks and appreciation to you, Dave and the others in CA who have borne the brunt of the work of giving me such excellent backstopping. Give Walter Robertson my best and say that I am looking forward to seeing him soon.

Now signing off from Geneva.

Sincerely,

Alex

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. We have arranged with the Consulate here promptly to telegraph to Ed and the Department anything the Chicoms send over. Ed will write you directly about the future administrative matters mentioned in your last letter to me. Incidentally, Ekvall has never got paid for that trip from France to here last summer. Can we not see that he gets paid before he leaves?

PPS. I keep thinking of things. When I came here I was given $300 (Frs. 1285.50) to be used for representation and any other such purposes. This amount of francs was simply given to me through the Consulate disbursing officer and it is my understanding that they required no accounting. There are Frs. 750.- remaining. Rather than returning them with perhaps the necessity of again requesting some such fund I am turning them over to Ed and if he doesn't use them he can turn them over to an Ambassador if one is again appointed. I have taken a receipt from Ed, of which I am enclosing a copy. If the Department wants anything else done with them he will, of course, do whatever he is instructed.

RECEIPT

American Consulate General
Geneva, Switzerland

December 12, 1957

Received from U. Alexis Johnson the sum of Swiss Francs 750.- representing official special funds of the United States Government for disbursement for approved official purposes.

Edwin W. Martin

856

Lot 72 D 415

December 12, 1957

Dear General Moorman:

It now appears that today may well be the last meeting at which Lt. Col. Robert B. Ekvall will serve as interpreter for my talks with the Chinese Communists. Therefore, I desire to take advantage of this opportunity again to express to you and to the United States Army my most sincere appreciation for your courtesy and cooperation in making Col. Ekvall available for this long and arduous duty, as well as again to express my high opinion of Col. Ekvall. I have most highly valued him not only as an exceptionally able interpreter but also for his advice on substantive matters. He has a keen and accurate sense of probable Chinese Communist reactions and of their psychology which has been very helpful to me. I greatly regret that he is required to retire from the Army and will thus no longer be available for this duty.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

Copy to:

Dept. of State

Brigadier General F. M. Moorman,
United States Army Attaché,
American Embassy,
58 bis, rue de Boetie,
Paris, France.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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American Embassy,
London W.1, England.
December 16, 1957

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ralph:

An idea has occurred to me which I am sure has undoubtedly occurred to you or Dave now that the "Johnson-Wang talks" have come to an end after seventy-three meetings and almost 2½ years. This idea is that some sort of official recognition or award should be given Alex Johnson for a diplomatic feat which, if not unique in history, is hard to parallel in the annals of our country's diplomacy. The fact that Alex was holding down a Chief of Mission job which had nothing to do with the negotiations at Geneva makes his accomplishment the more noteworthy. The treking back and forth from Prague to Geneva with all its attendant unsettling effects (which I have begun to appreciate having now done six months' commuting from London to Geneva)also increased the difficulties of his more than ordinarily tough negotiating assignment.

Of course I don't need to describe to you the merits of this particular case. I do feel, however, that some sort of an award or other recognition is not only highly merited by Alex, but would be the kind of thing which would boost esprit in the Service at large.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Lot 72 D 415

CONFIDENTIAL

858

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OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Declassified for Publication in Foreign Relations of the United States

Lot 72 D 415

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy,
London W.1, England.
December 17, 1957

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ralph:

We should probably wait to see what response comes from Peiping on our latest move before deciding the question of "advisers" which I raised in my last letter, and which you mentioned in your last letter to Alex. Nevertheless, I will give you my preliminary thinking, since I discussed it with Alex and he goes along with it.

In the event that the Chicoms agree to continue the talks with me as the United States representative, I think they will do so only on the basis of "equality," meaning that they will appoint a person of First Secretary rank to meet with me. As Wang made it clear in his reaction last Thursday to our proposal (and as one would expect on the basis of Chicom behaviour in general), any talks conducted on a First Secretary level will be routine in the extreme. I can't imagine the Communists being willing to discuss any policy question (e.g. renunciation of force) at that level; the best we could expect to get out of such talks would be information as to prisoners and welfare, etc. and precious little of that. In these circumstances, I would certainly question the need of an "adviser" of the caliber and rank of Dave Popper or Bob Rinden. Moreover, I feel (as does Alex) that assignment of Dave Popper would put an undue strain on the Consulate General at Geneva.

/Thus, if the

Ralph N. Clough, Esquire,
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Thus, if the Communists do agree to go on with the talks with me and appoint someone of my level to carry this task out, I feel that, at least for the first meeting, I might simply take Cameron LaClair with me to shuffle documents and Sue Gross for the purpose of keeping the record, and Dexter for interpreting---as well as Ekvall, if the meeting is held in time. Alex agrees that the present system of having LaClair take what approaches a verbatim transcript is a rather inefficient hangover from the original idea of keeping the talks on an informal basis, and there is no reason why Sue shouldn't do it.

We were sorry not to have Dexter at the last meeting, since it appears unlikely there will be another in which he can overlap with Bob Ekvall. Bob will be available only until January 15. However, he should have his present travel orders extended in case we do have a meeting before then.

Sincerely,

Ed

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

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book.

Outgoing

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December 23, 1957

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Letter No. 1

Dear Ed:

With Alex's departure as the American protagonist in the Geneva discussions, I decided it would only be fitting to start a new letter series of which this is No. 1.

Judging from the length of time it is taking Peiping to reply to our proposal to shift the talks down from the ambassadorial level, we must have presented them with a difficult decision. They may react in one of three possible ways: (1) break off the talks entirely with a violent blast at us; (2) inform us they desire to continue the talks but only when we appoint an ambassador to meet with them or (3) agree to continue the meetings as proposed by us. The first alternative I consider very unlikely. The second however is quite possible and appears to be Alex's choice as the most probable. We have prepared a draft press release for use in this eventuality and I enclose a copy. I should appreciate any comments or changes you may suggest. As you will see, the purpose of the release is to imply that the downgrading of the talks resulted from our dissatisfaction with the Chinese Communist response to our initiatives in the talks. At the same time we want to make clear that we are not breaking off the talks. That we have appointed an experienced officer to continue them and by not explicitly relating our action to failure of the Chinese Communists to do what we want them to, we leave the way open to appoint an ambassador whenever we consider it desirable to do so.

It is possible that the Chinese Communists may accept our proposal and appoint someone to meet with you. It seems to me that the likelihood of this happening diminishes as time passes without a response from Peiping.

It is probably premature as you suggest in your letter of December 17 to decide the adviser question until we know what the Chinese Communist response is. If you feel that you could manage with Cameron LaClair and Sue Gross that would of course simplify matters

Edwin W. Martin, Esquire,
First Secretary,
American Embassy,
London.

Lot 72 D 415

administratively. I suppose it is true that at a lower than ambassadorial level, the Communists statements at the meetings are likely to be even more routine and predictable than they have been in the past.

Orders are being written for Dexter to leave for Geneva the first week in January. We hope by that time to know what Peiping intends to do. It would be very awkward to have spent a year and a half training Dexter as a Chinese interpreter just to have him assigned to Geneva as a general service officer with no interpreting to do. We had such a difficult time working out some way of assigning him to Geneva that we are reluctant to suggest delay at this point for fear the arrangement might break down.

I agree entirely with your suggestion that some sort of official recognition be extended to Alex for the unique contribution he has made at Geneva to our diplomacy. I discussed the matter with Sam Gilstrap of FE/EX who suggested a letter of commendation from the Secretary to be followed by a recommendation to the Awards Committee for a superior service award.

Whether or not the Chinese Communists decide to appoint someone to continue the Geneva talks with you, I am sure you will be pleased to know that Mr. Robertson has great confidence in your ability to carry on the discussions, and it was he who recommended to the Secretary that you be selected for the job.

With best wishes for a happy New Year to you and EmmaRose and the children,

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure:

Draft press release

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

At the meeting in Geneva with the Chinese Communist representative on December 12, Ambassador Johnson informed him that he was being transferred and that the United States Government had designated his assistant, Mr. Edwin W. Martin, a senior Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in London, as the United States representative in the talks. Mr. Martin is a Chinese language and area specialist with sixteen years' service, who was a member of Ambassador Dean's staff in the negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Korea in 1953-54. He took part in the conversations with the Chinese Communists in Geneva in 1954 concerning the Americans imprisoned in Communist China and was Ambassador Johnson's advisor at the outset of the ambassadorial talks which began in Geneva, August 1, 1955. He has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State and has acted as Ambassador Johnson's assistant at the meetings in Geneva since July, 1957.

The Chinese Communists have announced that they are unwilling to continue the talks except at the ambassadorial level. The United States is not prepared at this time to designate an ambassador for this purpose. However, it should be emphasized that the United States is not breaking off the talks. Mr. Martin will meet with a Chinese Communist representative at any mutually agreeable time.

The ambassadorial level talks at Geneva convened on August 1, 1955, with the mission of settling, first, the question of the return of civilians desiring to do so. What seemed to be a satisfactory solution was reached on September 10, 1955, when the Chinese Communists publicly announced that they would take appropriate measures to permit Americans desiring to do so to return "expeditiously" to the United States. Now, nearly two and a half years later, six Americans are still held by the Chinese Communists. The next question the two Ambassadors took up was the matter of a mutual renunciation of force. The Chinese Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, refused to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self defense and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area. For the past year and a half, the Chinese Communists have refused even to enter into a substantive discussion looking toward a meaningful declaration of the renunciation of force. The American Ambassador has also repeatedly attempted to obtain from the Chinese Communist representative an accounting for the United States military personnel missing and unaccounted for from the Korean hostilities, as well as any other American personnel missing in or near Chinese Communist territory of whom the Communists have any knowledge. The Chinese Communist representative has not only refused to provide such an accounting, but has rejected this matter as a subject for discussion in these talks, insisting merely that his authorities are not now holding any American military personnel.

FE:CA:RNClough/ilb

12/20/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


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
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

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